PATTERNS OF POWER

British Transjordan

The Complete Study

1915 — 1921 — 1946 — 1957

Thomas J. Bryan

with Claude (Anthropic)

Held as tested, not revealed.

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PATTERNS OF POWER · BRITISH TRANSJORDAN — FRONT MATTER

PREFACE AND OUTLINE

> *Front matter · how this study was made, the disciplines it holds itself to, and a map of its fourteen parts*

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

The collaboration

This is a case study in the Patterns of Power series, applying the series' framework to British Transjordan, from the wartime promises that raised the Hashemites in 1915 to the emirate improvised at Cairo in 1921, and on through independence in 1946 to the termination of the British connection in 1957, with the annexation, the assassination, and the deferred bill of the buffer as its coda. The framework is a lens for reading how any order of power is founded, dressed, and held: the floor of force beneath every order, the robe of doctrine laid over the floor to make the force cheap, the settlement that divides the spoils, the cost column in which each subject prices defection, the seam that manages the belief on which the whole depends, the default by which an elite coordinates without instruction, and — running through all of it — position logic, the proposition that rulers in like positions converge on like solutions because a position poses a problem with only a few good answers.

Transjordan was chosen because it is a control case, and one the series had earned the right to run. The study of British Iraq had isolated the imported chair — the conquest that finds no seat it can take and fetches one from outside — and had found that build to be the most brittle on the menu, ending in a Baghdad courtyard in 1958. But Iraq could not by itself say *which* of its features had done the damage, because it carried two candidate variables at once: a point-resource that made the state a prize worth seizing, and a welded fracture of Sunni, Shia, and Kurd that no formation could close. Transjordan removes both and holds everything else constant. The same imperial power, in the same month, in the same room at the Semiramis Hotel, by the same men, set the same family's other son over a Class-A mandate on the same Sharifian principle — and this time over a thin, poor, overwhelmingly Sunni Arab population with nothing under the ground worth the digging. One brother's

dynasty was machine-gunned. The other's is on its throne today. That is as close to a controlled experiment as the historical record offers, and this study exists to read it.

The study was built the way the series is built, one module at a time. The author brought the framework, its spine, and the case, and held the collaboration to its disciplines — insisting that the seed material was scaffolding and not a cage, that the framework is a lens on tendencies and never a law, and that the research and not the outline should dictate the study. He brought, at two of the sharpest turns, the analytic core of the modules themselves: the specification of *the default* as a question about incentive alignment at every link of a hierarchy — whether a man defending his own position thereby defends the whole arrangement, from metropolitan treasury to colonial administrator to merchant to shaykh — which reorganised Module 8 around a link-by-link audit rather than a description of who ruled; and the insistence, governing Module 10, that a functioning state apparatus is never overthrown by the common man, so that change must be traced to elite chaos — factional split, rival elite intervention, or fiscal and military exhaustion — and to whatever repriced the holding for the power that held it. Claude, Anthropic's model, did the research — verifying every load-bearing quotation, date, and figure by web search against a source reproducing the primary text before any module was written — and produced the drafts, applying the framework module by module, each presented and confirmed before the next was begun. The framework's concepts are the series'; the Transjordanian application, and the refinements it yielded, are the work of the collaboration.

Its engine throughout is the method of information asymmetry. The study exists to show the gap between what was said at the metropole and what was done in the colony, and it works by setting the exact public words beside the exact words of the ground: McMahon's pledge of October 1915 that Britain was "prepared to recognize and support the independence of the Arabs in all the regions within the limits demanded by the Sherif of Mecca," beside the exclusion drawn west of "the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo" — and the fact that the land east of the Jordan lay inside the promised area by that letter's own geography; the Covenant's "sacred trust of civilisation" and its "peoples not yet able to stand by themselves," beside Article 25 of the mandate empowering the mandatory "to postpone or withhold application of such provisions of this mandate as he may consider inapplicable to the existing local conditions"; the 1928 treaty's recognition of "an independent Government in Trans-Jordan," beside its twenty-one articles of control, its requirement that the Amir be "guided by the advice" of Britain, its provision that the supervised state pay the salary of its supervisor, and its final stipulation that where the Arabic and English texts diverge "the English text shall prevail"; the League resolution that

switched off the Jewish national home clauses east of the river while leaving in force the Mandatory's responsibility for "the development of self-governing institutions," beside a Legislative Council dissolved the one time it declined to pass the budget annex; an American Secretary of State cabling that an oil company wished to pay the Emir a transit tax and that the Colonial Office "is opposed to payment of such a tax and ... is reported so to have advised Emir"; and the commander of the King's army telling an American diplomat that, as to whether that army would march, "Abdullah not only one who would have say in matter." It lays out the arithmetic and leaves the sum to the reader. It does not preach the conclusion.

The study went in holding a premise about its own subject, and the sources sharpened it twice. The premise was that poverty explained the survival — that a state with nothing to steal is a state nobody bothers to seize. The evidence turned that intuition into a mechanism and, in doing so, corrected it: poor states are overthrown constantly, and what protected this one was not poverty as such but the particular form its solvency took. A rent is attached to the ground and transfers to whoever takes the wellhead; a subsidy is attached to a person the payer chooses, so that seizing Amman meant inheriting a bankruptcy. Rents are seizable and subsidies are not — and the same property that made the throne unseizable also made the client portable, which is why, when the metropole's will emptied, the order was not overthrown but re-sponsored. The second sharpening was smaller and more chastening. The study expected a floor that recruited its own base from the founding; the record showed a floor that began as a leash — a settled gendarmerie, four-fifths Circassian and Chechen at the outset, raised to police the Arab tribes — and became a bond only in February 1931, with twenty men and four trucks, when one officer decided to enlist the raiders instead of hunting them. Where a figure could not be run to ground it is given as a range with its claimants named, most of all the casualties of September 1970, which the record gives as anywhere between roughly three and a half thousand and figures several times that depending entirely on who did the counting.

The disciplines

Five rules govern every module.

Quotation. Public-domain primary sources — the Covenant, the mandate and its memoranda, treaties, parliamentary records, diplomatic despatches, the words of the men who ran the order — are quoted exactly, at the length the argument needs, because in an order held together by legal fictions the precise wording is the evidence and not its decoration. Modern copyrighted scholarship is paraphrased, briefly, and credited.

No fabrication. No quotation, date, attribution, or figure is ever invented or reconstructed from memory. What cannot be verified against a source reproducing the primary text is dropped or flagged, never guessed. Where no clean public-domain text of an instrument was found — the Organic Law of 1928, the electoral law, the Law of Tribal Courts — the instrument is described from the scholarly record and not quoted, and the module says so. Contested figures are given as ranges with each claimant named and none of them crowned.

Gravity without partisanship. Suffering is held with gravity, and the study refuses both flattery and demonisation. It writes from the top of the order, where the men who ran it actually stood, and takes their professions of trusteeship with the grain of salt they took them with — asking not whether the story was sincere but what it was for and whether the machine's spending changed. Legibility is not pardon: to explain an order's logic, even to credit its competence, is never to excuse it. Where the study touches the most contested material in the region's history — the Hashemite contacts with the Jewish Agency, the annexation of 1950, the events of 1970 — it states the structure the record supports, flags the historiographical disputes as unresolved, and takes no side.

Contribution. Every module returns a refinement to the framework, stated plainly in its closing section, rather than merely applying the framework to the case. The discipline is one spine and its confirmations, not a manufactured new law each chapter; where the evidence refused a finding, the study says so and leaves the finding resting on the case that carried it.

Held as tested, not revealed. The pattern is treated as something discovered and tested against the evidence, not handed down as doctrine — a lens laid over the record, a tendency and never a law.

What British Transjordan added to the framework

Because this study is the series' control case for the imported chair, it was able to isolate which features of that build do the damage and which do the holding, and to name a colonial type the corpus had not carried. Chief among its contributions: that there exists a distinct kind of colony, the **buffer** or **positional** colony, held for where it sits rather than what it yields, whose ledger runs backward — the sponsor subsidising the colony rather than drawing from it — and whose returns arrive not as an income stream but as a contingent payout at a moment of crisis, so that the accounting the metropole uses to judge it systematically misprices it until the year it does not; that in such a colony **cheapness and**

consent are the same policy, every device that made the order inexpensive having also made it sit lightly on the governed, which forces the conclusion that the gentleness was real and was not chosen for the governed's sake; that **importation and illegitimacy are separate variables**, an imported apex carrying a portable robe his sponsor neither wrote nor owned — here Sharifian descent and service in the Arab Revolt — being able to root where a forged chieftaincy cannot; that a floor may **recruit its own base**, a third condition beside the surveillance of an unbelieved order and the withdrawn force of a believed one, in which belief is manufactured out of engineered self-interest and a wage hardens into loyalty across two generations; that formation may be neither imposed nor withheld but **licensed**, the state constituting the old law as a delegated jurisdiction and inserting itself only at the approval of its judges, so that nothing visible changes and the location of sovereignty moves; that withholding formation **is** an information technology operating on a delay, the unbuilt school of 1925 becoming the unsustainable press of the 1930s and then the literacy qualification for the franchise, each exclusion appearing to follow from a natural condition rather than from a decision taken twenty years earlier in an education estimate; that the seam may be held open not by concealment but by **indifference**, which is cheaper and cannot be breached by disclosure, so that the absence of suppression records is evidence of an order nobody was watching rather than of an order with nothing to hide; that an imported apex occupies a **third position** in the seam and runs two information asymmetries at once, against his sponsor as well as his subjects, which is much of what makes such a chair survivable and exactly what destroys it when the two audiences meet; that a representative institution may be a **foreclosure device** rather than a plurality device, the test being not what powers it holds but where its members go afterwards, and that foreclosure by architecture is more durable than foreclosure by repression because it generates careers instead of martyrs; that the extraction of a surplus-poor colony takes the form of **adjacency** — land, transit, and labour contributed to an extractive economy sited across a border drawn by the same hand that grants the concessions — and, more deeply, of the deliberate maintenance of the client's **inability to earn independently**, so that in a net-cost colony the metropole's generosity and its dominance are the same act; that the **grim accounting of a cheap colony must be conducted in omissions**, since every instrument the framework possesses is built to register commissions and will return a null result where the harm is a school unbuilt and a capital never invested; and, largest of all and answering the question the corpus turns on, that **rents are seizable and subsidies are not** — that the resource which looks like a state's greatest asset is, for the durability of its regime, a standing liability, while the sponsor's cheque that looks like humiliating dependence is armour; that the same

property makes the client portable, so that a subsidised order collapses only if the subsidy cannot be re-sourced; and that the moment of maximum danger is therefore not the loss of the patron but the **interval between patrons**, when the calculation that makes a coup unprofitable is briefly unavailable.

The arc

A landscape opening and twelve modules, each with a framework function and its own evocative title.

Landscape — the two orders on the eve. *A Place to Put a Prince.* A periphery of every empire and the centre of none, its recursion thirteen centuries deep, thin but not empty and holding no seizable apex; met by a war-exhausted Britain that wanted a cheap buffer and had a defeated Hashemite family, raised for the Revolt and then failed, that it needed somewhere to put.

1 — The Floor of Force. *The Last Raid.* Not the bomber but the Legion: a settled gendarmerie raised to police the tribes and break the risings at Kura and in the Balqa, which became under one officer a force that enlisted the raiders it had been built to suppress — the leash that turned into a bond, and the coercion the romance covers.

2 — The Settlement. *Their Claim to British Gold.* A settlement with no spoils to divide, which therefore manufactured the categories through which an imported wealth could be shared out: a provisional throne that stayed, a resented layer of Syrian administrators, shaykhs bought with registered title and rank, and a cadastral survey that reached into every village and re-founded property itself.

3 — The Robe. *The English Text Shall Prevail.* A sacred trust performed annually before a tribunal that could question and not compel; an "independent Government" defined by twenty-one articles of control; a statute empowering the mandatory to withhold whichever promises he judged inapplicable; and beneath all of it the one legitimating story that reached the governed, which the conqueror did not write and could not have written.

4 — Formation. *Four in the First Class.* A country whose only secondary school graduated four boys in its first year and three in its second; teachers imported from Palestine and Syria who carried a creed the state had not commissioned; an old law the state licensed rather than replaced; and a regiment that turned out to be the most effective school in the country.

5 — The Cost Column. *The Middle Eastern Services Vote.* The ledger that runs backward — ninety-two thousand pounds against Iraq's tens of millions, roughly one per cent of the colony next door — what the cheapness was made of, and the single year in which the whole insurance premium was repaid.

6 — Extraction. *A Reasonable Transit Tax.* What is taken from a place with nothing to take: a tithe on a thin harvest, a customs frontier that ran through another territory's ports, the one mineral prize sited on the far bank by a border drawn with it in mind, and the moment the protecting power advised its client to refuse money.

7 — Information and Suppression. *Officially Denied.* A seam that ran the wrong way: a metropole that was never deceived because it was never curious, a public sphere too small to require censorship, and a prince who kept one set of books with his sponsor and another with his subjects.

8 — Elite Coordination and the Default. *Not the Only One Who Would Have Say.* The hierarchy audited link by link for whether each man's self-defence defends the whole; why the one asset that cannot be seized is a cheque; why the officers best placed to take the state were categorically ineligible to rule it; and where in the chain the alignment failed, which was at the top.

9 — Plurality or Foreclosure. *The Budget Annex.* A chamber in which the government held seven of twenty-three votes, a franchise that excluded almost everyone, an opposition that organised five times and was neither crushed nor answered but absorbed — and the single occasion on which a parliament used its one real power and was dissolved for it.

10 — Change and Collapse. *Terminated by Mutual Agreement.* How the holding was repriced from ninety-two thousand pounds to twelve million while every reason for holding it expired; how the apex destroyed his own best protection by annexation; how the fuse laid in the officer corps burned down on schedule; and how an order that could not be seized was instead sold to a new buyer.

11 — The Grim Accounting. *The Raid That Did Not Come.* A founding whose dead can be counted in the low hundreds, a security that was real and fell first on the weakest, a twelve-year drought met with seed loans and no capital — and a colony whose deepest harms were things that were never done.

12 — Convergence and Divergence. *A Hundred Years of the Provisional.* What the case confirms and what it breaks; the machine completing one full turn as an improvisation of

1921 becomes the furniture of reality; and the strongest defence of a colonial order this collection has had to answer, stated at full power and answered without flinching.

A note on sources. This front matter is descriptive and makes no primary-source claims of its own; every factual assertion about the case is established, with its sources and its flags, in the module it summarises. The framework it describes is the series'; the disciplines it lists are the ones the modules hold themselves to and document in their own closing notes. The reader who wishes to test this study should begin with those notes, which are written to make that testing possible — including where it would embarrass the argument.

Part of the collection Patterns of Power. *Tested, never revealed.*

PATTERNS OF POWER · BRITISH TRANSJORDAN — OPENING LANDSCAPE

A PLACE TO PUT A PRINCE

> *The ground before the emirate — a thin tribal periphery east of the Jordan set against a war-exhausted Britain that wanted a cheap buffer and had a spare Hashemite to place; and the one variable, present next door and absent here, that would send two brothers' thrones to opposite fates*

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The same room, the same month, the same family

The decision that made Transjordan was taken in Cairo in March 1921, at the Semiramis Hotel, by Winston Churchill — three months into his tenure as Colonial Secretary — and the clutch of Middle East hands his new department had gathered to settle the shape of Britain's mandates in a single conference. In the same room, in the same weeks, the same men resolved two questions with one answer. Iraq, three welded Ottoman provinces, would be given to Faisal, the third son of the Sharif of Mecca. The land east of the river Jordan, a strip of desert and upland with no state and barely a name, would be given to Faisal's elder brother Abdullah. It was one policy — later called the Sharifian solution — and it did the same thing twice: it set an imported Hashemite prince, a Hejazi from the Arabian west with no local base, over a Class-A League of Nations mandate, and paid for him with British money.

The two decisions were siblings, and their outcomes were opposites. Under Iraq lay oil, and Iraq's imported monarchy was machine-gunned out of existence in a Baghdad courtyard in 1958, thirty-seven years after the room in Cairo dispersed. Under the land east of the Jordan lay nothing anyone had found worth the digging, and the monarchy set over it is still on its throne today. That is the fact this study exists to explain, and it is not that one brother was wiser than the other. It is that the two were given, in the same month by the same hands, two entirely different things — and the difference is most of what follows. The landscape's task is to stand on the ground before either throne was laid, and see plainly what was there and what was not.

Why a colonial case is read from two landscapes at once

Every study in this collection begins by reconstructing the order a conquest fell upon — who held the floor of force, how the wealth was settled, what story the people had been formed to hold rightful — so that the conquest reads as an act against a real prior world rather than upon empty scenery. A colonial case doubles the requirement, because the conqueror answers to an audience the conquered will never see: in an ordinary order the floor and the legitimating story sit over one population, but in a colony they come apart by distance, the floor operating on the ground taken while the belief that funds and mans the taking is cut for the people back home. Two landscapes must therefore be reconstructed — the land invaded and the power that invaded it.

This case bends even that colonial shape, and the bend should be named at the outset because everything downstream turns on it. Transjordan was not taken to draw a surplus out of. It offered no surplus to draw. It was taken for where it sat on the map, and paid for out of the Treasury in London — so the first thing to reconstruct is not what the conqueror wanted *from* the ground, but why he wanted the ground *held* at all, when it gave him nothing to want. The answer to that question is the whole of the case, and it begins with a piece of ground that had been ruled by everyone and had ruled nothing.

A periphery of every empire, and the centre of none

The land east of the Jordan is one of the oldest inhabited corridors on earth and had almost never been a seat of power. In the Iron Age the citadel of Amman was Rabbath-Ammon, capital of the small Ammonite kingdom; in the Hellenistic centuries it passed under the Ptolemies and Seleucids, who left palaces like the one at Iraq al-Amir; renamed Philadelphia, it became one of the Decapolis cities strung along the Roman empire's desert edge after Rome annexed the region as the Provincia Arabia in 106. Byzantine bishoprics and mosaic floors followed; then the Muslim armies broke the Byzantines at the Yarmuk in 636 and the corridor passed to the caliphs, whose Umayyad successors built their hunting-palaces — the desert *qusayr* — out in its steppe. The Crusaders raised a great castle at Karak; Saladin took it back in 1187; the Mamluks garrisoned the pilgrim road that ran through to the Holy Cities; and from 1516 the Ottomans held it for four centuries, not as a province in its own right but as a cluster of peripheral districts of the vilayet of Damascus, a passage the Hajj crossed on its way south.

Late in that long Ottoman tenure two things thickened the corridor, and both are visible in the ground the mandate inherited. From 1878 the Ottoman state resettled Circassian and Chechen refugees — Muslims driven from the Caucasus by the wars and expulsions of tsarist Russia — onto its under-used land east of the Jordan, and they refounded a scatter of villages, among them the long-abandoned ruin of Roman Philadelphia, which they made once more into a town: Amman, the future capital, was on the eve of the mandate a refugee settlement among Roman stones, some four centuries emptied and freshly repopulated by people fleeing an ethnic cleansing a thousand miles to the north. And from the turn of the century the Hejaz Railway ran south from Damascus through Amman — reached about 1903–04 — toward Medina, opened in 1908, laying an iron spine of pilgrims and soldiers down the same desert the caravans had always used. This is the recursion the framework asks the reader to hold: not empty land, but a naturalised periphery, every stratum of it a former conquest that had long since become simply the way the world was — and, decisively for what comes next, a periphery with no seat of its own. It had a Roman past and an Umayyad past and an Ottoman present, and it had never once been the place from which any of them ruled.

Thin, but not empty

On the eve of the mandate perhaps a quarter of a million people lived east of the river — the early-1920s estimates run from about two hundred thousand to two hundred and thirty thousand, and the record disagrees enough that the figure should be held as a range. Roughly a fifth of them lived in a handful of small Sunni towns — Salt, Karak, Irbid, Madaba — each with its own notable families; the rest were villagers and pastoralists, split almost evenly between the settled cultivation of the uplands and the tents of the steppe, something on the order of a half sedentary and a half nomadic. The great tribal confederations — the Bani Sakhr under their paramount shaykh Mithqal al-Fayez, the Huwaytat, the ʿAdwan, the Bani Hasan and others — held the desert and its margins by their own customary law, their own lineage reckoning, and the old economy of grazing and the raid, and had spent the last Ottoman decades playing weak regimes against one another to widen their autonomy. The land was, by the standards of its region, strikingly homogeneous: overwhelmingly Sunni Arab, with a Christian minority of about a tenth — Greek Orthodox, Greek and Roman Catholic — clustered in Karak and Salt, and the Circassian towns beside them; and the only deep cleavage running through it was not sect but mode of life, the settled against the nomad.

This is the exact inverse of the ground the same men were bolting together into Iraq next door, where a Sunni-Arab minority, a Shia-Arab majority, and a Kurdish north were being welded into one state along fault lines that would never fuse. Here the newcomer would meet no ancient clerical apex commanding the majority's belief — no Najaf, no *marja'iyya*, no rival throne — and no large fracture to police; the furniture of reality was sparse, and a sparse room is easier to move into. The thinness was real and so was its opposite: when the Ottoman order dissolved after 1918 the land governed itself, for two years, in pieces. A scatter of short-lived local "governments" formed in the vacuum — at Irbid and in the Ajlun hills, at Jerash, at Salt in the Balqa, at Karak and in Moab and Tafila in the south — town and tribal notables collecting rough taxes and keeping their own order under a light British advisory hand reaching over from Jerusalem. Thin is not empty: these were real communities running a real, if minimal, self-rule, and the world they ran was authentically their own. But there was no apex to capture, because the coordination had never pooled into one. Whoever meant to rule this ground would have to bring his own seat and lay his own floor, for there was none here to inherit.

The spare prince

The other landscape is Britain in 1920 and 1921: victorious in the war, broke and weary after it, and retrenching hard. The 1920 rising in Iraq had cost hundreds of British and Indian lives and millions the Exchequer did not want to spend, and sections of the press were calling to be quit of the whole Mesopotamian business; Churchill's new Colonial Office and its Middle East Department existed largely to make the region cost less. And Britain had, by 1921, a particular problem to dispose of cheaply: a Hashemite family it had raised up in the war and then failed.

The failure was a specific one, and its words survive. In 1915 and 1916 the Sharif of Mecca, Hussein bin Ali, was drawn into an Arab revolt against the Ottomans by a correspondence with Sir Henry McMahon, Britain's High Commissioner in Egypt, in which McMahon pledged, in his letter of 24 October 1915, that with certain named exclusions *"Great Britain is prepared to recognize and support the independence of the Arabs in all the regions within the limits demanded by the Sherif of Mecca."* The exclusions were drawn along a line to the west: *"portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo cannot be said to be purely Arab, and should be excluded from the limits demanded."* The land east of the Jordan lay well to the *east* of that line — inside the

promised Arab area, by the letter's own geography. The Revolt was declared in June 1916, and Hussein's sons Faisal and Abdullah led it in the field.

The promise was already being unmade as it was made. Britain and France had secretly agreed, in the Sykes–Picot arrangement of 1916, to partition the same Arab east between themselves; and in November 1917 the Balfour Declaration promised a Jewish national home in Palestine. When the fighting stopped the commitments collided. Faisal entered Damascus and was proclaimed King of Syria by the Syrian Congress on 8 March 1920; a month later the San Remo conference handed Syria to France as a mandate; and on 24 July 1920, in a battle of a few hours at Maysalun west of Damascus, French troops broke the Arab army — Faisal's war minister, Yusuf al-ʿAzma, died on the field — and drove Faisal from a throne he had held less than five months. So by late 1920 the men Britain had armed for the Revolt were a dynasty without a country. Faisal went into exile; and his elder brother Abdullah came north to the far south of the land east of the Jordan, reaching Maʿan in November 1920 with a few hundred men, announcing that he had come to expel the French from Syria and win back the family's Damascus throne.

That threat — a Hashemite prince massing on the edge of France's new mandate — was precisely the crisis Cairo was convened to solve, and it was precisely what gave the empty ground east of the Jordan its sudden use. It was a place to put a prince. T. E. Lawrence rode out to Abdullah's camp; Churchill met him in Jerusalem at the end of March 1921; and the bargain was made — Abdullah would take a small British-subsidised emirate east of the river and abandon the march on French Syria. He returned to Amman on 30 March and formed his first government, under Rashid Talaa, on 11 April 1921. Churchill's later boast that he had made Transjordan "with a stroke of the pen, one Sunday afternoon" is repeated everywhere and its exact source is uncertain; it is held here as an attributed line, for the settlement to weigh. The family's dispossession, meanwhile, had further to run. Within four years the Hashemites would lose even their ancestral Hejaz — Mecca itself — to Ibn Saud of Najd, the very power against whose raiders the new emirate was partly meant to stand, so that the dynasty which had launched the Revolt from the Holy Cities ended holding only the two thrones Britain had manufactured for it out of the residue of the mandates.

Three faces of a buffer

Why hold empty ground at all is answered by its position, and the position had three faces. Transjordan was a buffer first against France: keeping Abdullah and the Damascus exiles from launching attacks on French Syria out of the British zone, which kept the peace with

an ally who had just won a war beside Britain. It was a buffer second against the Ikhwan, the Wahhabi warriors of Najd whose raids struck up out of the desert toward the settled edge of Palestine — the emirate walled that flank, and would earn its subsidy doing so when British air power and the emirate's new levies broke a great Ikhwan raiding force near Amman in 1924. And it was a buffer in a third sense that would matter more than either as the decades ran: the reserve of Palestine. London decided in 1921 that the land east of the river, though administratively inside the Palestine mandate, would be exempted from that mandate's Jewish-national-home provisions — the instrument was a memorandum brought into effect under Article 25 of the mandate in September 1922 — so that Jewish settlement was confined to the ground west of the Jordan and the east was held as Arab land. This is a legitimating story of *position* rather than of trusteeship-for-development, and its full reckoning belongs to the study of the robe; but the shape is already plain. The worth of this colony was where it sat, not what came out of it.

The note that organises the study

Every other conquest in this collection took something off the ground it held. Transjordan runs the ledger backwards. Britain drew no surplus from it and instead paid a subsidy *in* — a grant-in-aid on the order of a hundred thousand pounds a year at the outset, though the accounts vary and the figure grew, and for years it was the emirate's only real revenue. The Lebanese historian Kamal Salibi judged the place scarcely a country at all, handed to Abdullah in effect because no one else cared to have it; the phrase is his and it fits. Set the two mandates side by side and the whole of the study's question is in the gap between them: the same imperial power, the same region, the same year, the same room, the same family — and two entirely different footprints. Next door in Iraq the footprint was extraction — oil under the ground, a national army raised over it, a state worth seizing. East of the Jordan the footprint was subsidy — a buffer worth paying for, a state no faction would trouble to own. What that difference did, across a generation and an assassination and the emptying of Britain's floor, is the case.

The thesis the study is built to test can be stated in one line and must at once be guarded: that the imported chair roots when there is nothing to steal — that Iraq's wealth made its state a prize and its king a target, and Transjordan's poverty made its state a burden its own officers would not seize and forced its imported king to build a real base merely to stand. That is a thesis, not a verdict. Poverty is one variable, and the homogeneity of the substrate, the prince's own political skill, the army that was not yet built, and the sponsor's cheque all

carry weight of their own; a study that reduced the survival to poverty alone would fail exactly as a study of Iraq that reduced its collapse to "sectarianism" would have failed. The landscape's work is only to lay the two grounds bare. The proving is for the modules.

Reading the landscape against the framework

The landscape confirms the colonial bend the framework predicts and sharpens one part of it. The bend is that the floor operates in the colony while the belief that pays for it is cut for the metropole — and Transjordan states the bend in its purest form, because here there was not even a surplus to soften the arrangement into ordinary extraction: the metropole simply paid, and held the ground for its place on the map. The corpus should carry this as a distinct kind of colony, one it has not yet isolated — the buffer state, whose value is its position and not its produce, and whose ledger runs backward, the sponsor subsidising the colony rather than drawing from it. What happens to every other relationship in an order when the extraction term goes negative is a genuine hole in the theory, and this is the case placed to fill it.

The sharpening concerns the recursion. The land east of the Jordan was a former conquest naturalised many times over, exactly as the framework expects; but it was a *thin* one, and the thinness is a finding rather than a gap. Because its coordination had never curdled into a capturable apex — no caliph, no clerical hierarchy commanding the majority, no throne, only tribes and towns running their own affairs — the newcomer inherited nothing he could sit down in and operate. He could not assume a chair, because there was no chair; he could not redirect a standing hierarchy at the population, because none pooled the population's trust into one hand. He would have to forge his own seat and man his own floor. That is the same position Britain met among the Kikuyu of Kenya, and the opposite of the one it met in the emirates of northern Nigeria, where a conqueror could take over the Caliph's own machine for appointing and deposing emirs and run it unchanged; and it predicts that the Hashemite order here, like the forged order in Kenya, would begin with no borrowed legitimacy at all. The whole interest of the case is what it did with that starting point — whether, as in Kenya, a forged apex stayed expensive and resented, held up by the pass and the camp, or whether this one, over a generation, grew a belief where it began with none. That is the thing to watch from here: an order that must run on force and surveillance betrays a belief that never took, and the question this study carries forward is whether the emirate east of the Jordan was such an order or became, instead, the rarer thing — an imported chair that rooted.

One last note is owed before the modules begin, because it governs the tone of all of them. Of all the cases in this collection, Transjordan is the one that will most resemble a colonialism that worked — a poor, raided desert made into a durable state that outlived the empire that built it. The study is built to meet that claim at its full strength at the end, conceding what is real in it and refusing the step from *this order survived* to *the conquest was therefore justified*. That reckoning is not the landscape's to make. But the reader should know, standing here on the empty ground before the emirate, that it is coming — and that the arithmetic laid out from here is laid out so that the sum, when it is reached, is the reader's own.

A note on sources. The two exact quotations are from a public-domain primary source: Sir Henry McMahon's letter to Sharif Hussein of 24 October 1915 (*"Great Britain is prepared to recognize and support the independence of the Arabs..."* and the exclusion of *"portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo..."*), as published by His Majesty's Government in 1939 and reproduced in the standard collections; the letter is conventionally dated 24 October 1915, though the Arabic dating has been read by some as 25 October. Dates given as established are drawn from the primary and reference record: the proclamation of Faisal as King of Syria on 8 March 1920, the Battle of Maysalun on 24 July 1920, Abdullah's arrival at Maʿan in November 1920 and at Amman in early 1921, the Cairo Conference of 12–30 March 1921, and the formation of Abdullah's first government on 11 April 1921. Contested or moving figures are given as ranges: the population of the early 1920s at roughly 200,000–230,000 (a British estimate of 1924 put it near 200,000, of whom some 10,000 were Circassians and Chechens and some 15,000 Christians), growing toward 300,000–350,000 by the early 1940s; and the initial British subsidy at on the order of £100,000 a year, a figure the sources give variously and which rose over the mandate — its detailed trace is deferred to the study of extraction. The exemption of Transjordan from the Jewish-national-home provisions (the memorandum under Article 25 of the Palestine mandate, in effect September 1922) is stated here in substance, with its text reserved for the study of the robe; and Churchill's "stroke of the pen" boast is flagged as an attributed line of uncertain provenance, likewise deferred. All modern scholarship is paraphrased and credited, not quoted: Mary Wilson on the making of Jordan and Abdullah's position; Yoav Alon on the tribes and the state; Eugene Rogan on the late-Ottoman frontier; Kamal Salibi and Philip Robins on the emirate's poverty and dependence; and Vladimir Hamed-Troyansky and Myriam Ababsa on the Circassian resettlement and the growth of Amman. Every load-bearing quotation, date, and figure has been checked against a source reproducing the primary record or against the reference literature; where the record disagrees, the disagreement is given rather than resolved.

Part of the collection Patterns of Power. *Tested, never revealed.*

PATTERNS OF POWER · BRITISH TRANSJORDAN — MODULE 1

THE LAST RAID

> *Module 1 · The Floor of Force — not the bomber but the Legion: a ground force that began as a settled gendarmerie built to police the tribes and became, under Glubb, a floor that recruited the raiders it was made to suppress; the leash that turned into a bond, and what the turning cost*

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

The floor that was a wage, not a bomb

Every order in this collection begins on a floor of organised force, laid before any story is told about it, because force is the founding fact and the belief is added afterward to make the holding cheap. The question Module 1 asks of any conquest is who held the best violence, by what act, and against whom — and how the governed were made unable to disperse or resist. In most colonial cases the answer is a garrison and a gun. In Transjordan the answer is stranger, and it is the first place the case starts to bend away from its sister next door, because the floor that finally held the land east of the Jordan did not hold the population off at the point of a bomb. It held them, in the end, by paying them. The emirate's monopoly of violence was built, over fifteen years, out of the very men whose independent violence it was meant to end — and the desert was pacified less by killing raiders than by putting them in uniform and on a wage.

That is the finding the module is built to earn, and it must be earned carefully, because the pacified end is where the romance lives and the coercive beginning is where the corpses are. The Arab Legion that later stood as the finest small army in the Arab world, its Bedouin troopers in long khaki robes and red sashes bound by loyalty to the throne, is a real institution and a genuine achievement. But it did not start as a bond. It started as a leash — a settled gendarmerie raised to protect villagers from the tribes and to break the risings of men who did not want to be ruled from Amman at all — and the turning of the leash into the bond was neither automatic nor gentle. It was a choice, made by one officer, enabled by a substrate that permitted it, and laid over ground already broken by air power and gunfire. Legibility is not pardon; the floor is reconstructed here whole, the wage and the bomb together.

What was not laid here

To see what Transjordan's floor was, begin with what it was not, because the same imperial power, in the same years, laid a different floor on the country next door and the contrast is exact. In Iraq the British governed by air control — Churchill's cheap imperial method, in which a handful of RAF squadrons policed a vast territory by bombing villages that withheld tax or rose against the state, so that the floor was made cheap by technological reach rather than by any belief in the men who commanded it. And beneath the aircraft Iraq's ground floor rested substantially on a minority proxy: the Assyrian Levies, a Christian minority recruited and officered by the British to police an overwhelmingly Muslim, Arab-and-Kurdish population that neither shared their faith nor forgave their service. It was a floor that held the majority off rather than recruiting it, and it carried a deferred cost that came due the moment the British hand lifted — the massacre of Assyrian villagers in 1933, the minority-proxy's bill presented, as such bills usually are, not to the men who designed the arrangement but to the proxy who manned it.

Transjordan received none of this in full. The Royal Air Force was present — a base at Marka near Amman, a small detachment of aircraft and armoured cars — and it was decisive at moments the module will come to; but Transjordan was never placed under the air-control scheme as a system of government, and it was given no national army on the Iraqi model, a choice the mandatory made deliberately and applied to Palestine and Transjordan alike. A separate imperial gendarmerie, the Trans-Jordan Frontier Force, was raised in 1926 under the Air Ministry to guard the northern frontier, and it was a British instrument, not the emirate's. But the floor that actually held the ground east of the Jordan, that broke its risings and ran its desert and grew into the thing the state finally rested on, was the emirate's own force: the Arab Legion, *al-Jaysh al-ʿArabi*, the Arab Army. Its story is the story of the floor, and it divides cleanly into two men.

Peake's leash

The first was Frederick Gerard Peake — Peake Pasha — a British officer who had served with the wartime Arab forces and left the Imperial Camel Corps in the autumn of 1920 to report on security east of the Jordan. He found it inadequate, and in October 1920 the High Commissioner in Jerusalem ordered him to raise two small police forces: a hundred men to guard the road from Palestine up to Amman, and fifty to stand behind the British district officer posted to Karak. From these he built, across the summers of 1921 and 1923, a

Reserve Mobile Force of some hundred and fifty men, based at Zarqa and armed with surplus German rifles. Its composition is worth naming precisely, because it tells you what kind of floor this was at the start. The earliest force was drawn very largely — by one account four-fifths of it — from the Circassian and Chechen settlers, the immigrant Muslim minority the Ottomans had planted a generation before, who had fought for the Ottomans against the Arab Revolt and now policed the Arab tribes for the British; and it was filled out with Arabs who had served in the Ottoman army, with Kurds and Turks among them. On 22 October 1923 Peake's force absorbed the existing police and took the name it would carry for a generation, the Arab Legion. By 1926 it numbered around fifteen hundred men.

What matters for the floor is not the number but the purpose, and the purpose was to hold the settled country against the desert. Peake recruited mainly villagers, not Bedouin, because his Legion existed to keep order among the tribes and to safeguard the cultivator from the raid — to protect the sown from the nomad, and both from each other. This was a floor set squarely against the tribal majority's oldest autonomy, the independent capacity for organised violence that the framework calls the thing a conqueror must monopolise; and in its earliest form, a minority-tinged gendarmerie policing the Arab tribes, it was closer in shape to the floor next door than to the bond it would later become. Its whole cost, from its inception until the mid-1950s, was paid by the British subsidy — which is to say the floor that held the emirate was, from the first day, funded entirely from London. A floor a conqueror pays for wholly is a floor he can also switch off, and that fact sits underneath everything that follows; but its reckoning belongs to the modules on the cost and the collapse. Here the point is simpler: at the founding, the floor policed its base. It did not recruit it.

What the romance covers

The founding legend of the Legion is a legend of order brought to a lawless desert, and like most such legends it is laid over a period of killing that it does not mention. In its first years the floor's real work was the suppression of men who did not accept the new government at all. In 1921, in the northern district of Kura, a local strongman named Sheikh Kulaib al-Shraideh — a self-made ruler who refused to see his district folded under the notables of neighbouring Irbid — held out against Amman until Abdullah's forces, backed by the RAF, broke him, at a cost the record puts at fifteen or more dead before a general pardon was issued in May 1923 to mark the announcement of self-government. Two years later came the largest rising the young emirate faced. Sultan al-Adwan, paramount shaykh of the ʿAdwan of

the Balqa, resented both Abdullah's conspicuous favour to his tribal rivals the Bani Sakhr and the Syrian exiles who filled the government's offices, and in 1923 he advanced on Amman at the head of a few hundred horsemen under a slogan that would echo through the emirate's later politics — that Transjordan should be for Transjordanians. Peake's Legion met him, stiffened by two RAF armoured cars and by pro-Hashemite tribesmen, and broke the revolt; the dead numbered around eighty-six, among them thirteen women, and Sultan al-Adwan fled across the border into Syria.

Set the legend beside the ledger and the shape of the founding floor is plain. The order that would later be remembered for winning the desert's love began by imposing a monopoly of violence on people who had governed themselves for centuries and did not wish to stop — and it imposed it, where persuasion failed, with the gendarme's rifle and the armoured car and the aircraft overhead. The men killed at Kura and in the Balqa were not foreign invaders; they were Transjordanians resisting the consolidation of a state over them, and the floor was built partly on their defeat. To reconstruct this is not to indict the men who ran it more harshly than the record allows — risings were broken with restraint by the standards of the neighbouring mandates, and the toll was small beside what air control was doing in Iraq. It is only to refuse the romance its erasure, and to hold in view that the bond, when it came, was laid over ground the leash had already cleared.

The Ikhwan, and the floor earning its keep

The external threat was graver than the internal one, and it was the reason the buffer had been armed at all. Out of Najd, in the early 1920s, came the Ikhwan — the puritan Wahhabi warriors whom Ibn Saud had raised to conquer central Arabia and who now struck north and west across the desert toward the settled edge of the emirate and, beyond it, Palestine. In 1922 a raiding force of perhaps fifteen hundred camel-mounted men drove toward Amman; the accounts diverge, one holding that the column scattered when a British aircraft appeared overhead and never reached the capital, another that it fell first on two small villages of the Bani Sakhr a dozen miles south of Amman and massacred them, and was cut up by British armoured cars and aircraft only as it withdrew. In August 1924 a far larger force — the estimates run from three to four and a half thousand — crossed some thousand miles of desert from Najd and was broken near Amman, the RAF's armoured cars and aircraft from Marka doing the decisive killing, with Ikhwan losses given variously in the sources and high, and the emirate's own defenders losing a fraction of that number.

This is the buffer performing the function it had been created and subsidised to perform, and it is worth marking that at this stage the floor still looked very much like Iraq's: the emir, in the plain judgment of the record, was powerless to repel the raids by himself, and the shield that saved his southern villages was British air power. The subsidy was earning itself here — the cheque from London converted directly into the armoured cars that held the Wahhabi off the Palestine flank — and if the story had stopped in 1924 the floor of Transjordan would read as one more instance of the cheap imperial pattern, a native ruler held on his seat by the bomber his sponsor flew. What changed the pattern was not a battle. It was a decision about who should be recruited into the floor.

Glubb's bond

The second man was John Bagot Glubb, who came to Transjordan from Iraq in November 1930. In the Iraqi south he had spent the 1920s learning to raise mobile columns from the desert tribes rather than against them, living among Bedouin, learning their dialect and their law, and he arrived in Transjordan to answer the same problem the RAF had been answering with aircraft — the raiding of the desert frontier — by an opposite method. In February 1931 he formed the Desert Patrol, *Quwwat al-Badiyah*, as a semi-independent arm of the Legion to hold the whole eastern desert, everything beyond the cultivated strip. It began minute: twenty men in four trucks mounting Lewis and Vickers guns, with small forts scattered across the waste and camels for the ground the trucks could not cross. Its novelty was entirely in its recruits. Glubb enlisted the Bedouin themselves — the raiders, the very men the settled Legion had been built to police — and he held them not by coercion but by the things a destitute desert could not otherwise offer: a soldier's wage that was a small fortune in one of the poorest lands in the Arab world, exemption from labour dues, the prestige of the uniform and the rifle, and the promise of protection against the Ikhwan whom the tribes themselves feared. His own account of it, in memoirs written long after and still in copyright, tells a romance of winning the Bedouin by love; the more structural truth, which the romance half-conceals, is that he was offering the tribes a better bargain than raiding at the exact moment raiding was dying anyway — drought, the closing of the new international frontiers, and the state's own tightening monopoly having made the old economy of the *ghazu* unpayable. The wage was the better deal, and the tribes took it.

The effect was rapid and it is dateable. By the spring of 1931 the frontier raids had been cut by half; Glubb dated the last raid into Transjordan to 1932, and though pacification is never quite the single event a founder likes to name, the desert was in substance quiet within

a few years of the Patrol's forming. The Bedouin who had been the problem became the floor, and — this is the part that outlasted everything — they bonded in the process to the Legion and, through it, to the Hashemite throne, a link between the tribes and the monarchy that has held for the better part of a century since. The floor that Peake had built to police its base, Glubb rebuilt to recruit it. The leash had become a bond.

Reading the floor against the framework

The framework carries a sharp diagnostic for reading a floor: surveillance and continuous visible force are the tell of a belief that never took, the mark of an order that must hold its people down because it has not made them hold it up themselves. Transjordan's floor forces a refinement of that tell, and the refinement is this study's first contribution to the machine. A floor that *recruits its own base* is neither of the two things the diagnostic anticipates. It is not the surveilling leash of an unbelieved order, and it is not yet the withdrawn, invisible force of a believed one. It is a third thing — the *manufacture* of a belief out of engineered self-interest, the mechanism by which a floor of pure coercion can begin, over a generation, to grow into a floor of consent. The Bedouin trooper joined for the wage, the exemption, the prestige, and the protection; that is self-interest, not conviction, and at the outset the bond was as calculated as any garrison's pay. But a wage paid for twenty years, to fathers and then their sons, inside an institution that gave them rank and identity and a place in a new nation, does the work that formation does: it converts the man who came for the money into the man who cannot now imagine himself outside the thing he serves. Recruitment of the base is the tell not of a belief that never took but of a belief being built — and the building is visible here in a way it rarely is, because the case is recent enough to catch the wage before it hardened into the loyalty.

Why this floor could be built here, when the floor next door could not, returns the module to the ground the landscape laid. Transjordan's substrate was homogeneous, and its Bedouin were the majority; arming them therefore built loyalty rather than resentment, because there was no large excluded population for an armed majority to sit upon. In Iraq the same imperial hand armed a minority — the Assyrian levy, and behind it the Sunni-Arab core — over a majority that outnumbered and resented it, and so built the resentment into the floor itself, where it waited to be discharged. The shape of the floor followed the shape of the substrate: a homogeneous base can be recruited into a bond, a fractured one can only be policed by a proxy. This is why the deferred atrocity the framework expects from a minority-proxy floor — the bill that came due at Simele — has no equivalent in mandate-era

Transjordan. The floor here was native and, increasingly, inclusive; there was no resented minority holding down a hostile majority, and so no massacre waiting to be paid. That prediction of the sister case holds, with one caveat to be carried forward: an order can grow a bond with the base it has and still leave a fracture for a base it does not yet contain, and if Transjordan's floor ever presents a deferred bill it will be to a population that is not yet inside the frame — a matter for the coda, not for the founding.

Two disciplines close the module. The first is that the divergence from Iraq was not a gift of superior British wisdom or kindlier intent. Britain did not set out to build a bonded national army; it set out to hold a cheap frontier, tried it first with the bomber and a settled gendarmerie exactly as it did elsewhere, and arrived at the bond because one officer chose to recruit the tribes and the substrate allowed the choice to work. The outcome was a by-product of the ground and of a decision, not of a policy of benevolence, and it was reached by way of the aircraft over Marka and the dead in the Balqa. The second is the one the whole study will keep: the bond was real and so was the coercion beneath it, and neither cancels the other. The desert grew safer, the raids stopped, the tribesman who had lived by the raid and died young now drew a wage and a pension and a place in a state — and the floor that gave him those things was raised on the defeat of the men who rose at Kura and in the Balqa, and on the bombs that broke the Ikhwan, and it was paid for, every shilling, by a foreign treasury that could stop paying whenever it chose. The last raid was a real achievement. It was also the moment a people's oldest freedom, the freedom to make their own war, passed finally into the monopoly of a state that had been placed over them from outside.

A note on sources. This module reconstructs an institution rather than a text, and its sourcing reflects that. The two British officers who built the floor, Peake and Glubb, left detailed memoirs, but these are in copyright and are paraphrased here, not quoted — including Glubb's own framing of having won the Bedouin "by love," which is given as his characterisation and weighed, not reproduced. No founding ordinance or contemporary official report is quoted verbatim, because none was verified against a clean public-domain reproduction in the course of writing; a doubtful line is dropped rather than guessed. The mandatory's own testimony to the League of Nations Permanent Mandates Commission confirms in the public record the shape of the imperial floor — the Royal Air Force and the Trans-Jordan Frontier Force named among the forces on which security rested — and is used for that structural point only. Contested and moving figures are given as ranges: the Legion's strength (about 150 men in 1920, rising to roughly 1,500 by 1926); the 1924 Ikhwan raiding force (variously 3,000 to 4,500) and its casualties (given high and inconsistently across the accounts); the dead in the Adwan rising (about 86, including 13 women); and the "last raid," dated by Glubb to 1932, with pacification in substance achieved across the following few years. Modern scholarship is paraphrased and credited: Yoav Alon on the Legion and the politics of tribal recruitment and on whether the tribal bond is best read as co-optation, incorporation, or both; Mary Wilson on Abdullah and the making of the state; and the standard reference accounts of the Kura and Adwan risings and the Ikhwan raids. The Iraq comparison — air control as a governing method, the Assyrian minority levy, and the massacre of 1933 — is stated as the sister study in this collection established it, and named here as a mechanism rather than a citation.

Part of the collection Patterns of Power. *Tested, never revealed.*

PATTERNS OF POWER · BRITISH TRANSJORDAN — MODULE 2

THEIR CLAIM TO BRITISH GOLD

> *Module 2 · The Settlement — who got what in a state with almost nothing to divide: an imported prince on a "provisional" throne that stayed, a resented layer of Syrian administrators, a tribal elite bought with recognised land and rank, and a peasantry re-bound to a state through its own land register — the whole of it funded, and leashed, by the sponsor's subsidy*

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

The settlement with nothing to settle

The settlement module in this collection asks how the wealth a conquest seizes is divided and among whom — which families took which lands, which factions took which offices, what marks a man inside the arrangement from a man outside it. Almost every case answers with loot: a treasury emptied, estates parcelled out, tribute rerouted to the victors. Transjordan cannot answer that way, because there was no loot. The land east of the Jordan held no treasury, no plantation, no mine, no trade worth monopolising; its quarter-million people were poor, its towns small, its desert empty of anything a conqueror could carry off. The conventional question — who got the spoils — has no purchase here, because there were no spoils to get.

What there was instead is stranger and more revealing, and it is the whole of this module. Where there is nothing to divide, a conqueror who means to build a durable order must first *manufacture* the things that can be divided — a throne, a salaried administration, a system of land title where land had been held in common, and, above all, a flow of money from outside. The settlement of Transjordan was not a carving-up of existing wealth. It was the creation of the categories through which a new wealth, most of it the sponsor's own cash, could be distributed to buy a governing coalition into being. The prize at the centre of it was not Transjordanian at all. It was British gold, and everyone who mattered in the new order — the prince, the ministers, the shaykhs, the soldiers — was arranged around the tap it flowed from and the hand that could turn it off.

The provisional throne, and the men from Damascus

The apex came first, and it came from outside, provisionally, and stayed. Abdullah had reached Maʿan in the south in November 1920 not to rule Transjordan but to use it as a staging-ground for recovering his family's lost Syrian throne; the emirate he was offered at Cairo was a consolation and, in its own terms, a temporary expedient — a holding arrangement while larger questions settled. Abdullah took it as a base for an ambition he never abandoned, the union of Syria, Iraq, and Transjordan under his house, and the provisional emirate quietly became the permanent one as the larger ambition died. Whether Britain deliberately strung him along with the promise of a greater realm it never meant to grant, or whether he settled with open eyes for the small state he could actually have, is disputed among historians and cannot be resolved from the outside; what is not disputed is that the "temporary" arrangement outlasted everyone who called it temporary. Churchill's much-repeated boast that he had made Transjordan "with a stroke of the pen, one Sunday afternoon in Cairo" is the emblem the manufactured throne earned — though the line's exact source is elusive and it is best held as attributed rather than quoted as verified, and the companion legend that a tipsy Churchill's wavering hand drew the zigzag Jordan–Saudi border, "Winston's Hiccup," is folklore. The throne itself transmitted by the oldest of markers: Hashemite descent, the bloodline of the Prophet through the Sharifian house of Mecca, which is what Abdullah brought that no local shaykh could match and the entire reason Britain had him to place.

Beneath the imported prince sat an imported administration, and this is the settlement's first real division of the one thing besides land there was to give — office. The men who filled the early governments were not Transjordanians. They were exiles of the wider Arab collapse, Syrians above all: Abdullah's prime ministers through the 1920s were Rashid Talaa, then Mazhar Raslan, then Ali Rida al-Rikabi — a Damascene ex-Ottoman general who had been prime minister of Faisal's short-lived Syria — and then Hasan Abu al-Huda, born in Aleppo. To the town notables of Salt and Karak and Irbid, and to the tribal shaykhs, this looked like what one historian's subjects called rule by Syrians, a government in exile parked on their soil and drawing the new state's salaries, and the resentment of it was among the currents that drove the risings the floor had to break. Britain, for its part, took a formal grip on this imported layer in the settlement's founding legal instrument: the Anglo-Transjordanian Agreement of 1928 bound the Amir so that, in the treaty's own words, *"no official of other than Trans-Jordan nationality shall be appointed in Trans-Jordan without the*

concurrence of His Britannic Majesty." The clause reads as a limit on Abdullah's Syrian favourites; it was equally a British claim on the staffing of the state.

The largest landowner

Below the imported prince and the imported ministers, the settlement reached down to the men who actually commanded the country's people — the tribal shaykhs — and bought the most important of them with the two currencies a poor state could mint: recognition and rank. The paradigm is Mithqal al-Fayez, paramount shaykh of the Bani Sakhr, who had met Abdullah at Maʿan in 1920, allied his tribe to the newcomer, and helped draw him north to Amman. Abdullah repaid him in kind and in title. He confirmed Mithqal as *shaykh al-mashayikh*, shaykh of shaykhs of the confederacy; he made him a lieutenant-general of the emirate's army in 1923; he exempted his family from taxation, restored to him land the Ottomans had taken to build the Hejaz Railway, and gave him gifts down to a motor-car. In return Mithqal gave what the emirate most needed — the military weight of the Bani Sakhr against the Ikhwan — and became, over the following years, by common account the wealthiest man and the largest landowner in the country. He was the settlement's clearest winner, and the shape of his winning tells you what kind of settlement it was: not a grant of conquered spoils, but the state's recognition and enrichment of a man who could deliver a fighting following.

The favour shown to the Bani Sakhr made losers as surely as winners, and the losers were the tribes passed over — the ʿAdwan of the Balqa above all, whose 1923 rising against Amman was in part a protest against exactly this preferment of their rivals. So the settlement's boundary among the tribes ran not between conquered and conqueror but between those who had allied early and been rewarded and those who had not and were not. And the co-optation carried, from the start, a hidden edge that would matter later: the same state that made Mithqal rich was also, through the 1920s, centralising power and beginning to constrain the very autonomy his wealth was supposed to protect. The shaykh who took the land and the rank became, in taking them, a client of the state rather than an independent lord of the desert — richer than he had ever been and less free, his standing now flowing from the throne he served rather than the tribe he led. That is the characteristic sting of a settlement that binds by patronage: what it gives in wealth it takes in autonomy.

The register and the map

The one asset the country did possess was the land itself, and the deepest act of the settlement — larger, in its reach into ordinary lives, than the throne or the ministries — was the remaking of how land was held. From 1927 the Anglo-Hashemite state, its land department run and designed by British officials, began a full cadastral survey and land-settlement programme that would take a generation and reach, in the historian Michael Fischbach's phrase, into literally every village. Its premise was a British one: that all land was owned by someone and should be held by individuals with clear, registered, taxable title. And its effect was to dissolve the old order of tenure, the collective *musha'* holding in which a village worked and periodically redistributed its land in common, and to replace it with individual private property fixed on a map. This was the true division of the country's wealth, and it cut two ways at once.

On one edge it served the co-optation already described: in the Bani Sakhr country the survey came early and deliberately, out of the general order, precisely so that the state could register — and thereby legitimate — the land the al-Fayez had seized, buying the shaykhs' loyalty by turning their grabs into titles. On the other edge it did something the co-optation did not intend and the framework should mark. By making registered title and state-assessed tax the basis of land-holding, the programme made the *state*, not the shaykh, the arbiter of who held land and who owed what on it; mandatory officialdom replaced the tribal leader as the guarantor of access to the ground a family lived on, and in the lean years of the 1930s the same state softened its own taxes in drought and advanced its own seed-loans, so that the cultivator's security came increasingly to rest on the government's register and the government's mercy rather than on his lineage or his shaykh. The cadastral map, carried village by village into the country, did more than record who owned what; it drew the people it surveyed into a common relation to a single state and, several scholars argue after Benedict Anderson, into an incipient identification with a *Jordanian* thing that had not existed before the surveyors came.

The comparison that makes this legible is the one the whole study keeps in view — the same imperial power, in the same years, next door. West of the Jordan the machinery of land registration ran toward dispossession, clearing and transferring ground to make room for a settler project; east of the Jordan, where the settler project had been expressly excluded and the land was wanted only to carry a stable buffer population, the same technology of title was turned the other way, toward securing the smallholder on his plot and preventing the landlessness that was tearing Palestine apart. It is a sharp illustration of a plain point: the tool

of private title is neither benign nor malign in itself; its direction is set by the purpose it serves, and here the purpose — a quiet, self-identifying, taxable buffer people — bent the tool toward inclusion. The settlement re-founded property not to loot a population but to manufacture one.

British gold, and the leash

Every strand of the settlement ran back, in the end, to a single source of money, because the state had no other. Its own revenues — a poor land-tax on a poor country — came nowhere near paying for a prince, a cabinet, a land department, and an army, and the gap was filled by a British grant-in-aid, on the order of a hundred thousand pounds a year at the outset and given variously in the sources; a contemporary American newspaper of 1924 put the figure at about half a million dollars a year and described its terms with unusual candour. The subsidy, that report explained, was conditioned on Abdullah's introducing order and reforming his taxes, and its expenditure was supervised not by the Amir but by his prime minister and by the British representative in Amman — the official the treaties politely called an *adviser*. The same report caught the essence of the whole arrangement in a sentence a colonial ministry would never have written: that Transjordan *"would rather relinquish some of its right to self-determination than its claim to British gold."*

That is the settlement's core, stated by a contemporary observer more plainly than any of its architects would: a state whose one indispensable asset was its sponsor's cheque, and which would trade sovereignty before it traded the cheque. Because the subsidy paid for everything — the Legion's wages, the ministers' salaries, the shaykhs' subventions, the Amir's own civil list — control of the state reduced, at bottom, to control of the money's flow, and that hand was London's. Abdullah, chronically extravagant, was a standing problem to the officials sent to manage him; the first of them, St John Philby, was set to "sort out Abdullah's finances" and found the task hopeless before resigning in 1924, the year the British reasserted their grip and the same American paper reported them placing, in its headline's words, a curb on the waste of the Arabs in governing. The subsidy was thus two things at once, and the doubleness is the point: it was the substance of the settlement, the very wealth being divided, and it was the leash, because a coalition funded entirely from outside can be starved from outside. A conqueror who pays for an order rather than looting one holds a lever the looting conqueror never has — and the reckoning of that lever, when the metropole's will to keep paying finally matters, is the business of the modules on extraction and collapse. Here it is enough to see that the whole apex coalition — Amir,

ministers, shaykhs, officers — was assembled and held together by a flow of money none of them could generate and Britain could stop.

The instrument that made all of this lawful was the Anglo-Transjordanian Agreement signed at Jerusalem on 20 February 1928, with its companion Organic Law and the Legislative Council that followed in 1929 — and the framework's discipline is to read that instrument as the settlement's primary fiction, the stationary bandit's truce written down, before hunting any doctrine laid on top of it. The Agreement delegated to the Amir the powers of legislation and administration that the mandate had vested in Britain, while reserving to Britain — in the careful formula a contemporary American official summary rendered as "advice, or control" — foreign relations, financial and fiscal policy, jurisdiction over foreigners, and the appointment of non-Transjordanian officials. The word that did the work was *advice*, and the scare-quotes the summary put round it are the whole of the fiction: advice that could not be refused is control, and a protectorate that calls its control advice has written its robe into its constitution. The settlement was, on paper, a self-governing Arab state guided by a friendly adviser. In substance it was an imported prince and a co-opted elite living on a foreign subsidy administered by a foreign hand that reserved to itself everything that finally mattered.

Reading the settlement against the framework

Transjordan bends the settlement module in a way the corpus should carry, and the bend follows directly from the buffer's poverty. The module normally reconstructs a division of spoils; here there were no spoils, and the finding is that a conqueror who takes a surplus-poor land does not divide wealth — he *manufactures the categories* through which a new and largely imported wealth can be distributed to assemble a coalition. He creates a throne where there was none, a salaried administration where there was none, a system of private title where land was held in common, and a flow of cash from outside; and the settlement is the division of *those* manufactured things. In the net-cost colony the settlement divides the subsidy, not the surplus — and because the subsidy is the sponsor's, the settlement binds the whole coalition to the sponsor at the moment it creates them. This is the material root of the imported chair's dependence that the coordination module will return to: the apex here owned the throne but never the treasury, because the treasury was a grant.

Two further findings sit inside that one. The first is the double-edged land settlement, which is this module's sharpest contribution. The registration of title did the ordinary colonial work of co-opting an elite by legitimating its seizures — but, because the telos here

was a stable buffer population rather than a settler frontier or an extractive estate, the same registration also bound the mass of cultivators *to the state* as the guarantor of their land and softened their taxes in bad years, and even furnished, in the cadastral map, an instrument of national identity. The identical technology of private title that dispossessed for settlement west of the river included-and-attached east of it; the fork was not the tool but the purpose it served, and a framework that reads land-registration as inherently a machine of dispossession will misread the case where the conqueror needed the native present, settled, and content rather than gone. The second finding is the shape of the co-optation itself: the shaykh bought with land, rank, and tax-exemption was, in the same motion, stripped of the autonomy that had made him worth buying — enriched into a client, centralised into a dependent — which is the characteristic form a Co-opt draw takes when the buyer is also building a state, and a pattern the coordination module will find running through the whole order.

Two disciplines close the module. On the three monopolies: violence, wealth, and — as the next module will show — the legitimating story were fused in a single coalition, the Amir and the British Resident together, with no independent wealth-holder, no autonomous force, and no rival interpreter standing outside it; but the fusion had a seam that the framework must not miss, which is that the wealth leg was not the Amir's at all but the sponsor's, held by a foreign department out of a foreign grant, so that the apex coalition was Anglo-Hashemite with the purse on the British side. And on legibility: the land programme was, by the standards of the neighbouring mandates, comparatively humane — it protected the smallholder, prevented mass landlessness, geared taxes to the harvest — and that must be granted plainly and not sneered away. It was also the imposition of an alien category of ownership on a people who had held their land in common, administered by officials placed over them from outside, and it bound them, through their own new title-deeds, to a state they had not made. The register that secured the peasant's plot was the same register that fixed him, for the first time, as a subject of a manufactured state living on another country's gold. Both of those are true, and the settlement is the place where they were written down together.

A note on sources. Primary sources are quoted exactly and are in the public domain. The clause binding the Amir over the appointment of non-Transjordanian officials is from the Agreement between His Majesty and the Amir of Trans-Jordan, signed at Jerusalem on 20 February 1928 (His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1930). The characterisation of Transjordan preferring to relinquish self-determination rather than "its claim to British gold," together with the roughly half-million-dollar annual grant, the supervision of its expenditure by the prime minister and the British "adviser," and the reported 1924 British "curb," are from a contemporary American newspaper report of July 1924 and are given as a period-press account, with its outside vantage noted. The rendering of the 1928 Agreement as reserving to Britain "advice, or control" over foreign relations, finance, jurisdiction over foreigners, and freedom of conscience is from a United States State Department summary (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946), a public document. Contested and moving figures are given as ranges: the subsidy at roughly £100,000 a year at the outset, variously reported and rising over the mandate, with its detailed course reserved for the module on extraction. Churchill's "stroke of the pen" boast is flagged as widely repeated but of unverified primary provenance, and the "Winston's Hiccup" border legend as apocryphal. The dispute over whether Abdullah was deliberately strung along with the promise of a greater realm is given as an open question, not settled. Modern scholarship is paraphrased and credited, not quoted: Michael Fischbach on the land programme, the cadastral survey, and *musha'* tenure; Yoav Alon on Mithqal al-Fayez and the co-optation of the shaykhs; Tariq Tell on the rural political economy and the cadastral map's role in identity; Mary Wilson and Philip Robins on Abdullah, the emirate's finances, and its dependence; and the standard accounts of the Syrian-staffed early governments and of St John Philby's brief tenure. Every load-bearing quotation, date, and figure has been checked against a source reproducing the primary record or against the reference literature; where the record disagrees, the disagreement is given rather than resolved.

Part of the collection Patterns of Power. *Tested, never revealed.*

PATTERNS OF POWER · BRITISH TRANSJORDAN — MODULE 3

THE ENGLISH TEXT SHALL PREVAIL

> *Module 3 · The Robe — the story told over the buffer: a "sacred trust of civilisation" performed annually before Geneva, an "independent Government" defined by twenty-one articles of control, a statute empowering the mandatory to withhold whichever promises he judged inapplicable — and, beneath all of it, the one legitimating story that actually reached the governed, which the conqueror did not write and could not have written*

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

Who the robe was cut for

An order held by force alone is expensive, and every order that means to last drapes its floor in a story that makes the arrangement look like something other than what it is — right, natural, inevitable, or merely temporary and for the governed's own good. The robe module asks what that story was, in the exact words its makers used, and who was meant to believe it. In the colonial cases this collection has assembled, the answer bends in a way the framework predicts and this case confirms with unusual clarity: the robe is cut not for the conquered, whose belief the floor does not need, but for the metropole, whose belief funds the conquest and mans it. Transjordan states the reversed robe almost in its pure form, because the reasons for holding the ground could not be stated at all. A buffer's value is its position — keeping a Hashemite prince off the French, walling the Wahhabi from Palestine, reserving the east bank as Arab land — and none of that is a story anyone can be asked to believe in. So the robe was cut elsewhere, for two audiences the Transjordanians never sat in, and the words are exact and survive.

The first audience was Geneva. The mandate system, unlike any imperial arrangement before it, required the conqueror to justify himself annually to an international tribunal — to file reports, to send an accredited representative, to be questioned by a commission of European statesmen who could not enforce a thing but whose approval was constitutive of the whole legal edifice. The second was Westminster and the British public, who were paying, and who had been told after the war that the age of naked annexation was over.

What both were offered was the language of Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, the founding text of the entire mandate order, and it is worth quoting at the length the argument needs, because every word of it is load-bearing: to territories which had ceased to be under the sovereignty of the states that formerly governed them, *"and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilisation."* The method was tutelage, and the tutors were to be *"advanced nations who by reason of their resources, their experience or their geographical position can best undertake this responsibility."*

There is the robe entire, and it should be read with care rather than contempt, because it is doing several things at once. It converts conquest into guardianship and the conquered into wards — a legal analogy the League's own commentary made explicit, comparing mandatories to guardians in civil law obliged to act in their wards' interest and forbidden to exploit the territories for their own profit. It builds in a promise of ending, since tutelage by its nature is not meant to be prolonged indefinitely but only until the peoples under it can manage their own affairs. And it makes a claim of fact — that these peoples were not *yet* able to stand by themselves — which is the pivot the entire structure turns on, an assertion of incapacity that justifies the control and defers the ending, and which no one in Geneva was in any position to test. The phrase *"geographical position"* in the list of qualifications is the small tell worth noticing: among the reasons an advanced nation might be fit to hold a sacred trust, the drafters included the fact that it happened to be there. Strategy is written into the charter of altruism, in the charter's own words.

The article that switched the promises off

If Article 22 was the robe's fabric, the instrument that cut it to Transjordan's shape was Article 25 of the Mandate for Palestine, confirmed at London on 24 July 1922, and it is the most remarkable legal text in this study. It provided that in the territories lying between the Jordan and the eastern boundary of Palestine, the Mandatory should be entitled, with the Council's consent, *"to postpone or withhold application of such provisions of this mandate as he may consider inapplicable to the existing local conditions, and to make such provision for the administration of the territories as he may consider suitable to those conditions"* — the whole subject to a floor of three articles that could not be touched, those guaranteeing freedom of conscience, non-interference with religious bodies, and commercial non-discrimination among League members.

Read that clause slowly, because the framework has a name for what it describes. Formation withheld — the conqueror's refusal to extend to the governed the schooling, the institutions, and the civic membership that would make them full participants, because forming them would mean admitting them — is normally a practice, visible in budgets and enrolment figures and the quiet decisions of officials. Here it is a statute. Article 25 is the withholding of formation written into positive international law, and written moreover in the language of pure administrative discretion: not *which* provisions are inapplicable, but such as *he may consider* inapplicable; not what is suitable, but what *he may consider* suitable. The mandatory was made the judge of his own trusteeship, and the tribunal that was to hold him to it had, by the same instrument, consented in advance.

What was actually switched off is as revealing as the power to switch. The memorandum Lord Balfour presented to the League Council on 16 September 1922 resolved that certain provisions of the Palestine mandate *"are not applicable to the territory known as Transjordan"* — and then listed them: recitals of the preamble, Articles 4, 6, 13, 14, 22 and 23 entire, and specified portions of Articles 2, 7 and 11. Stripped of their numbers, these were the Jewish national home: the recognition of a Jewish agency, the facilitation of Jewish immigration and close settlement on the land, the citizenship provisions framed to ease Jewish naturalisation, the Holy Places machinery, and the article making Hebrew an official language alongside Arabic and English. East of the river, the national home clauses were turned off; and the memorandum closed by undertaking that whatever provision was made for Transjordan's administration under Article 25 *"shall be in no way inconsistent with those provisions of the Mandate which are not by this resolution declared inapplicable."*

That closing undertaking is where the robe tears, and the tear is this module's sharpest finding. The memorandum excised from Article 2 only the words about securing the establishment of the Jewish national home. It left the rest of Article 2 standing, in force, legally binding east of the Jordan — and what remained was the Mandatory's responsibility for *"the development of self-governing institutions, and also for safeguarding the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants."* So the promise of self-government was not withheld from Transjordan at all. It was retained, in the same document, by the same hand, in the same breath that withheld everything else; Britain undertook before the League to develop self-governing institutions east of the Jordan and then governed the territory through an emir it had imported, ministers it held a veto over, a resident whose advice could not be refused, and a legislative council it dissolved in 1931 when the council declined to pass the budget annex. The gap between the exact public words and the arrangement on the ground

is not a matter of inference here. It is a matter of reading one sentence of a League resolution against twenty-one articles of a treaty.

An independent Government

Those articles are the Agreement between His Majesty and the Amir of Trans-Jordan, signed at Jerusalem on 20 February 1928, and it is the robe's masterpiece, because it performs the whole trick inside a single short document. Its preamble announces that His Britannic Majesty *"is prepared to recognise the existence of an independent Government in Trans-Jordan under the rule of His Highness the Amir of Trans-Jordan, provided that such Government is constitutional and places His Britannic Majesty in a position to fulfill his international obligations in respect of that territory."* Independence, granted in a subordinate clause and conditioned in the same sentence on placing the grantor in a position to fulfil his obligations — which is to say, conditioned on being controllable. Then come the articles, and they should be set out in their own words, because the sum is the argument.

His Highness the Amir *"agrees to be guided by the advice of His Britannic Majesty"* in all matters concerning foreign relations and all important matters affecting British international and financial interests; he undertakes not to alter the system of control of the public finances without British consent; he agrees to refer for British advice the annual budget, any law affecting the currency, and — the two clauses that reveal precisely what Britain feared from this particular prince — *"any law whereby the grant of land or money or other donation or gratuity may be made to himself"* and *"any law under which the Amir may assume sovereignty over territory outside Trans-Jordan."* The first is a leash on Abdullah's chronic extravagance; the second is a leash on the Greater Syria ambition that had brought him north in the first place. On force: His Britannic Majesty *"may maintain armed forces in Trans-Jordan, and may raise, organise and control in Trans-Jordan such armed forces as may in his opinion be necessary"* — while the Amir *"agrees that he will not raise or maintain in Trans-Jordan or allow to be raised or maintained any military forces without the consent of His Britannic Majesty."* The floor of the last module is here in law: the sponsor may raise armies, the sovereign may not. On martial law, the Amir agrees to follow British advice in proclaiming it and to hand the administration of any district so placed to British officers, and to pass afterwards a special law indemnifying those forces for everything done under it. On money, Article 11 states the principle that the cost of defending Transjordan is a charge on Transjordan's own revenues, and Article 12 concedes what everyone knew — that so long

as those revenues were insufficient, arrangements would be made for a contribution from the British Treasury by way of grant or loan.

Two smaller clauses finish the portrait, and they are the ones a reader is likeliest to skim past. Article 1 provides that the ordinary expenses of civil government *and the salaries and expenses of the British Resident and his staff "will be borne entirely by Trans-Jordan,"* with the Amir providing their quarters: the supervised state pays for its own supervisor, and houses him. And Article 21 provides that the Agreement was drawn up in English and Arabic, that both texts have the same validity — and that *"in case of divergence between the two in the interpretation of one or other of the Articles of the present Agreement, the English text shall prevail."* There is the entire structure in a single sentence of boilerplate. Two languages, formally equal, in an agreement between two parties, formally partners; and when they diverge, one prevails. Not by argument, not by arbitration — by prior stipulation. A robe is a story about a relationship, and this one told the truth about the relationship in the clause nobody was meant to read.

The word doing the heaviest work across the whole instrument is *advice*. The Amir is to be guided by advice, to refer for advice, to follow advice. A United States State Department summary, writing for its own government's internal purposes and not for Geneva, rendered the arrangement without the delicacy: the agreement reserved to British *"advice,"* or control, certain matters — foreign relations, financial and fiscal policy, jurisdiction over foreigners, freedom of conscience. The scare-quotes are the Americans', and they are the whole point. Advice that cannot be refused is control, and a protectorate that names its control advice has written its robe into its constitution.

The liturgy

A story that must be performed annually before a supervisory body develops a liturgy, and the minutes of the League's Permanent Mandates Commission are that liturgy preserved. Once a year the mandatory's accredited representatives came to the Commission's table in Geneva and were questioned, courteously and at length, by men who could withhold approval and nothing else. The transcripts show something the framework should note carefully: the questioning was often sharp and sometimes exact. In the session examining the report for 1931, the High Commissioner, Sir Arthur Wauchope, opened by naming his three tasks — public security, goodwill and economic development, and increasing trust between people and government — and conceded that almost a third of the revenue went on defence and police, and that he could not foresee reducing it. The Chairman, after eleven

years supervising the mandate, remarked that he had always found it extremely difficult to ascertain whether the development of self-governing institutions was assured for all the inhabitants as Article 2 required, and said plainly that there was something in the situation which escaped him. In a later session a member drew attention to the arrangement's asymmetry in the plainest terms: in practice two mandates were being applied, one to Palestine and one to Trans-Jordan, and while Trans-Jordanians might go freely into Palestine, Jews were not allowed to settle in Trans-Jordan.

This is a genuinely unusual feature of the mandate-era robe and it deserves recording without either cynicism or credulity. The Commission was not a sham; its members read the reports, caught inconsistencies, and pressed. But it had no power beyond the record, and the record was answered by a mandatory who reported on himself. The performance was real and so was its emptiness — a tribunal that could question everything and compel nothing, hearing an account rendered by the only party in a position to know. What the liturgy produced was not accountability but *documentation*: an immense, meticulous, self-generated archive of trusteeship, which is exactly what a robe cut for an international audience looks like when the audience is honest and powerless.

The robe the conqueror did not write

And now the case bends away from the pattern, because there was a second robe over Transjordan, and Britain neither wrote it nor owned it.

The framework, reading colonial cases, expects the conquered to be offered nothing they can believe — the metropole gets the story, the colonised get the floor. That expectation holds for the mandate's own language, which meant nothing to a shaykh of the Bani Sakhr and was never meant to. But it does not describe the emirate, because the man Britain installed carried a legitimating story of his own, portable, ancient, and entirely legible to the people he was set over. Abdullah was a Hashemite: a descendant of the Prophet through the Sharifian house that had held Mecca for centuries, son of the Sharif who had been custodian of the Holy Cities, and a commander of the Arab Revolt that had thrown off Ottoman rule in the name of the Arabs. To a Sunni Arab Muslim population — and Transjordan's population was overwhelmingly that — this was not a foreign imposition dressed in unfamiliar clothes. It was a claim of the most familiar kind available: sacred descent plus martial service to the Arab cause, the two currencies of legitimacy in that world, held by one man.

This is the single most important structural fact about the imported chair in this study, and it is why the Kenya comparison from Module 1's close only half-applies. A forged apex with no story is expensive forever; it must be held up by the camp and the pass. Abdullah was an *imported* apex, which is why he had no local base and had to build one from nothing — but he was not an *illegitimate* one, because the robe he carried was intelligible to the governed in their own terms. The framework should mark the distinction plainly: importation and illegitimacy are separate variables, and a conqueror who imports an apex whose legitimating story the population already recognises has done something categorically different from one who invents a chief. What Britain supplied was the floor, the money, and the borders. What Abdullah supplied was the only part of the arrangement that the governed had any reason to believe — and it was not British, not liberal, not developmental, and not on file in Geneva.

The counter-robe

Against both robes a third story formed early, and it used the imperial vocabulary against the imperial arrangement. The 1928 Agreement, far from settling opinion, provoked it: the treaty was widely read in Transjordan as a failure to deliver the sovereignty its preamble advertised, and on 25 July 1928 a national congress assembled at Amman — notables, town leaders, and thinkers — declared itself a legitimate representative of the people, established an executive committee, and issued a National Charter, the first document of its kind in the country's history. Its opening principle was that the Emirate of Trans-Jordan is an independent and sovereign Arab state within its recognised borders, administered by an independent government.

Set that beside the treaty's preamble and the contest is exact. Britain's instrument said *independent Government* and meant a government whose budget, army, foreign relations, senior appointments, and legislation were subject to a foreign veto. The Charter said *independent and sovereign* and meant it. This is what the framework calls the robe being turned back on its makers: the conqueror's own legitimating vocabulary — self-determination, independence, the promises of the wartime correspondence and the Covenant's talk of provisional recognition — taken up by the governed and pressed, not as revolutionary doctrine but as a demand that the words be honoured in the sense they plainly bore. It is worth noting what the Charter did *not* do. It did not repudiate the Amir; the national movement's quarrel was with the treaty and the British hand, not with the Hashemite chair. The counter-robe attacked the imperial story while leaving the portable

one standing — further evidence that the two robes over Transjordan were genuinely separate garments, and that only one of them was resented.

Reading the robe against the framework

The module confirms the reversed robe and then adds to it. Confirmed: the legitimating story was cut for the metropole and its international audience, in words — *sacred trust of civilisation*, *peoples not yet able to stand by themselves*, *independent Government*, *advice* — that were meticulously drafted, formally binding, and addressed to people who would never set foot east of the Jordan. Added: the mandate system introduces a robe audience the framework does not yet carry, a *supervisory tribunal* that is neither ruler nor ruled — external, formally empowered, materially toothless, and dependent on the conqueror's own reporting. The corpus should hold this as a distinct third audience, because it changes the robe's texture: an order answering annually to a body that can question but not compel produces enormous documentary self-justification and no correction, and the abundance of the archive can be mistaken by later readers for the abundance of the accountability. That is a trap for any historian working from mandate records, and this study will keep flagging it.

The second contribution is the one drawn from Article 25, and it is a genuine sharpening of the framework's account of formation withheld. The framework treats withholding as a practice inferable from what a conqueror does not build. Transjordan shows it can be a *statute* — an express legal power to postpone or withhold whichever obligations the mandatory himself considered inapplicable, subject to a tiny inviolable floor. When withholding is written into law rather than exercised in silence, two things follow. The withholding becomes auditable, which is why we can read it a century later in the League's own resolution. And it becomes *legitimate* in the order's own terms — not a failure to keep a promise but the lawful exercise of a discretion the promise itself conferred. That is a more advanced technology of rule than simple neglect, and the corpus should name it: the discretionary clause is the mechanism by which an order can withhold formation without ever breaking its word.

The third contribution is the separation of importation from illegitimacy. The framework's colonial bend assumes that a conqueror's story does not take with the conquered, and so predicts an expensive-pole order running on force and surveillance. Transjordan complicates this, because the apex carried a robe the conqueror did not write and could not have written — Sharifian descent and Arab Revolt service — which was legible to the governed in their own categories. The prediction should therefore be

conditioned: an imported apex begins with no *local* base, but if his legitimating story is one the population already holds valid, the chair can root in a way a forged chieftaincy cannot. What made this available here was the substrate the landscape described — an overwhelmingly Sunni Arab Muslim population for whom descent from the Prophet was not an exotic claim but the top of the existing hierarchy of legitimacy. The lesson is not that importing rulers works; it is that the robe's fate depends on whether it is cut from cloth the governed already recognise.

Two disciplines close the module. The first concerns naming the fiction as fiction without pretending it did nothing. The 1928 Agreement's "independent Government" was a legal fiction, and the twenty-one articles beneath it say so. But Article 25 and the 1922 memorandum, which withheld from Transjordanians the self-determination the Covenant gestured at, also withheld from them the Jewish national home — and so the same instrument that denied them sovereignty shielded the east bank from the settler project convulsing the west. Transjordanians experienced the mandate's exclusions, uniquely among the peoples in this collection, as partly *protective*. That is not a defence of the arrangement; it is a fact about it, and a study that suppressed it to keep the indictment clean would be doing propaganda. The second discipline is the one this collection keeps: the men who drafted "sacred trust of civilisation" were not, most of them, cynics. The language of trusteeship was believed by many who wrote and administered it, and belief is precisely what made it effective — a robe worn sincerely is warmer than a robe worn knowingly. That the trust was real in the minds of its trustees does not make the ward's incapacity real, or the discretion honest, or the independence independent. It makes the whole thing harder to see, which is the function a robe performs. And when the two texts diverged, the English text prevailed.

A note on sources. Every quotation in this module is from a public-domain primary text and is reproduced exactly. Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations ("peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world"; "a sacred trust of civilisation"; "advanced nations who by reason of their resources, their experience or their geographical position") is quoted from the Covenant text as reproduced in the League and United Nations records. Article 25 of the Mandate for Palestine ("to postpone or withhold application of such provisions of this mandate as he may consider inapplicable to the existing local conditions") is quoted from the mandate as confirmed by the Council of the League at London on 24 July 1922 and communicated as C.529.M.314.1922.VI. The Trans-Jordan memorandum's operative resolution ("are not applicable to the territory known as Transjordan") and its concluding undertaking are quoted from the memorandum presented by the British representative and approved by the Council on 16 September 1922; the list of provisions declared inapplicable — recitals 2 and 3 of the preamble, Articles 4, 6, 13, 14, 22 and 23, and specified portions of Articles 2, 7 and 11 — is given as the memorandum lists it, and the point that the remainder of Article 2, including "the development of self-governing institutions," was left in force follows from the text of both documents. All quotations from the 1928 treaty are from the Agreement between His Majesty and the Amir of Trans-Jordan, signed at Jerusalem, 20 February 1928 (His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1930), ratifications exchanged 31 October 1929. The Permanent Mandates Commission exchanges — Sir Arthur Wauchope's opening statement and the Chairman's remark about Article 2, from the twenty-second session examining the 1931 report, and the observation that Trans-Jordanians might enter Palestine while Jews were not allowed to settle in Trans-Jordan, from a later session — are paraphrased from the published minutes rather than quoted at length. The State Department's rendering of the treaty as reserving to British "advice", or control, is from Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946. The 1928 National Charter's first principle is given in substance from a Jordanian official account of the congress of 25 July 1928; the Charter's full Arabic text was not verified against a primary reproduction in the course of writing, and it is therefore summarised rather than quoted. Modern scholarship is paraphrased and credited, not quoted: Mary Wilson on Abdullah's position and ambitions; Philip Robins on the treaty and the emirate's constitutional development; and the standard accounts of the 1929 and 1931 Legislative Councils, including the dissolution of 1931 following the council's failure to pass the budget annex. Where the record disagrees, the disagreement is given rather than resolved.

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PATTERNS OF POWER · BRITISH TRANSJORDAN — MODULE 4

FOUR IN THE FIRST CLASS

> *Module 4 · Formation — what the order taught, and to whom: a country whose only secondary school graduated four boys in its first year, whose teachers were imported and carried a rival creed, whose oldest law the state licensed rather than replaced, and whose real school was a regiment*

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

The question, and why the poor case sharpens it

Formation is the machinery by which an order stops needing its floor: the schooling, the ritual, the calendar, the law a person is raised inside, so that by adulthood the arrangement is not a thing imposed on him but the shape of the world he thinks with. The framework's colonial prediction is bleak and specific — that a conqueror withholds formation from the majority, because to form them fully would be to admit them, and admitting them would end the arrangement; and that the withholding is expensive in the long run, because an unformed population must be held by force, which is why colonial orders stay brittle and surveillance-heavy while the naturalised orders they displace run cheaply on conviction.

Transjordan tests that prediction under a hard constraint the framework has not yet had to reckon with: a conqueror who could not have afforded mass formation even had he wanted it. Britain was subsidising this state, not extracting from it; there was no surplus to fund a school system and no political will in London to send more. So the case cannot cleanly distinguish *would not* from *could not*, and any honest reading has to hold both. What it can do — and what makes it valuable — is show with unusual clarity what happens in the space formation does not fill. The finding of this module is that the space did not stay empty. It was filled three times over: by an old order the state chose to license rather than replace, by imported teachers carrying a creed the state had not commissioned, and by a regiment that turned out to be the most effective school in the country.

Four in the first class

Begin with the arithmetic, because it is the least arguable thing here. At the founding, formal education east of the Jordan amounted to something on the order of twenty-five religious schools — *kuttabs*, in which boys learned Qur'anic recitation and the rudiments of Arabic letters, the ordinary provision of the late Ottoman countryside. A Department of Education was established in 1923 to unify curricula and open government schools, and in the same period the emirate's first secondary school was founded at Salt, its foundation stone laid by Abdullah himself, the building rising to seventeen rooms. Teaching began in 1924. The first class graduated in 1925, and it numbered four students: Ahmad al-Zahir, Dawood Abdul Rahman Tuffaha, AbdulRahim al-Waked, and Ali Mohammad Abdullah Mismer. The second cohort, in 1926, numbered three.

Four boys, then three, from the only secondary school in a country of a quarter of a million people. It would be easy to make that figure do more work than it can bear — a single school's early cohorts are not a national enrolment series, primary provision grew faster than secondary, and the mandate's later years saw real expansion whose precise figures this study has not verified and will not invent. But the shape is not in doubt and the shape is the point. In a territory the size of Transjordan, in the third and fourth years of the emirate, the entire annual output of secondary education could be seated at one table and named individually. Whatever formation this order was performing, it was not the mass manufacture of citizens.

And that is exactly what the framework predicts, with the poverty adding its own twist. A conqueror who withholds formation ordinarily does so because forming the governed would oblige him to admit them. Here a second logic ran alongside the first and pointed the same way: a buffer needs a quiet population, not an educated one, and every pound spent on schools was a pound the Treasury had to send. The two motives — do not admit them, and do not pay for them — converge on the same empty classroom, which is why this case cannot separate them and should not pretend to. What it can say is that the result was a country whose educated class, for a generation, was small enough to know each other by name.

The teachers came with a creed

The consequence the framework flags — that withheld formation does not create a vacuum but leaves the field to whoever else is forming — appears here in an unusually literal form,

and it is this module's first real finding. Transjordan had almost no teachers of its own, so it hired them, and it hired them from the places that had them: the staff who opened the Salt school in 1924 came from Palestine, Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq. Across the mandate the same pattern held; a shortage of qualified local personnel meant that the schoolmasters forming the emirate's small elite were overwhelmingly outsiders from the wider Arab east, many of them formed in turn at the American University of Beirut, which had become the region's chief incubator of pan-Arab thought, where students from across the Arab provinces met, studied, and learned to organise.

Consider what this means structurally. A colonial state too poor to make its own teachers must buy them, and the men it buys arrive already formed — carrying the political creed of the milieu that produced them. What the emirate's schools transmitted, therefore, was not British trusteeship, not loyalty to the mandate, and not the developmental gospel of Article 22. It was Arabism: the conviction that the Arab lands were one nation artificially divided, that the wartime promises had been betrayed, and that the borders drawn at Cairo and San Remo were impositions. The mandatory power was, through its own Department of Education and out of its own subsidy, paying the salaries of the men teaching the next generation to regard the mandate as illegitimate. Scholars of these mandates have noted the corollary: because qualified teachers were scarce and locally valued, they could join anti-government protest and keep their posts, being too useful to dismiss — a class of privileged intermediaries protected by their own indispensability.

The long consequence is visible in who ran the country afterwards. The educated class formed in these tiny schools became, almost mechanically, the political class: of the seventeen men who served as prime minister of Jordan from the end of the mandate to the early 1970s, six were former teachers. That is what a very small formation pipeline does — it does not fail to produce a governing elite, it produces a *narrow* one, in which the schoolmaster and the minister are the same person at different ages, and in which the ideas circulating in a handful of classrooms in the 1920s become the state's governing vocabulary in the 1950s. Formation withheld from the many was formation concentrated in the few, and the few were formed by pan-Arabists on the government payroll.

The order that was already there

Beneath and around the sparse new schooling stood the formation that actually shaped nearly everyone — and it was not new, and it was not British, and it did not need the state's help. The population east of the Jordan was overwhelmingly Sunni Muslim, and it lived

inside a fully naturalised Islamic order: the Qur'anic school, the mosque, the *sharīʿa* court for marriage and inheritance and personal status, the Ramadan fast and the two Eids structuring the year, the pilgrimage road running south through Maʿan that had defined the region's place in the Muslim world for a millennium. Alongside it, and in the desert more powerfully than it, ran tribal customary law — *ʿurf* — with its own procedures for blood-money, truce, banishment, honour, and the settlement of feud, administered by shaykhs whose authority rested on lineage and consent rather than on any state.

The recursion the framework insists on applies exactly here and must be stated without condescension in either direction. That Islamic order was itself the residue of a conquest — the seventh-century Arab-Muslim expansion that broke Byzantine rule at the Yarmuk in 636 and remade the region's law, language, and calendar — which had been naturalised over thirteen centuries until it was not an ideology at all but simply the way the world was. Its origin as a conquest does not make it false or its adherents dupes; it makes it a thing that was built and then became real, and by 1921 it was more real, more deeply held, and vastly cheaper to run than anything Britain could have constructed. Customary law, likewise, was not a primitive survival but a functioning legal system with its own jurisprudence and its own experts, one of whom — ʿAwda al-Qusus of Karak — would write it down. The emirate was an expensive new order laid over a cheap old one that had long since reached the self-running pole. That asymmetry is the heart of the case, and it explains why the state's formation problem was never really a contest. It could not out-form Islam and *ʿurf* on a British grant-in-aid, and it did not try.

Licensing the old law

What it did instead is this module's central finding, and it is not on the framework's list of options. The state neither replaced the old formation nor merely tolerated it. It *licensed* it — and in licensing became the authority from which the old law's validity now flowed.

The instrument was the Law of Tribal Courts, first passed in 1924 and amended in 1929 and again in 1936, the last version drafted by Glubb himself. It did not abolish customary law; it constituted it as a recognised jurisdiction of the state. The law scheduled which tribes were permitted to use their own justice systems and for which categories of claim — the characteristically tribal matters of honour, blood-money, and the sheltering of a culprit — with the courts judged by tribal shaykhs themselves. And it inserted the state at the two points that mattered: prospective tribal judges had to apply to the Prime Minister for the King's approval, and a state committee oversaw the courts. The central government reserved

powers of fine and imprisonment which in practice it scarcely used, and which were there less to punish than to establish the principle of superiority.

The elegance of this, as a technique of rule, is considerable, and the framework should carry it as a distinct move. To replace an entrenched formation is ruinously expensive and usually fails. To leave it alone is to leave a rival source of authority standing. But to *license* it is to get both — the old order goes on doing the work of ordering people's lives at no cost to the treasury, while the question of who authorises it has been quietly answered in the state's favour. The shaykh still judges, in the same tent, by the same customary rules his grandfather used; but he now judges as an approved officer of a jurisdiction the King confirms, and the law he applies is valid because a schedule in Amman says so. Nothing visible changes and the location of sovereignty moves. It is the same logic as the land settlement in Module 2, which registered the shaykhs' seizures and thereby made their possession depend on the register — and it is the same sting: the licensed authority is enriched in status and diminished in independence, converted from a rival into an organ.

The regiment was the school

The last of the three fillers is the one the previous module uncovered from the other side. If the emirate's schools formed a few dozen boys a year, the Arab Legion formed thousands of men across a generation, and it formed them in precisely the direction the state needed. The Bedouin recruit of Glubb's Desert Patrol and the units that grew from it entered for the wage, the exemption, the rifle, and the protection; he stayed inside an institution that gave him rank, a uniform that marked him, a discipline that ordered his year, comrades drawn from tribes his father had raided, and an oath to a throne. Over twenty years — and then through his sons, for service ran in families — the man who had joined for money became a man whose identity was the regiment and whose regiment was the King's.

That is formation, in the framework's full sense: not instruction but the manufacture of a self that cannot easily be imagined outside the order it serves. And it was, for a poor state, radically more efficient than schooling. A school forms a whole population slowly, expensively, and with no guarantee of loyalty — as the pan-Arabist teachers were demonstrating in the same years. A regiment forms exactly the men whose capacity for organised violence would otherwise be the state's chief danger, converts that capacity into the state's own floor, and binds them by interest before conviction has time to be required. In a country that could not afford to form its people, the army formed the people who counted. The corollary should be stated plainly, because it will matter for everything after

1948: an order whose deepest formation runs through its army has bound its most-formed men to the throne and left the rest of the population comparatively unattached — and it has made the army, rather than the school or the church or the party, the institution through which national identity is transmitted.

The counter-formation, and the cheque that answered it

The rival formation the framework predicts did arrive, and the state's response reveals what its own formation was made of. Through the 1930s Arab nationalism ran east across the river from Palestine, where the mandate's other half was tearing itself apart, and by the revolt of 1936–39 it had found sympathy among Transjordanian shaykhs. Glubb observed that support directly. What Britain did about it was not to build schools, not to launch a competing civic ideology, and not to send troops. It sent money: grants placed in the hands of Glubb and Abdullah to be distributed among the tribal shaykhs in exchange for loyalty, a system of subsidisation that continued for years afterward.

Set beside the naturalised orders it was competing with, that response is diagnostic. Islam had thirteen centuries of formation behind it; Arab nationalism had teachers, newspapers, and a grievance that was substantially true. The emirate answered with a subvention. And the subvention worked, in the sense that the tribes did not rise and the order held — but it worked the way a wage works, not the way a creed works, and it had to be paid again the following year. The framework's diagnostic sharpens here: an order that must keep buying its elite's loyalty annually has not formed them, it has rented them. The interesting question, which the modules on collapse and convergence will have to answer, is what happens over decades when the rent is paid reliably enough and long enough that the renting itself becomes traditional — whether purchased loyalty, sustained across three generations of the same families, eventually hardens into the real thing.

Reading formation against the framework

The module confirms the prediction and then adds a mechanism the framework does not yet carry. Confirmed: formation was withheld from the majority, the schools were minimal, and the old order held the field — precisely the pattern the colonial bend anticipates, with the poverty of this particular colony making the withholding overdetermined rather than purely political, which is a distinction the corpus should record as a genuine ambiguity rather than resolve for narrative tidiness.

The addition is *licensing*, and it belongs in the framework as a third option beside forming and withholding. A conqueror facing an entrenched native formation has been treated as having two choices: replace it, at ruinous cost and usually in vain, or withhold his own and leave the field to it. Transjordan demonstrates a third and cheaper move — constitute the existing formation as a delegated jurisdiction of the state, schedule who may exercise it, approve its officers, and reserve nominal supervisory powers you need never use. The old formation keeps running at its own expense and continues to order people's lives exactly as before; what changes is that its validity now derives from the state. This is the formation analogue of the settlement's land register and of the Menu's co-optation family, and its signature is that it produces no visible rupture and no resistance, because from below nothing has been taken away. The framework should also note the price the licensor pays: an order that licenses rather than forms never acquires the direct claim on its subjects' loyalty that formation confers — it holds them at one remove, through intermediaries whose own standing it has just underwritten, which is durable in calm and exposed in crisis, since the intermediary can always be bid for by someone else.

Two further findings. The first is that withheld formation with *imported teachers* is not a vacuum but an outsourcing, and the outsourcer does not choose the content. A state too poor to make teachers buys men already formed elsewhere and thereby imports their creed on its own payroll — which is how the British-subsidised schools of a British-supervised emirate came to transmit pan-Arabism to the boys who would later govern. The corpus should mark this as a general mechanism: wherever formation is thin and personnel are imported, the formation that actually occurs will carry the ideology of the exporting society, not the importing state. The second is that in a surplus-poor order, the *army* is the efficient formation institution — cheaper than schooling, targeted at exactly the population whose violence is the state's chief risk, and producing a bond that runs through families across generations. That is the deep answer to Module 1's question about whether a wage can become a loyalty: it can, because the regiment is not merely an employer but a formative institution, and twenty years inside one does what twelve years of school would have done, to a smaller number of much more important men.

Two disciplines close the module. The first is against condescension in both directions. The Islamic and customary orders that held the field were not the absence of formation awaiting a modern replacement; they were a complete and functioning formation, older and better rooted than anything the emirate possessed, and the people formed by them were not unformed people but differently formed ones. That the mandate did not displace them is a fact about the mandate's weakness and poverty, not about its subjects' backwardness. The

second is against reading the licensing of tribal law as simple respect for indigenous custom, which is how the mandate's own reports presented it and how it is sometimes remembered. It was respect, in a real sense — the courts were genuine, the shaykhs genuinely judged, and the arrangement spared the desert the imposition of an alien code it would have resisted and the treasury a cost it could not have borne. It was also the quiet transfer of the source of law's authority from the tribe to the throne, accomplished by a schedule and an approval process, in a country where four boys had just graduated from the only secondary school. Both of those are true, and the tribal courts law is where they were written down together.

A note on sources. This module rests on institutional and legislative history rather than on a marquee primary text, and no founding education ordinance or tribal courts statute is quoted verbatim here, because none was verified against a clean public-domain reproduction of its text in the course of writing; a doubtful line is dropped rather than guessed, and the laws are therefore described from the reference and scholarly literature. Verified particulars: roughly twenty-five religious schools at the emirate's founding; a Department of Education from 1923; the founding of the Salt secondary school with its foundation stone laid by Abdullah, teaching from 1924, a first graduating class of four in 1925 and a second of three in 1926, with staff drawn from Palestine, Syria, Lebanon and Iraq; the Law of Tribal Courts of 1924, amended in 1929 and 1936, the 1936 version drafted by Glubb, scheduling the tribes entitled to their own courts, requiring prospective tribal judges to seek the King's approval through the Prime Minister, and placing the courts under a state committee's oversight; and the distribution of British grants through Glubb and Abdullah to secure shaykhly loyalty following the Palestinian revolt of 1936. No national enrolment series or education budget share for mandate Transjordan was verified, and none is given; the four-and-three figures are the early cohorts of a single school and are presented as such, not as a national total. The count of six former teachers among the seventeen prime ministers serving from the end of the mandate to the early 1970s is drawn from the scholarly literature on educators in the British mandates. Modern scholarship is paraphrased and credited, not quoted: Hilary Falb Kalisman on educators as privileged intermediaries across Iraq, Palestine and Transjordan and on the American University of Beirut as a pan-Arab hub; Yoav Alon on tribal politics, subsidisation and the shaykhs; Eugene Rogan on Karak and the late-Ottoman frontier; and the legal-anthropological literature on the Law of Tribal Courts and on customary law in Jordan, including reference to ʿAwda al-Qusus's written treatment of Bedouin justice. Where the record disagrees or is incomplete, the gap is stated rather than filled.

Part of the collection Patterns of Power. *Tested, never revealed.*

PATTERNS OF POWER · BRITISH TRANSJORDAN — MODULE 5

THE MIDDLE EASTERN SERVICES VOTE

> *Module 5 · The Cost Column — the ledger that runs backward: what a buffer cost the treasury that held it, why it was roughly one per cent of the colony next door, what the cheapness was made of, and the single year in which the whole premium was repaid*

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The column with a minus sign

Every order has a cost column: the price of holding the floor, staffing the administration, and keeping the arrangement from coming apart, set against what the arrangement yields. The framework's usual finding is that a conqueror works to drive the first number down and the second up, and that the ratio between them explains most of what looks like ideology — that an order which can be held cheaply will be held gently, and an order which requires constant force will be brutal in proportion, not from malice but from arithmetic. The colonial cases in this collection have all run the column the same way: extraction on the credit side, garrison and administration on the debit, and the conqueror's whole art directed at widening the gap.

Transjordan runs it backward. There is no credit side. The emirate produced no exportable surplus, paid no tribute, sent home no commodity; its entire material relation to the metropole was a flow of money in the wrong direction. What the ledger records instead is a purchase — Britain buying a strategic position with an annual payment — and the interesting questions become how much the position cost, why it cost so remarkably little, and what, if anything, the buyer ever collected. The answers are unusually precise, because a state funded by parliamentary vote leaves its accounts in the public record, and the men who asked about them in the Commons were asking exactly the question this module asks.

What the founding cost

The first arithmetic is the plainest statement of dependence in the study. When St John Philby, the British Resident, revised the emirate's budget for the year 1923–24, the figures ran roughly as follows: local revenue of about £142,800 against British aid of about £161,900, with civil government expenses of about £153,688 and the cost of the Arab Army about £135,000. Two ratios sit inside that table and both are decisive. British aid *exceeded* everything the country could raise from its own people — the sponsor was the majority shareholder in the state's income, not a supplement to it. And the army consumed something close to half of all expenditure, in a country with no external enemy but the Ikhwan and no internal one but its own tribes. This was a state whose principal activity was maintaining a floor of force, financed by a foreign treasury which paid more into it than its own population did.

By the middle of the decade the arrangement had settled into the form that would carry it through the mandate, and it appears in the British estimates under a name that tells the whole story. Asked in the Commons on 23 March 1927 what grant or loan in aid Britain made to Transjordan, the government answered that *the sum of £92,000 was provided in the Middle Eastern Services Vote for 1926 as a contribution to the Trans-Jordan Administration; that in addition £108,000 was provided in the same Vote as a grant-in-aid of the cost of the Trans-Jordan Frontier Force, a similar amount being borne on Palestine funds; and that in 1927 both the contribution to the administration and the grant-in-aid of the Frontier Force would be reduced.*

There is the emirate as the metropole saw it: two figures in a subhead of an estimate, alongside a promise that both would be cut next year. A country of a quarter of a million people, with an army, a prince, a cabinet, a land department, and a constitution in preparation, appearing in the imperial accounts as roughly two hundred thousand pounds under Middle Eastern Services — and half of that not for Transjordan's own administration at all but for a frontier force run by the Air Ministry, whose cost Palestine matched pound for pound. The framework's dictum that a cheap order will be held gently is not an abstraction here; it is a line item, and the line was under continuous pressure to shrink.

One per cent of the country next door

The figure means little until it is set beside the alternative, and the alternative was ninety miles east. Iraq's revolt of 1920 cost the British Treasury on the order of £40 million to

suppress — the estimates cluster around forty and run as high as fifty — with British and Indian dead in the hundreds to a thousand and Iraqi dead estimated in the thousands to over ten thousand. Before the rising, the ordinary annual cost of holding Mesopotamia was running at something like £18 to £20 million. Those numbers produced the political crisis that produced the Cairo Conference: an anti-waste campaign in the press, demands to quit Mesopotamia altogether, and Churchill's search for any method of holding the Middle East that did not involve garrisoning it with imperial infantry.

Now set the columns side by side. Iraq: tens of millions a year, and a single year's rebellion costing forty million. Transjordan: ninety-two thousand pounds for the administration, plus a shared frontier force. Even totalling the Vote's Transjordan lines and allowing generously for the RAF detachment and the officers seconded from the British Army, the emirate was costing Britain on the order of one per cent of what Iraq had been costing — and the 1920 Iraqi revolt alone, in one year, cost several hundred times Transjordan's annual administrative grant.

That ratio is the buffer's entire justification and the reason the arrangement survived every economy drive of the interwar years. It is also, read structurally, the reason for almost everything the preceding modules described. The cheapness was not luck; it was manufactured, and each of its components has already appeared in this study wearing a different label.

What the cheapness was made of

Module 1 found a floor made of a native army rather than an imperial garrison — and a native army is cheap in a way an imperial one cannot be, because it pays local wages in a local economy, requires no shipping, no home leave, no imperial pension, and generates no domestic political cost when its men die. Glubb's Desert Patrol began with twenty men and four trucks; the Legion of 1926 numbered around fifteen hundred and did the work that squadrons and armoured car companies were doing next door. Module 2 found an apex bought with recognition, rank, and registered title rather than with cash transfers at scale — Mithqal al-Fayez was made the country's greatest landowner largely by having his existing seizures written into a register, which cost the Treasury nothing. Module 3 found a robe that required no investment in the colony at all, being cut for Geneva and Westminster, and a legal instrument, Article 25, that permitted the mandatory to withhold whichever developmental obligations he judged inapplicable — which is to say, whichever ones cost money. Module 4 found formation withheld and, more ingeniously, the old formation

licensed: the Law of Tribal Courts let customary law go on ordering the desert at the tribes' own expense while the state took the authority to approve its judges. A country of four secondary-school graduates a year is a country with almost no education budget.

Assemble those and the finding is one the framework should carry explicitly: in this case the legitimacy devices and the cost-control devices are the same devices. Recruiting the base instead of policing it, co-opting a shaykh with a title deed instead of a stipend, licensing the old law instead of imposing a new one, importing an apex whose legitimating story the population already accepted — each of these was chosen or stumbled into because it was cheap, and each of them also happened to be the thing that made the order sit more lightly on the governed. Cheapness and consent were not in tension here. They were two descriptions of the same policy, which is precisely why this colony was both the least profitable and the least resented in the collection, and why it would prove the most durable.

The premium and the payout

A ledger with no credit side raises the obvious question, and it is the one the Commons kept asking: what was Britain actually getting? For long stretches the honest answer is *nothing visible* — a quiet frontier, a prince who did not attack the French, a desert that no longer raided. Positional assets pay nothing at all for years at a time, which is why they are perpetually vulnerable to the economy drive, and why the 1927 answer promised reductions.

Then the position pays everything at once. The pattern of the returns is worth laying out because it is the module's most important structural point. In 1924 the emirate's forces and British aircraft broke a large Ikhwan raiding force near Amman, walling the Wahhabi off from the settled edge of Palestine. Through the Palestinian revolt of 1936–39 the frontier force and the Legion contained the spillover eastward, kept Transjordan's own shaykhs from joining, and guarded the Iraq–Haifa oil pipeline running across the territory. And then came 1941. When a pro-Axis government under Rashid Ali seized power in Baghdad and besieged the RAF cantonment at Habbaniya, the column Britain scraped together to relieve it and retake the Iraqi capital included Glubb and his desert men; in the following weeks the Legion fought the Vichy French in the Syrian campaign; throughout, it guarded British installations in Palestine and the pipeline, freeing imperial troops for other theatres. In the single most dangerous year of the empire's twentieth century, with Rommel in the western desert and the Middle Eastern position hanging on a thread, the cheap little army that had cost a couple of hundred thousand a year turned out to be the reserve that helped hold Iraq.

The arithmetic of the war years shows what that was worth and what it then cost. The Legion expanded from a strength of about 1,450 costing some £186,000 in 1940 to nearly 6,000 costing over £1,600,000 by 1945 — a near-ninefold increase in expenditure — and estimates of its end-of-war strength vary considerably across the sources, some putting it as high as eight or even sixteen thousand, so the figure should be held as a range. By 1949 it stood at around twelve thousand and by 1956 around twenty-two thousand. And from its inception until the mid-1950s, every penny of its cost was British.

So the cost column has a shape the framework has not yet described. The buffer was an insurance premium: small, annual, apparently wasted, resented by the men who had to justify it in Parliament, and then redeemed in a single claim that no accumulation of savings could have covered. This has a sharp implication for how positional colonies should be read. Ordinary cost-column reasoning — what does it cost, what does it yield, is the ratio favourable — systematically misprices them, because the yield is not an income stream but a contingent payout, and the years of apparent waste are not evidence against the arrangement but the premium being paid. Britain in 1927 could see only the ninety-two thousand pounds. Britain in 1941 collected.

Who else was paying

Cheap for the metropole is not the same as free for the governed, and the ledger has a second page that the parliamentary answers do not show. The 1928 Agreement is explicit about where the burdens sat. Article 1 provided that the ordinary expenses of civil government *and the salaries and expenses of the British Resident and his staff* would be borne entirely by Trans-Jordan, with the Amir providing their quarters. Article 11 recognised the principle that the cost of the forces required for the defence of Trans-Jordan was a charge on the revenues of that territory, that Transjordan would continue to bear a sixth of the Frontier Force's cost, and that as soon as its finances permitted it would bear the excess cost of British forces stationed there and the whole cost of any force raised for Transjordan alone. Article 12 conceded the reality — that while revenues were insufficient, the Treasury would contribute — but the principle was established and the direction of travel was clear: the subsidy was a temporary indulgence against a debt the territory was expected eventually to shoulder.

Meanwhile the population paid the ordinary way, through a land tax on a poor agrarian economy, assessed on holdings the cadastral survey was in the process of registering. The framework's discipline requires this to be stated without inflation and without erasure. Transjordanians were not being drained; there was nothing to drain, the taxes were modest,

and in drought years the state softened them and advanced seed loans. But they were funding a British Resident who supervised them, they were told in treaty language that their own defence was properly their own charge, and roughly half the state's expenditure in the founding years went to an army commanded by British officers. The cost column of a subsidised colony is not empty on the native side. It is simply small, like everything else about the place.

Reading the cost column against the framework

Three contributions, and the first is the one this whole case exists to make. The framework's cost column presumes an extractive relation and asks whether the yield justifies the cost of holding. Transjordan requires a second column type — the *positional* colony, whose value is where it is rather than what it produces, whose ledger runs negative by design, and whose returns arrive not as income but as contingent payouts at moments of crisis. Two consequences follow that the corpus should carry. Such a colony is permanently vulnerable to the economy drive, because in ordinary years its accounts show only cost, which is why the 1927 answer promised cuts and why every interwar retrenchment threatened it. And such a colony is systematically undervalued by exactly the accounting the metropole uses to judge it — until the year it is not, at which point the payout is beyond the reach of any savings the cuts would have achieved. The insurance logic is the correct frame, and no participant in the parliamentary exchanges of the 1920s appears to have used it.

The second contribution concerns the identity of cheapness and consent. In the extractive colony these pull against each other: extraction requires coercion, coercion costs money, and the conqueror trades brutality against expense. In the buffer colony they align, because every device that made Transjordan cheap — the native army, the co-opted shaykh, the licensed customary court, the legible imported apex, the unbuilt school — also made it less intrusive. This is the structural reason a study of this case must resist the conclusion it invites. The order was gentler than its neighbours *and* the gentleness was not primarily a moral achievement; it was what a treasury unwilling to spend produces when it must nonetheless hold ground. That the outcome was better for the governed than Iraq's or Palestine's is true. That it was chosen for their sake is not.

The third contribution is about dependency's direction, and it complicates a point Module 2 made. A sponsor who funds rather than extracts holds an obvious lever: he can stop paying, and the coalition he assembled dissolves. But the lever binds at both ends. A client whose army, administration, and throne all rest on the sponsor's cheque becomes an

obligation the sponsor cannot easily set down, because withdrawal does not merely end a subsidy — it produces the collapse of a state in a position the sponsor cared about enough to buy. By the 1940s Britain was not paying for the Arab Legion because it wished to; it was paying because the alternative was to unmake the only reliable military asset it possessed between Suez and the Gulf. The subsidy is a leash held at both ends, and the question of which end pulls harder is answered by whichever party can better afford the rupture. That question will decide the collapse module, because the answer changed — not when the client grew strong, but when the metropole's will emptied and a richer sponsor appeared.

Two disciplines close the module. The first: the smallness of these figures should not be mistaken for the smallness of what was done with them. Ninety-two thousand pounds bought a monopoly of violence over a quarter of a million people, the end of an economy of raiding that had run for centuries, the registration of every village's land, and the installation of a dynasty that still reigns. The cheapest interventions in this collection were not the least consequential; they were merely the least noticed, and the parliamentary record's brevity about Transjordan is itself a finding about how little attention a well-functioning arrangement attracts. The second: an order that costs its metropole almost nothing is an order whose metropole has almost no reason to examine it. The seam that colonial studies exist to trace — between what is said at the centre and what is done on the ground — is held open here not by concealment but by *indifference*. Nobody in London was lied to about Transjordan. They were simply told the sum, and told it would be reduced, and asked no further questions, because a hundred thousand pounds is not enough money to make anyone curious. That is the cheapest hold of all, and the module on information and suppression will have to take it up.

A note on sources. The parliamentary figures are quoted from the answer given in the House of Commons on 23 March 1927 (Hansard), a public-domain primary record: £92,000 in the Middle Eastern Services Vote for 1926 as a contribution to the Trans-Jordan Administration, £108,000 in the same Vote as a grant-in-aid of the Trans-Jordan Frontier Force with a similar amount borne on Palestine funds, and the statement that both would be reduced in 1927; the Hansard page could not be retrieved directly and the wording is taken from a verbatim reproduction of the entry, with its date and House recorded. The treaty provisions on cost — Article 1 (ordinary expenses and the Resident's salaries borne entirely by Trans-Jordan), Article 11 (defence a charge on the territory's revenues, a sixth of the Frontier Force's cost, and the eventual assumption of further costs), and Article 12 (Treasury contribution by grant or loan while revenues are insufficient) — are quoted or closely rendered from the Agreement between His Majesty and the Amir of Trans-Jordan, signed at Jerusalem, 20 February 1928 (HMSO, 1930). The 1923–24 budget figures (local revenue about £142,800; British aid about £161,900; civil government expenses about £153,688; Arab Army about £135,000) are from a scholarly reconstruction of the British Resident's financial administration and are given as approximations. Contested or varying figures are given as ranges: the cost of suppressing the 1920 Iraqi revolt at roughly £40–50 million, with casualties variously reported; the pre-revolt annual cost of holding Mesopotamia at roughly £18–20 million; the Arab Legion's wartime growth from about 1,450 men costing some £186,000 in 1940 to nearly 6,000 costing over £1,600,000 by 1945, with end-of-war strength estimates ranging as high as eight or sixteen thousand and the sources in clear disagreement; and later strengths of roughly 12,000 by 1949 and 22,000 by 1956. The statement that the Legion's costs were borne entirely by Britain from its inception until the mid-1950s is drawn from the reference literature. Modern scholarship is paraphrased and credited, not quoted: Philip Robins on the grant-in-aid and the emirate's finances; the Cambridge study of Glubb and the Arab Legion for the wartime expansion figures and the 1946 treaty context; and the standard accounts of the 1941 Iraq and Syria campaigns, the 1936–39 containment, and the pipeline guard. Where the record disagrees, the disagreement is given rather than resolved.

Part of the collection Patterns of Power. *Tested, never revealed.*

PATTERNS OF POWER · BRITISH TRANSJORDAN — MODULE 6

A REASONABLE TRANSIT TAX

> *Module 6 · Extraction — what is taken from a place with nothing to take: a tithe on a poor harvest, a customs frontier that ran through someone else's ports, the one mineral prize sited on the far bank by a border drawn with it in mind, and the moment the protecting power advised its client to refuse money*

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

The question a poor colony reframes

Extraction is the module where most colonial studies find their indictment, because most colonies were held in order to be drained and the draining is documented in tonnages, tax rolls, and shipping manifests. The framework asks the standard questions: what was taken, by what mechanism, sorted by which caste, and at whose expense. Transjordan appears at first to refuse the question entirely. It exported almost nothing; it had no plantation, no mine of consequence, no cash crop, no port. Module 5 established that the ledger ran the other way, with the metropole paying in. On the ordinary accounting, there is nothing here to extract and therefore no extraction module to write.

That conclusion is wrong, and the work of this module is to show why. Extraction in a surplus-poor colony does not disappear; it changes form. It moves out of the commodity column and into three others — into what can be squeezed from a poor peasantry through the ordinary fiscal machinery, into the value a territory contributes to an extractive economy *next door* while receiving wages rather than rents, and, most importantly and least visibly, into the deliberate maintenance of the client's *inability to earn independently*. The last of these is the finding that makes this module worth writing, and it is documented in a single telegram of 1946 in which the protecting power is discovered advising its protégé to turn down money.

The tithe on a thin harvest

Start with the ordinary fiscal base, because it is where nearly all of the emirate's own revenue came from and because it fell on nearly everyone. The Ottoman inheritance was the tithe — the *ʿushr*, a share of the crop — and under the mandate the mandatory power set about converting it into something a modern administration could assess and collect: commuting it to a fixed payment based on average harvest values across a period of years, and moving toward a land tax reckoned on productivity. The mandatory described this work to the League in its own words, reporting that measures were being taken with a view to the early introduction of a tax on land, based on productivity in terms of wheat, which, replacing the tithe, should be *"more even and equitable in its incidence."* That passage comes from the section of the combined Palestine and Trans-Jordan report dealing with the western territory, and the fiscal reform ran furthest and fastest there; but the direction of travel was the mandatory's across both banks, and east of the river it proceeded in step with the cadastral survey of Module 2, since a productivity-based land tax presupposes exactly the registered, mapped, individually-owned parcels that the survey was manufacturing.

Two things should be said about this, and the discipline requires both. The reform was, in intent and largely in effect, an improvement: a fixed commuted payment is less arbitrary than a tax-farmer's share, a productivity assessment is fairer than a flat levy, and in the drought years of the early 1930s the administration remitted portions of the tithe and advanced seed loans rather than pressing collection. This is not the extraction of a plantation colony and it should not be dressed as one. And yet it was extraction, and its incidence was regressive in the way agrarian taxation always is — it fell on cultivators living close to subsistence, in a country where the land settlement was simultaneously converting collective *musha'* holdings into individual titles that could be taxed, mortgaged, and lost. The state was building, at the same moment and with the same instrument, a fairer tax and a firmer grip. That is what fiscal modernisation looks like from below: the assessment improves and the escape routes close.

The customs frontier that was not there

The second mechanism is structural rather than fiscal, and it is written into the 1928 treaty in a clause that reads like a courtesy. Article 7 provided that, except by agreement between the two countries, *"there shall be no customs barrier between Palestine and Trans-Jordan, and the Customs tariff in Trans-Jordan shall be approved by His Britannic Majesty."* It then set

out the accounting: Palestine would pay Transjordan the estimated duties levied on goods that entered Palestine from elsewhere and subsequently crossed into Transjordan for local consumption, netting off the reverse flow, and Transjordanian trade would receive at Palestinian ports facilities equal to Palestine's own.

Read structurally, that clause does three things. It denies Transjordan an independent tariff — the rate is set subject to British approval, which is to say the emirate cannot use the ordinary instrument by which a poor state protects an infant industry or raises revenue. It makes Transjordan's customs receipts an *estimate remitted by a neighbouring administration* rather than a revenue the state collects at its own frontier, which converts a sovereign income into a transfer payment calculated by someone else. And it locks the emirate's external trade into Palestine's ports, principally Haifa, so that the physical infrastructure of Transjordan's commerce sat in a territory it did not govern. The generous reading is that this was rational integration for a landlocked territory that had no port of its own worth the name and would have starved behind a customs wall. The structural reading is that a country whose tariff is approved abroad, whose customs revenue is remitted by a neighbour's treasury, and whose goods move through a neighbour's harbour has been made an economic dependency of the adjacent colony as well as a fiscal dependency of the metropole. Both readings are correct, and the second one explains why Transjordanian merchants of the period found themselves competing with Palestinian merchants moving east into their market with better capital and better access.

The prize on the other bank

There was, in fact, one thing of real value in the region, and its story is the sharpest extraction narrative in the study. The Dead Sea is a vast natural reservoir of potash, bromine, and magnesium salts, and from the moment Allenby took Jerusalem the British understood what lay in it — an engineer was sent to survey its potential as early as 1917. After more than a decade of competing applications and negotiation, a seventy-five-year concession was granted in August 1929 to the Palestine Potash Company, founded by the Siberian-born mining engineer Moshe Novomeysky; the formal *Concession for the extraction of salts and minerals in the Dead Sea* was granted on 1 January 1930 by the governments of Palestine and Transjordan *jointly*. The company had been incorporated in England, its board and marketing sat in London, its management and laboratories in Jerusalem, its first plant at Kalya on the northern shore, and — as a condition of the grant — it was to be run by a Briton. Its strategic purpose was explicit in British calculations: to keep the trade out of

German hands and secure potash for the Crown in a crisis. The calculation proved exact. During the Second World War, Dead Sea potash supplied around half of Britain's requirement and the great majority of the Commonwealth's.

Now place Transjordan in that picture. It was a co-grantor of the concession and therefore, formally, a party to the enterprise. What it actually contributed was land on the eastern and southern shores and cheap unskilled labour: at the southern plant the workers were drawn substantially from the Transjordanian village of al-Safia and from the villages around Jericho, some three hundred men at peak seasonal demand, amounting to roughly half the company's workforce at that time. What it received was wages. The capital was British and Zionist, the incorporation English, the direction London, the profits corporate, and the strategic benefit imperial — and the war-winning potash that filled British magazines came out of a sea whose eastern shore belonged to a state living on a hundred thousand pounds a year of British charity.

The detail that turns this from unlucky geography into something sharper is the border. When the boundary between Palestine and Transjordan was delimited in 1922, the question of Dead Sea mineral extraction was central to the argument, and Zionist representations were given considerable weight in where the line was drawn. The line is not a neutral fact about the map; it was drawn, in part, by people who knew what was in the water. A framework reading of this should be stated plainly: in a colony whose only asset is its position, *the border is itself an extractive instrument*, because where the line falls determines which administration grants the concession, banks the royalties, and hosts the industry. Transjordan's poverty was not purely a gift of nature. Some of it was cartography.

The tax the protector opposed

The last mechanism is the one this module is named for, and it is documented in a single despatch that says more than any amount of commentary. In March 1946 — while Abdullah was in London negotiating the treaty of alliance that would recognise Transjordan's independence — the American Secretary of State, James Byrnes, cabled the United States Chargé in London about a pipeline. The Arabian American Oil Company wanted to run its line across Transjordanian territory, and it had informed the State Department that it was *willing to pay a reasonable transit tax to the Transjordan Government in consideration of the granting of a pipeline concession, the amount to be negotiated directly between the company and the Emir.* The Department endorsed the company's wish and

instructed its Chargé to take the matter up with the Colonial Office — *"which is opposed to payment of such a tax and which is reported so to have advised Emir."*

Read that clause again, because it is the extraction module's centre of gravity. An American oil company offered to pay the Emir of Transjordan for crossing his territory. The Emir's protecting power, the government that had installed him, funded him, armed him, and was at that very moment negotiating his independence, was opposed to his receiving the payment, and had told him so. The American position, set out in the same cable, was that *Transjordan was entitled to receive determinate and proportionate compensation for transit privileges, whatever the historical precedents might be, and that concessions in the region should reflect full recognition of the principle that countries contributing in any way to the development and commercialisation of petroleum resources should receive fair and reasonable compensation for that contribution.*

The Americans were not disinterested; they wanted the pipeline, and they wanted the competitive position of their oil protected, and the cable says so. But the alignment is unmistakable and it prefigures everything the collapse module will have to handle. In 1946 the incoming sponsor was arguing that the client deserved an income of its own, and the outgoing sponsor was arguing that it did not. Britain's reasons can be reconstructed without malice — a transit tax set a precedent that would ripple through the Iraq Petroleum Company's existing contracts, raise the cost of Middle Eastern oil, and unsettle a concession structure Britain had built. But whatever the motive, the effect is exactly what the framework should name: the protecting power acting to prevent its client acquiring revenue it did not control.

Reading extraction against the framework

Three contributions, and the first reframes the module type. Where there is no surplus, extraction takes the form of *extraction by adjacency*: the poor territory contributes land, transit, and labour to an extractive economy sited next door and is paid in wages rather than rents. The Dead Sea concession is the model — Transjordanian shore, Transjordanian labourers, English incorporation, London board, Jerusalem management, imperial strategic benefit — and the customs union is its fiscal counterpart, routing the emirate's trade through Haifa under a tariff approved in London. The corpus should carry this as a distinct extractive relation, because it is invisible to the usual test. Nothing is shipped out of Transjordan; the manifests are empty; and yet value produced with Transjordanian ground and Transjordanian hands accrues to balance sheets in another jurisdiction. The border does

the work that the customs house does in an ordinary colony, and the framework should therefore treat *boundary delimitation as an extractive instrument* wherever a resource straddles a line drawn by the same power that grants the concessions.

The second contribution is the more important and the more disturbing. The deepest extraction from Transjordan was not of any good but of the *capacity to earn independently*. A client funded by grant is a client whose every organ — army, cabinet, throne — depends on the annual renewal of a foreign vote, and that dependence is an asset to the sponsor precisely as long as no alternative income appears. An independent revenue stream, however modest, would have converted the relationship from patronage into partnership, because a ruler with his own money can decline advice. The 1946 telegram catches the logic in the open: at the very moment of granting formal independence, the protecting power was working to ensure that the independence would not be fiscally real. The framework should hold this as a general mechanism of the subsidised colony — *the sponsor's interest in the client's poverty* — and should note its uncomfortable implication, which is that in a net-cost colony the metropole's generosity and its dominance are the same act. Every year the cheque arrives is a year the client cannot leave, and the cheapest way to keep it so is to make sure no one else pays him.

The third is a caution against the narrative this case invites. It would be easy to write Transjordan as the colony that was too poor to be exploited and therefore was not — a kind of accidental innocence. The record does not support it. The tithe fell on subsistence cultivators; the land settlement made their holdings taxable and alienable; the tariff was set abroad; the trade ran through another territory's ports; the one mineral prize was sited across a line drawn with the mineral in mind, and worked by Transjordanian hands for a company registered in England; and when a real income was finally offered, the protecting power advised refusal. Extraction was thin here because the country was thin, not because anyone declined to extract. That distinction matters for the whole collection: the absence of plunder in a poor colony is evidence about the colony's endowment, not about the conqueror's character.

Two disciplines close the module. The first is that Britain's opposition to the transit tax was not a conspiracy and should not be written as one — it was a defensible position about concession precedent and oil pricing, argued by officials who would have said, honestly, that they were protecting an established contractual order. What makes it damning is not the motive but the position: whatever the reasoning, the Colonial Office was found on the side of its client receiving less. The framework's lesson is that structural interest does not require

bad faith to operate, and usually does not have it. The second discipline is the one this case keeps demanding. The Transjordanian labourer at the southern potash works was better off with the wage than without it; the roads and the registered title and the remitted tithe in a drought year were real benefits; and a man's life east of the Jordan in 1940 was in most measurable ways less precarious than it had been in 1915. All of that is true. It is also true that the arrangement was designed so that the value his hands helped produce was banked in another jurisdiction, and that his sovereign was advised not to accept payment for the ground beneath his feet. Both belong in the ledger, and the ledger is the module.

A note on sources. The 1946 despatch is quoted and closely rendered from a public-domain United States government publication: the Secretary of State (Byrnes) to the Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman), telegram 2352, file 867N.6363/3–1146, printed in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946*, volume VII — including the statements that Aramco was willing to pay a reasonable transit tax, that the Colonial Office "is opposed to payment of such a tax and ... is reported so to have advised Emir," and the United States position on compensation for transit and for contributions to petroleum development. The editorial note that Abdullah was then in London negotiating the treaty of alliance is the volume's own. The customs provisions are quoted from Article 7 of the Agreement between His Majesty and the Amir of Trans-Jordan, signed at Jerusalem, 20 February 1928 (HMSO, 1930). The phrase "more even and equitable in its incidence" is quoted from the mandatory's report on Palestine and Trans-Jordan to the League of Nations for 1930, and is expressly identified above as describing the fiscal reform in the western territory; no claim is made that its wording applies verbatim to Transjordan, whose land-tax development is described in general terms alongside the land settlement. Dead Sea particulars are given as verified: the seventy-five-year concession granted in August 1929, the *Concession for the extraction of salts and minerals in the Dead Sea* granted on 1 January 1930 jointly by the governments of Palestine and Transjordan, the company's English incorporation and London board, the condition that it be run by a Briton, the first plant at Kalya and the later southern plant, the drawing of Transjordanian labour from al-Safia and the Jericho villages at roughly three hundred men in peak season and about half the workforce, and wartime supply of approximately half of Britain's potash requirement — the last figure given as reported and varying between accounts. The role of Dead Sea mineral extraction in the 1922 boundary delimitation is drawn from the scholarly literature and is stated as a contributing consideration, not as the sole determinant of the line. Modern scholarship is paraphrased and credited, not quoted: Michael Fischbach on land settlement and taxation; Vartan Amadouny on the mandate-period economy and Palestinian merchant penetration; Jacob Norris and the Institute for Palestine Studies literature on the Dead Sea concession and the competing Hazboun bid; and Barbara Smith on British economic policy and the roots of economic separation. Where the record disagrees, the disagreement is given rather than resolved.

PATTERNS OF POWER · BRITISH TRANSJORDAN — MODULE 7

OFFICIALLY DENIED

> *Module 7 · Information and Suppression — a seam that ran the wrong way: a metropole that was never deceived because it was never curious, a public sphere too small to require censorship, and a prince who kept one set of books with his sponsor and another with his subjects*

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

The prediction, and the first place it fails

The framework's account of colonial information is one of its sharpest instruments. An imperial order, it holds, is split in two by distance: the story told at the metropole and the conditions endured in the colony cannot be reconciled, and so the order's central administrative task becomes keeping the two ends from meeting — censoring the local press, managing the despatches, controlling which commissions visit and what they are shown, so that the people whose belief funds the conquest never learn what their money buys. The seam is the join between those two worlds, and suppression is the thread that holds it shut. Algeria supplies the classic form: a public pledge to respect the liberty and religion of the inhabitants, set beside a private instruction to kill all the men, with an ocean and a censor between them.

Transjordan does not work this way, and the failure is instructive enough to reorganise the module. There was no atrocity here to conceal after the first years, no scandal to manage, no razzia to keep out of the Paris papers. More decisively, there was no audience at home to keep it from. Module 5 established the reason in a figure: ninety-two thousand pounds in the Middle Eastern Services Vote, with a promise that it would be reduced. Nobody in London was lied to about Transjordan because nobody in London asked. The mandatory filed its annual reports, the Permanent Mandates Commission read them and posed courteous questions it could not enforce, the Commons received a two-line answer about a grant-in-aid, and that was the sum of metropolitan attention to a territory the size of Portugal.

So the seam runs the other way. What had to be managed was not the metropole's knowledge of the colony but the colony's knowledge of itself — and the party with the

strongest interest in managing it was not the British Resident but the Emir. This module traces that inversion, and finds at the end of it a structure the framework has not carried: an apex holding a different story for each of the two powers it stands between.

Indifference is cheaper than concealment

Begin with what was not hidden, because the list is long. The 1928 Agreement, with its twenty-one articles of control, was a published Command Paper laid before Parliament and printed by His Majesty's Stationery Office. Article 25 of the mandate and the memorandum of September 1922 that switched off the Jewish national home clauses east of the river were League of Nations documents, circulated to all members. The grant-in-aid appeared annually in the estimates. The Permanent Mandates Commission's minutes — including the Chairman's admission that he had never been able to satisfy himself whether Article 2's promise of self-governing institutions was being fulfilled, and a member's observation that Transjordanians might cross freely into Palestine while Jews were not permitted to settle east of the river — were published. Anyone in Britain who wished to know how Transjordan was governed could have found out in an afternoon.

Almost nobody wished to. And that is the module's first structural finding: *indifference holds a seam open more reliably than concealment does*, because concealment requires continuous effort and can fail catastrophically when it does, whereas indifference requires nothing at all and cannot be exposed. A censored fact can be smuggled out; an uninteresting one is safe forever. The framework should therefore distinguish two mechanisms by which the metropolitan end of the seam is kept from meeting the colonial end — active suppression, which is expensive and brittle, and structural inattention, which is free and stable — and should note that the second is produced by exactly the conditions this study has been describing. A colony that costs little, kills few, exports nothing, and threatens no domestic interest generates no constituency for scrutiny. Its obscurity is not manufactured. It is a by-product of its cheapness.

The cheapest censorship

Turn now to the colony's own information order, and the first thing to notice is how little machinery of suppression the record shows. There was a press, of a kind: several privately owned newspapers appeared from 1927 — among them *al-Urdunn*, which would survive into the 1980s — and the 1930s saw short-lived ventures such as *al-Hikma*, *al-Mithaq*, and

al-Wafa', none of which lasted. Journalism in the emirate has been fairly described as unsettled, financially poor, and without a settled identity. That is not the profile of a press being crushed. It is the profile of a press that cannot find enough readers or advertisers to survive.

Set that beside Module 4 and the mechanism becomes plain. A country whose only secondary school graduated four boys in 1925 and three in 1926, whose formation was withheld from the mass and licensed out to mosque and tribal court, is a country in which the overwhelming majority cannot read a newspaper, a treaty, or a budget. No Press Law is needed to prevent a population from scrutinising a Command Paper printed in English, whose Arabic counterpart is by its own Article 21 subordinate to the English in case of divergence. The state did not have to suppress a public sphere; the absence of formation had already ensured there was scarcely one to suppress.

This is the module's second contribution and it links two of the framework's instruments that have been treated separately. *Withheld formation is an information technology*, and its effects arrive on a delay. The empty schoolroom of 1925 is the silent public sphere of 1935; the decision not to educate a generation is the decision that the generation will not be able to read the terms on which it is governed. A conqueror who withholds formation does not need to build a censorship apparatus, because he has already built something better and cheaper — an audience that cannot receive the message. The corpus should record that suppression and formation are the same policy measured at different intervals, and that the cheapest censor is the school that was never built.

What machinery did exist was constitutional rather than editorial. The Legislative Council created under the 1928 Organic Law — sixteen elected members sitting with a six-member cabinet — was dissolved in 1931 after it declined to pass the budget annex, and fresh elections were held that June, with further elections in 1934 and 1937. The full reckoning of that arrangement belongs to Module 9. Here it registers as an information fact: a chamber that can be dissolved for refusing supply is a chamber whose scrutiny of the public accounts is advisory, and the emirate's finances — the subsidy, the Legion's costs, the Resident's salary charged to the Transjordanian budget — were therefore never subjected to any body with the power to insist on answers, in Amman or in London.

The counter-current

Information nonetheless flowed, and it flowed from the west. The river was not a barrier to newspapers, teachers, or ideas. Module 4 established that the men staffing the emirate's schools came from Palestine, Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq, many of them formed at the American University of Beirut, and that they carried Arabism into the classrooms the British subsidy was paying for. The Palestinian press circulated. The 1928 National Congress — assembling notables and thinkers at Amman that July to reject the treaty and issue a National Charter asserting that Transjordan was an independent and sovereign Arab state — demonstrated that a political public existed even where a reading public barely did, organised through the older channels of notable, mosque, and tribal assembly rather than through print.

By the later 1930s that current had become a security problem, and the response reveals how information control actually worked in this order. When the Palestinian revolt broke out in 1936, the danger to the emirate was contagion — sympathy among Transjordanian shaykhs, guerrilla bands crossing east, the revolt's politics taking root on the quiet bank. Britain and Abdullah answered on two tracks, and neither was censorship. The Frontier Force and the Legion patrolled the frontier, engaged bands that crossed, and physically prevented the revolt's spread. And, as Module 4 recorded, grants were placed in the hands of Glubb and Abdullah for distribution among the shaykhs in exchange for loyalty. Movement control and money: the emirate governed the flow of dangerous ideas by governing the flow of people who carried them and by outbidding the ideas among the men who mattered. In an order where the decisive audience is a few dozen shaykhs rather than a reading public, this is what suppression looks like — and it leaves almost no documentary trace of the kind an information module usually hunts, because a subvention is not a banned newspaper.

The prince between two audiences

The genuine information asymmetry in this case is not between London and Amman. It runs through the Emir himself, and it is the module's most important finding.

Abdullah stood between two constituencies whose demands could not be reconciled. His sponsor required a quiet frontier, no adventures against the French, no obstruction of British policy in Palestine, and a client who took advice. His subjects, and the wider Arab public whose good opinion his Hashemite standing depended on, required an Arab prince of the Revolt, defender of Arab lands against both the mandate and the Jewish national

home. Abdullah's response was to run two relationships and keep them apart — and this is documented, though it should be handled with care, because it sits at the edge of one of the most contested subjects in modern history and this study takes no side in that dispute.

The facts that are established are these. Zionist leaders took an interest in relations with the Emir from the founding of the emirate in 1921, and the Jewish Agency cultivated contacts with Abdullah and with the shaykhs of Transjordan across the period from 1922 to 1939; during the Palestinian revolt the Agency's intelligence arm worked deliberately at solidifying its relationship with him. Zionist organisations explored land purchase east of the river. Money moved: Mithqal al-Fayez, the paramount shaykh of the Bani Sakhr whom Module 2 identified as the settlement's greatest winner, met Chaim Weizmann at the King David Hotel in Jerusalem, and during the economic crisis of the 1930s — drought compounded by the world depression — he negotiated with Zionist representatives and accepted their money, though in the end he sold them no land, and during the revolt he became one of the strongest Transjordanian supporters of the Palestinian cause. Historians disagree, sometimes sharply, about how to read these contacts — whether as pragmatic hedging by men under acute financial pressure, as a Zionist strategy of using relations with Arab elites to fracture Palestinian nationalism, or as something between — and this study does not adjudicate that argument. What it records is the structure: leading figures of the emirate were conducting relations they did not disclose to the public whose sentiments they simultaneously invoked.

The pattern held to the end of Abdullah's life and is caught, in the clearest surviving form, in American diplomatic traffic after the mandate. In early 1949, an Israeli negotiator reported a frank and friendly secret conference held with Abdullah at Amman on 31 January. Within days, American observers were noting that rumours the King had undertaken secret direct negotiations with Israel had been *officially denied two days ago* — and reasoning, in the same despatch, that *were Abdullah to begin such negotiations it would be most difficult to keep them secret, and that by becoming known his precarious position among Palestinians would be greatly prejudiced at a time when he was seeking their support for the constitutional annexation of Arab Palestine to Jordan.* The Americans, as it happens, judged the rumours improbable; the meetings were real. What the despatch preserves is the mechanism in the open: a ruler conducting one policy in private, denying it in public, and understood by foreign observers to be doing so because disclosure would destroy his standing with the population whose support he needed.

Reading information against the framework

Three contributions. The first is that *the seam is not always held shut by concealment*. The framework has treated suppression as the labour of keeping two ends apart, and has looked for censors, controlled despatches, and managed commissions. Transjordan shows a second mechanism, and in cheap colonies probably the commoner one: structural inattention. The metropole is not deceived; it is uninterested, because the colony costs too little and kills too few to generate scrutiny. This should change how the corpus reads archival abundance. Mandate Transjordan is extensively documented — annual reports, Commission minutes, treaty papers, parliamentary answers — and none of it was hidden. The absence of concealment is not evidence of an order with nothing to hide; it is evidence of an order nobody was looking at. Obscurity by indifference is more durable than obscurity by censorship, precisely because it cannot be breached by disclosure.

The second is the identity of withheld formation and information control, separated only by time. The framework has treated Module 4's concerns and Module 7's as distinct — what the order teaches, and what the order permits to be said. In this case they are one policy on a delay. The unbuilt schools of the 1920s produced the unreadable public sphere of the 1930s, in which a press could not survive commercially, a treaty in two languages could be authoritative only in the one almost nobody read, and the state required no apparatus of censorship because it had already ensured that the message could not be received. The corpus should carry this as a general finding: the cheapest and most complete form of information control is not to suppress the answer but to prevent the formation of anyone able to frame the question.

The third is structurally new and belongs to the imported-apex family. The framework's seam has two ends, conqueror and conquered. An imported apex creates a third position, and the man who occupies it runs *two* information asymmetries at once — one against his subjects, one against his sponsor. Abdullah told London what a client tells a patron and told the Arab public what a Sharifian prince must tell it, and the two accounts were not the same, and the gap between them was his working room. This is not hypocrisy in any interesting sense; it is the structural condition of an intermediary whose position depends on satisfying two constituencies with incompatible requirements. The framework should mark that such an apex is not merely a transmission belt between metropole and population but an independent actor with its own information strategy, and that this is a large part of what makes an imported chair survivable — the intermediary who can hold two stories is more useful to both parties than one who can hold only theirs. It is also what makes such a chair

permanently vulnerable, because the two audiences may at any moment be brought into the same room. Abdullah was assassinated in 1951 at the al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem, and the reckoning of that belongs to a later module; but the despatch of 1949 shows the American observers correctly identifying the fault line two years early.

Two disciplines close the module. The first is that the thinness of the emirate's public sphere should not be read as evidence of contentment, and the framework's diagnostic must be applied with care in a poor country. Silence in the record here reflects the absence of instruments — few newspapers, few readers, no parliament with power over supply — rather than the absence of grievance; the National Charter of 1928 shows what the grievance was, expressed through the channels that existed. An order that generates no dissenting archive has not necessarily produced no dissent. It may only have produced no archive. The second is the discipline this study owes to the material at the centre of this module. The contacts between the emirate's leading men and the Jewish Agency, and Abdullah's later dealings with Israel, are among the most bitterly contested subjects in the region's history, and the temptation in a study of information asymmetry is to make them the module's indictment. That would be a misuse of the evidence. What the record supports is narrow and structural: that these relations existed, that they were not disclosed, that the men conducting them believed disclosure would be ruinous, and that foreign observers agreed. Why they were conducted, and whether they were betrayal, statecraft, or survival, is a question this study leaves standing — and the reader who wants it settled is asking the module for something the sources do not give.

A note on sources. The 1949 material is quoted and closely rendered from a public-domain United States government publication, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949*, volume VI, including the report of the secret conference held with Abdullah at Amman on 31 January 1949 by the Provisional Government of Israel's chief negotiator with the Arabs, and the subsequent despatch recording that such negotiations were "officially denied two days ago" and assessing that disclosure would greatly prejudice Abdullah's position among Palestinians while he sought their support for annexation. These documents post-date the mandate and are used here to display a mechanism traced across the mandate period, not to characterise the mandate itself. The published nature of the 1928 Agreement (HMSO Command Paper), of Article 25 and the September 1922 memorandum (League of Nations documents), of the annual reports to the Permanent Mandates Commission, and of the parliamentary answer of 23 March 1927 is a matter of record and is the basis for the finding about indifference. Press particulars — privately owned newspapers appearing from 1927 including *al-Urdunn*, and the short-lived 1930s titles *al-Hikma*, *al-Mithaq*, and *al-Wafa'* — are drawn from the scholarly literature on Jordanian media, as is the characterisation of the period's journalism. Electoral and constitutional particulars (the Legislative Council of sixteen elected members with a six-member cabinet, its dissolution in 1931 following failure to pass the budget annex, and elections in 1929, 1931, 1934, and 1937) are from the reference record. The account of Jewish Agency contacts with Abdullah and the Transjordanian shaykhs between 1922 and 1939, of the Agency's intelligence arm working to solidify relations during the Palestinian revolt, and of Mithqal al-Fayez's meeting with Chaim Weizmann, his acceptance of Zionist money during the drought and depression years, his refusal ultimately to sell land, and his subsequent support for the Palestinian cause, is paraphrased from modern scholarship — principally Yoav Alon, and the collaborative work on the Jewish Agency, Emir Abdullah, and the shaykhs of Transjordan — and no primary correspondence from these negotiations is quoted, since none was verified against a public-domain reproduction in the course of writing. The historiographical disagreement over how these contacts should be interpreted, including the readings advanced by Avi Shlaim and Ilan Pappé, is noted as unresolved and is not adjudicated. Where the record disagrees, the disagreement is given rather than resolved.

Part of the collection Patterns of Power. *Tested, never revealed.*

PATTERNS OF POWER · BRITISH TRANSJORDAN — MODULE 8

NOT THE ONLY ONE WHO WOULD HAVE SAY

> *Module 8 · Elite Coordination and the Default — the hierarchy link by link, and the alignment test at each: whether a man defending his own position thereby defends the whole arrangement; why the one asset that cannot be seized is a cheque; and where in this chain the alignment failed*

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

What a default is

An order that must be actively defended is an order in trouble. The arrangements that last are the ones in which nobody needs to defend them, because each person in the hierarchy, pursuing nothing more than his own advantage, produces the arrangement's continuation as a by-product. The apex does not survive because his subordinates are loyal; he survives because their interests are cut so that betraying him costs each of them more than serving him pays. That is the default: the settled condition an order returns to when nobody is doing anything in particular. The question this module asks is therefore not who held power in Transjordan but something more mechanical — at each link of the chain running from Whitehall down to a tribesman in a desert fort, did defending one's own position defend the whole?

This is the module the study has been building toward, because Transjordan's puzzle is a puzzle about defaults. The same imperial power built two Hashemite monarchies in the same month by the same method. One was overthrown and its king machine-gunned in a Baghdad courtyard in 1958. The other is on its throne today. If the difference is not luck and not virtue, it is in how the two hierarchies were wired — and the wiring can be traced link by link.

The chain

Begin at the top, in London, and work down.

The **Treasury and the Colonial Office** wanted two things from Transjordan: a quiet frontier and a small bill. The arrangement delivered both, and to that extent the officials responsible for it had every reason to keep it running. But this is the one link in the whole chain where the alignment is imperfect, and the imperfection deserves naming at the outset because it will matter at the end. A Treasury official doing his job well *reduces the vote*. The parliamentary answer of March 1927 promised precisely that: the contribution to the Trans-Jordan Administration and the grant-in-aid of the Frontier Force would both be reduced. Everyone below this point in the hierarchy had an interest in the emirate's continuation; the men at the top had an interest in its cheapness, which is not the same thing and can become its opposite. The fault line in this order does not run between rulers and ruled. It runs across the top, between an arrangement that needed paying for and a paymaster whose institutional virtue was paying less.

The **High Commissioner in Jerusalem and the British Resident in Amman** were aligned almost perfectly, and one clause of the 1928 Agreement made them more so. Article 1 provided that the ordinary expenses of civil government *and the salaries and expenses of the British Resident and his staff* would be borne entirely by Trans-Jordan. The supervisor was paid by the supervised. Whatever else that arrangement did, it tied the Resident's own establishment to the emirate's solvency and continuation: a British official in Amman had a direct, personal, salaried interest in there being a Transjordanian government to draw his salary from. Add the ordinary incentives of colonial service — a quiet posting, no crises reported upward, a career unmarked by the kind of trouble that ends careers — and the Resident's self-interest and the arrangement's survival were the same object.

The **British officers of the Arab Legion** are the decisive link, and the alignment here was total in a way that requires a moment's attention. By 1948 some thirty-seven British officers and twenty-five British non-commissioned officers led the force. At their head stood Glubb, who had arrived in 1930 as a captain seconded from Iraq and became Glubb Pasha, lieutenant-general, commander of the finest small army in the Arab world, and a figure of international consequence. In the British Army he would have been a competent middle-ranking officer of no particular fame. Everything he was, he was because the emirate existed and needed him. The same held in smaller measure for every seconded officer under him: rank, responsibility, and standing far beyond what the home establishment would have given them at their age.

And here is the structural point that makes this link the hinge of the whole order. The men best placed to seize the state — the professional commanders of its only organised force

— were *constitutionally ineligible to rule it*. They were foreigners. No British officer could have made himself Emir of Transjordan; the idea is not merely improbable but categorically unavailable. In Iraq, by contrast, the army's command was native, and a native colonel who commands the army is a plausible head of state, which is exactly what happened in 1958. An imported officer corps is therefore a coup-proofing device of great power: it places the most capable potential usurpers outside the set of possible rulers. It is also, precisely for that reason, a device with a fuse, since the moment nationalism makes foreign command intolerable, Arabisation must follow — and Arabisation manufactures eligible officers where none existed. That reckoning belongs to Module 10; here it is enough to record that during the mandate the emirate's army was led by men who could not want the throne.

The **Emir** sat at the centre and was mostly, but not perfectly, aligned. Abdullah wanted the throne, the subsidy, and the standing; all three required the arrangement. He also wanted Greater Syria, which did not, and Britain leashed that ambition explicitly in the treaty, requiring him to refer for British advice any law under which he might assume sovereignty over territory outside Trans-Jordan. His divergence was real and permanent, and it is why the 1928 Agreement contains that clause and the one requiring him to refer any law granting land or money to himself. The sponsor knew exactly which way its client would stray and wrote the leash to fit.

The **ministers** are the link where the framework's usual expectations are most sharply inverted. Abdullah's early governments were staffed by exiles from the wider Arab collapse — Rashid Talaa, Mazhar Raslan, the Damascene ex-Ottoman general Ali Rida al-Rikabi who had been prime minister of Faisal's Syria, Hasan Abu al-Huda of Aleppo. Module 2 recorded the resentment this caused. What matters here is its consequence for the default: a minister with no local constituency cannot defect, because defection requires a following, and these men had none. They held office entirely at the pleasure of an Emir whose favour was their only asset, in a country not their own, with no tribe to raise and no town to speak for them. Their dependence was total and therefore their loyalty was structural rather than moral.

Two further mechanisms tightened it. Britain held a veto over their appointment — Article 3 barred any official of other than Trans-Jordan nationality without British concurrence — so an imported minister needed the approval of both the Emir and the Resident, and could be removed by either. And the elite pool was so thin that its members became nearly unsackable. An American officer visiting Amman in November 1947 reported an open crisis between the King and his government, and noted that despite it *the*

Prime Minister's position was strong, as no replacement was available at the moment. That single clause is Module 4 arriving in the political system: a country that graduated four boys from its only secondary school in 1925 has, twenty years later, a governing class small enough that its members cannot be replaced and therefore cannot be threatened. Thin formation produced an elite that was simultaneously wholly dependent and practically irremovable — a combination that is very stable and very sterile.

The **tribal shaykhs** were bought, and Module 2 described the currency: recognition, rank, tax exemption, and above all registered land title. The alignment mechanism here is worth restating precisely, because it is the most elegant in the whole structure. Mithqal al-Fayez became the largest landowner in the country not by conquest but by having his existing seizures written into the state's register. From that moment his wealth existed *as an entry in a book kept in Amman*. To defend his estate was to defend the register; to defend the register was to defend the state that maintained it. The same logic ran through the Law of Tribal Courts, which made a shaykh's judicial authority a licensed jurisdiction confirmed by the King through the Prime Minister. A shaykh defending his own standing was, by the structure of what his standing now consisted of, defending the Hashemite state. That is a default in its purest form, and it cost the treasury almost nothing.

The **Bedouin soldiers** were bound by the mechanism Module 1 traced from leash to bond and Module 4 identified as the emirate's real formation: wage, exemption, rifle, rank, protection, and — across twenty years and into a second generation of the same families — an identity. A trooper of the Desert Patrol defending his livelihood was defending the Legion; the Legion was the King's.

The **town notables and merchants** are the weak link at the bottom, and honesty requires saying so. They received least from the settlement — no land windfall of the shaykhly kind, no wage, no rank — and they supplied the opposition: the National Congress of July 1928 and the National Charter that answered the treaty's "independent Government" with a demand for genuine sovereignty. But they were weak in the way that mattered, having no armed following and no independent wealth, and the framework's Three Monopolies test explains why their dissent never became a threat. Violence, wealth, and the legitimating story were all held inside the ruling coalition; the notables commanded none of the three. They could write a charter. They could not raise a regiment or fund one.

Why nobody took it

Map that chain and the answer to the study's central question emerges, but it is not yet complete, because a well-aligned hierarchy explains why the people inside it did not defect. It does not by itself explain why an outsider — an ambitious colonel, a rival dynasty, a nationalist movement — never found the state worth seizing. For that, the module has to look at the prize.

Iraq's state controlled oil. Oil is a *rent attached to territory*: it comes out of the ground regardless of who governs, and it flows to whoever holds the wellhead and the ministry. Seizing the Iraqi state therefore meant seizing the revenue, and the payoff to a successful coup was not merely power but wealth — transferable, immediate, and independent of anyone's opinion of the men who took it. The default in Iraq had to hold against an enormous and permanent incentive to defect, and in July 1958 it did not.

Transjordan's state controlled a subsidy. And a subsidy has a property that a rent does not: **it cannot be seized, because it is paid to a person the payer chooses.** Oil flows to whoever holds the wellhead; a cheque flows to whoever the drawer decides to write it to. A colonel who overthrew Abdullah would have inherited not an income but a deficit — a treasury whose principal line was a British grant-in-aid that the British would very likely have stopped, an army whose entire cost from its inception until the mid-1950s was borne by London, and a state that could not pay its own civil service for a month without external money. The reward for seizing Transjordan was the privilege of governing a bankruptcy.

This, and not poverty as such, is the mechanism the study set out to test, and it should be stated in its sharp form. Poverty alone does not make a throne safe; poor states are overthrown constantly. What makes this throne safe is that the state's solvency was *tied to the identity of its ruler*. The sponsor's willingness to pay was a judgement about Abdullah — a Hashemite whose family Britain had raised, whose loyalty was proven, whose army was commanded by British officers. Transfer the throne to someone else and the judgement, and therefore the money, would very plausibly go with it. The subsidy functioned as a form of extended deterrence against usurpation, and it did so without anyone having to threaten anything, because every potential usurper could work out the arithmetic for himself. That is the strongest kind of default: not a rule enforced, but a calculation nobody bothers to complete because the answer is obvious.

Where it strained

A module that only demonstrated the alignment would be flattering the order, and the record does not permit it. The chain had visible strain, and the same November 1947 telegram that showed the Prime Minister's security shows the strain in three places at once.

The King and his own government were not operating as one. The Under Secretary of the Transjordan Foreign Office was, the American officer reported, *unaware until queried of a press interview in which Abdullah had said Transjordan would remain neutral in the Palestine dispute — the King having been interviewed at his winter quarters without the knowledge of the Transjordan Government* — and the Under Secretary, deploring the King's unbridled press statements, insisted that Transjordan's policy was the Arab League's and that neutrality was impossible. More broadly, the American noted, *the Transjordan Government was not always aware of commitments made by the King.* An apex who commits his state without telling his ministers is running the two-audience strategy of Module 7 against his own cabinet.

And the army's command was not simply the King's instrument. Asked whether he would march into Palestine if Abdullah ordered it, Glubb replied — in the American's summary — that *Abdullah was not the only one who would have a say in the matter.* The commander of the King's army told a foreign diplomat that the King did not have sole authority over the King's army. Abdullah understood this precisely; speaking to the Greek Chargé the same month, he *admitted he might have a certain amount of difficulty with Glubb Pasha, but believed the Desert Legion would be loyal to the King and that he could rely on a sufficient number of Legion officers to achieve his aim.*

Read those together and the hierarchy's real shape appears. The Legion's Bedouin rank and file and its Arab officers were bound to the throne; its British command was bound to London; and the two chains of loyalty ran up the same institution to different apexes. In ordinary times this was invisible and even useful — it is exactly what made the army coup-proof, since no single hand controlled it. In a crisis it meant the King had to *count officers*. The default held not because the coalition was seamless but because its seams did not open at the same moment.

Reading the default against the framework

Four contributions, and the first is the study's central mechanism.

Rents are seizable; subsidies are not. The framework should carry this as a general proposition about elite coordination in dependent states. Where the apex sits atop a territorial rent — oil, a mine, a canal, a customs monopoly on a chokepoint — the revenue is attached to the ground and transfers with control of it, so the payoff to a successful coup is the full stream, and the default must hold against a permanent, calculable, enormous incentive. Where the apex sits atop a transfer from an external sponsor, the revenue is attached to *him*, and the payoff to a coup is the seat without the income. The corollary is uncomfortable and should be stated plainly: the resource that looks like a state's greatest asset is, for the durability of its regime, a standing liability, and the sponsor's cheque that looks like humiliating dependence is, for the same purpose, armour. Iraq's oil bought its dynasty thirty-seven years; Transjordan's poverty is still paying out.

An imported officer corps is coup-proofing with a fuse. Placing foreigners in command of the only organised force removes the most capable usurpers from the set of eligible rulers, and does so absolutely rather than probabilistically — not because they are loyal but because they are ineligible. The framework should record both halves of this. It is extraordinarily effective while it lasts, and it cannot last, because the same nationalism that the order's other features are managing will eventually make foreign command the regime's chief liability. The device converts a present risk into a deferred one, and the deferral has a date.

Thin formation produces a dependent and irremovable elite. The corpus has treated withheld formation as a cost to the order — an unformed population is expensive to hold. This case shows a second-order effect running the other way. A governing class too small to have replacements is a governing class that cannot be purged and need not conspire, since its members already hold their positions for life. Combined with an administration staffed by men with no local constituency, this produces a political elite with neither the means nor the motive to defect. The framework should note the price: such an elite is also incapable of generating alternatives, so the order's adaptability is mortgaged to its stability, and every succession crisis must be solved by the same few dozen men.

The default's fault line ran across the top, not the bottom. Every link from the Resident downward was aligned; the one imperfect joint was between the arrangement and the treasury that funded it, whose institutional interest was to pay less. This confirms the colonial bend's prediction that collapse in such orders comes from the metropole's will emptying rather than from the ruled beating the floor — and it sharpens it. The metropole's will does not empty through defeat or moral revulsion. It empties through the ordinary,

virtuous, unremarkable operation of officials doing their jobs: a vote reduced, an establishment trimmed, a commitment reviewed. The most dangerous man to this order was never a nationalist colonel. He was a Treasury clerk with a pencil.

Two disciplines close the module. The first is against reading the alignment as harmony. Every link in this chain was fastened by an interest, and several of those interests were purchased with things taken from someone: the shaykh's title deed came from the dissolution of collective *musha'* tenure, the trooper's wage came from a British grant that bought the end of his people's independence, the minister's office came from a country he had lost. A default is not a consensus. It is a set of individually rational calculations that happen to point the same way, and the men making them may be, and here often were, resentful of the arrangement they were sustaining. Mithqal al-Fayez took Zionist money in the 1930s and backed the Palestinian revolt while remaining the Hashemite state's greatest landowner. None of that broke the default, because the default never required agreement — only that defection cost more than compliance.

The second is against the flattering inference. That nobody seized this state is not evidence that the state was just, or that its people consented, or that its architects were wiser than the men who built Iraq. It is evidence that the arrangement was wired so that seizing it paid nothing. The framework's whole method is to prefer that kind of explanation to the moral kind, and this module is where the preference earns its keep: the throne of Jordan survived the century not because it deserved to but because, uniquely among the region's imported monarchies, it was not worth taking.

A note on sources. The 1947 material is quoted and closely rendered from a public-domain United States government publication: the Consul General at Jerusalem (Macatee) to the Secretary of State, telegram 529, file 867N.01/11–1847, printed in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947*, volume V — including the Under Secretary's ignorance of the King's press interview given at his winter quarters without the Government's knowledge, the observation that the Transjordan Government was not always aware of commitments made by the King, the note that the Prime Minister's position was strong because no replacement was available, and Glubb's reply that Abdullah was not the only one who would have a say in whether the army marched. Abdullah's remark about anticipating difficulty with Glubb while relying on the loyalty of the Legion's officers is from the same volume's editorial footnote reporting the Greek Chargé's account of his conversation with the King, and is therefore a second-hand report and is flagged as such. Treaty provisions are quoted from the Agreement between His Majesty and the Amir of Trans-Jordan, signed at Jerusalem, 20 February 1928 (HMSO, 1930): Article 1 on the Resident's salaries being borne by Trans-Jordan, Article 3 on the appointment of non-Transjordanian officials, and Article 6 on referring laws granting the Amir land or money and laws assuming sovereignty outside Trans-Jordan. The parliamentary undertaking to reduce the grants is from the Commons answer of 23 March 1927 (Hansard). The figure of some thirty-seven British officers and twenty-five British NCOs leading the Legion in 1948 is from the scholarly literature drawing on Glubb's papers, and the characterisation of Glubb as wielding a de facto veto over military decisions is contested in that literature and is presented here as one reading among others rather than as settled. The dates and outcome of the 1958 Iraqi revolution are given as established. Modern scholarship is paraphrased and credited, not quoted: Yoav Alon on the shaykhs and co-optation; Mary Wilson and Philip Robins on Abdullah and the political elite; Matthew Hughes on the Legion's command structure. Where the record disagrees, the disagreement is given rather than resolved.

Part of the collection Patterns of Power. *Tested, never revealed.*

PATTERNS OF POWER · BRITISH TRANSJORDAN — MODULE 9

THE BUDGET ANNEX

> *Module 9 · Plurality or Foreclosure — whether the order left room for an alternative to form: a chamber in which the government voted, a franchise that excluded almost everyone, an opposition that organised five times and was neither crushed nor answered but absorbed, and the single occasion on which a parliament used its one real power and was dissolved for it*

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

The variable, and why it is not about repression

The framework's liberty question is narrower and more useful than the one usually asked of colonial regimes. It does not ask how harsh the order was; it asks whether the order permitted an *alternative centre of coordination to form* — some body, institution, association, or public in which people could combine around a programme not authored by the apex, and from which a different arrangement could one day be assembled. An order can be gentle and wholly foreclosed. An order can be brutal and yet leave the seeds of its own replacement growing in a mosque, a union, a party, or a provincial assembly. Repression is a symptom; foreclosure is the structure. What matters is whether the channels through which people might coordinate all run through one hand.

Transjordan is a hard case for that instrument, and the reason makes it valuable. By the standards of the region and the period, the emirate was mild. There was no mass imprisonment, no colony-wide state of siege, no scaffold. Elections were held with reasonable regularity — 1929, 1931, 1934, 1937, and 1942, five Legislative Councils across the mandate — and an opposition organised openly, published a charter, held conferences, and boycotted a poll without its leaders being hanged. A study that measured liberty by counting political prisoners would find Transjordan among the freest colonial territories in this collection, and would be measuring the wrong thing. The finding of this module is that the emirate was substantially foreclosed, and that the foreclosure was accomplished not by repression but by *architecture* — by an electoral and constitutional design under which a national alternative was very difficult to build and a local notable's advancement was very easy, so that the ambitious were drawn continuously out of opposition and into office. That

is a more durable foreclosure than a police force, because nothing about it looks like tyranny and there is nothing to resist.

The arithmetic of the chamber

The Organic Law was promulgated on 16 April 1928, two months after the treaty, and it created a unicameral Legislative Council. The composition is the first thing to examine, because it settles most of the question. There were sixteen elected deputies. Sitting with them, and voting, were the Prime Minister and the six members of the Council of Ministers.

Work the arithmetic. Twenty-three votes in the chamber, of which seven belonged ex officio to the executive the chamber was supposedly scrutinising. The government began every division with seven votes in hand and needed only five of the sixteen elected members to command a majority — that is, it required the support of fewer than a third of the country's elected representatives to carry anything. To defeat the government, thirteen deputies would have to combine, leaving it a margin of three. A legislature whose executive sits inside it with a bloc of votes is not a check on the executive; it is a committee the executive chairs. The framework's usual tell for a decorative assembly is the absence of formal powers, and those were absent too — the Council was consultative, without binding authority over fiscal matters, foreign affairs, or executive appointments. But the composition is the sharper tell, because it operates even when the assembly is behaving assertively.

The term was three years, and could be extended to five. It was: the Council elected in October 1937 had its life extended by two years and sat until 1942, during which time five successive governments were formed under it. A parliament whose duration the executive may prolong, and whose composition includes the executive, is an institution whose independence exists at the executive's discretion in both time and arithmetic.

Who was permitted to choose

The franchise narrows the picture further, and it does so in two distinct ways that should be separated.

The first is exclusion. The vote under the 1928 electoral law was confined to adult males who were literate, paid direct taxes, or held sufficient property — which removed women entirely, removed the illiterate, and removed most nomadic Bedouin, whose wealth was in animals rather than in rateable property and whose lives did not intersect with a tax roll. Set

that beside Module 4 and the interlock is exact: a country whose only secondary school graduated four boys in 1925 and three in 1926, in which formation had been withheld from the mass and licensed out to mosque and tribal court, had made illiteracy the ordinary condition — and then made literacy a qualification for the vote. The unbuilt school of the 1920s is the silent press of the 1930s and the restricted franchise of the same decade. These are not three policies. They are one policy observed at three points, and the framework should record that withheld formation reappears as disenfranchisement without anyone having to legislate a disenfranchisement.

The second is indirection. Elections proceeded in two tiers: primary voters chose secondary electors, and the secondary electors chose the deputies. Every layer of indirection converts a diffuse electorate into a manageable set of intermediaries, and intermediaries are precisely what a co-opting state is equipped to handle — they can be identified, courted, subsidised, and rewarded in a way that a mass electorate cannot. Two-tier voting does not merely dilute the popular voice; it changes the object of political effort from persuading a public to securing a few hundred notables.

And the third feature completes the design: the seats were distributed by *community*. Alongside the districts of Amman, Salt, Karak, and Tafila sat reserved seats for the southern Bedouin, for the Circassians, and for the Christians. This is often read as an accommodation of diversity, and in one sense it was. Structurally it does something else. When a chamber is composed of representatives of communities, a deputy's mandate is to speak for a group whose leadership already exists and is already known to the state; what a deputy cannot easily do is assemble a following that cuts *across* the communities on the basis of a programme. Communal representation does not merely divide; it makes the cross-cutting national coalition — the thing an alternative order would have to be built from — structurally difficult to construct inside the institution. The chamber represented Transjordan's parts with reasonable fidelity and made it very hard for Transjordan's parts to combine into something new.

The one time it bit

All of which might be theoretical, except that the arrangement was tested once, and the test is unambiguous. The Council elected in 1929 declined to pass the budget annex. It was dissolved, and fresh elections were held on 10 June 1931.

That episode deserves to stand as the module's centre because it locates the boundary precisely. Everything else was permitted. Deputies could debate, petition, and criticise; the opposition could meet and publish; elections could be contested and boycotted. What could not happen was the refusal of supply — the single classical power by which a legislature converts consultation into control, the power over which the English parliament fought a civil war. The moment the Transjordanian chamber reached for it, the chamber ceased to exist. And the money in question was not even principally Transjordanian money; it was the budget of a state whose largest revenue line was a British grant-in-aid, whose army's entire cost was met from London, and whose Resident's salary was charged to the very estimates the deputies were being asked to approve. The one lever that could have made the Council real was attached to a mechanism that ran to a foreign treasury, and pulling it produced dissolution rather than negotiation.

The subsequent Council, elected in 1931, became the first to serve a full term.

The opposition that was answered by promotion

None of this was accepted quietly, and it is important to record that a genuine opposition existed, because the module's conclusion is not that Transjordanians were passive. On 25 July 1928, three weeks before the Organic Law's first elections were prepared for, a national congress assembled at Amman — notables, town leaders, and thinkers — declared itself a legitimate representative of the people, established an executive committee to lead a national movement, and issued a National Charter whose opening principle was that the Emirate of Trans-Jordan was an independent and sovereign Arab state administered by an independent government. It was the first national political document in the country's history. Between 1928 and 1933 the opposition coalition convened five such national conferences. Its demands were consistent and constitutional: reduce the Emir's powers, make the legislature genuinely representative. An eleven-point national pact formalised them into a call for constitutional monarchy. Several opposition figures and groups boycotted the first elections of February 1929 outright.

Here, then, was the raw material of plurality — an organised movement, a written programme, a repeated assembly, a boycott. What became of it is the module's finding, and the answer is neither suppression nor success. It was absorbed.

Look at who sat in the councils. Majed al-Adwan was returned in 1931, 1934, 1937, and 1942 — sitting in every Council of the mandate's second half, a member of the ʻAdwan, the

confederation whose paramount shaykh Sultan al-Adwan had ridden on Amman in 1923 under the slogan that Transjordan should be for the Transjordanians, and whose rising Peake's Legion and two RAF armoured cars had broken at a cost of some eighty-six dead. Eight years after the revolt, the family sat in the legislature; twenty years after it, they were still sitting. Refefan al-Majali and Hamad bin Jaz'i likewise appear in all four of those councils. Mithqal al-Fayez — the shaykh of shaykhs, the state's greatest landowner, the settlement's chief beneficiary from Module 2 — took a seat in the Council elected in 1934. And the traffic ran onward as well as inward: Sa'id al-Mufti sat as a deputy in 1931 and appears in governments thereafter; in 1941 two sitting members, Abdallah al-Kulayb and Shawkat Hameed, were appointed provincial governors and had to be replaced by by-elections.

That is the mechanism, and it is worth stating without ornament. The Legislative Council was not a check on the executive but a *conveyor belt into it*. A man of standing who might have spent his life as a critic could instead become a deputy; a deputy could become a minister; a member could be appointed a governor. Each step was a real advance in status and income, and each step attached him more firmly to the arrangement — the same logic Module 2 found in the land register and Module 8 found running through the whole hierarchy, here operating as a constitutional institution. The opposition of 1928 was not defeated. Its personnel were hired.

Reading plurality against the framework

Four contributions. The first is a distinction the corpus should carry explicitly: **a representative institution can be a foreclosure device rather than a plurality device**, and the test is not what powers it holds but where its members go afterwards. An assembly that generates an independent political class produces alternatives; an assembly whose members are recruited into the executive consumes them. Transjordan's Council did the second, systematically and visibly, and it did so while retaining every outward feature of parliamentary life — contested elections at regular intervals, real debates, genuine local standing. The framework's diagnostic should therefore be reformulated for such cases: ask not whether an opposition is permitted but whether an opposition career is *survivable as a career*. Where the only path upward for an able and ambitious man runs through the apex's gift, plurality is foreclosed regardless of how free the speech is.

The second is that **foreclosure by architecture is more durable than foreclosure by repression**. Nothing in the Transjordanian design required a secret police. The

government's seven votes in a twenty-three-seat chamber, the two-tier ballot, the literacy and property qualifications, the communal seat allocation, the executive's power to extend or dissolve — each of these is defensible in isolation as prudent administration in a poor and diverse country, and together they make a cross-cutting national alternative extremely difficult to assemble while making individual notable advancement easy. A police state generates martyrs, grievances, and an underground; an architecture generates only careers. The corpus should note that the second is the more advanced technology, and that its signature in the archive is exactly what Module 7 found — an absence of suppression records, which a careless reading mistakes for an absence of foreclosure.

The third connects three modules into one policy. Withheld formation (Module 4) produced an illiterate majority; an illiterate majority produced a public sphere too thin to sustain a press (Module 7); and literacy as a franchise qualification converted the same fact into formal exclusion from the vote (Module 9). The corpus should hold these as a single mechanism operating on a delay, and should note its self-concealing quality: at each stage the exclusion appears to follow from a natural condition rather than from a decision, and the decision that produced the condition lies twenty years back in an education estimate nobody debated.

The fourth is about where the *real* plurality in this order lay, which was not in the chamber. Module 8 found the hierarchy's one imperfect joint at the top, between the arrangement and the treasury funding it, and Module 7 found the apex running separate accounts with his sponsor and his subjects. The genuine alternative centres of coordination in mandate Transjordan were the tribal confederations, the Legion's Arab officer corps, the schoolteachers carrying Arabism, and the wider Arab public opinion to which Abdullah's Hashemite standing made him answerable — none of them constituted by the Organic Law, and all of them more consequential than the Council. A framework that looks for plurality only in formal institutions will misread orders of this kind, because a foreclosed constitution can sit above a society with several live centres of coordination, and it is those, not the assembly, that determine what happens when the arrangement is finally shaken.

Two disciplines close the module. The first is a genuine concession. Five councils met, elections were held on schedule even through a world war, and the deputies were real local figures rather than nominees; the experience of contested election, parliamentary procedure, and cabinet formation accumulated in a political class that would carry it into independence, and Jordan's post-mandate political life — for all its later restrictions — has been more open than most of its neighbours'. To call the Council decorative is accurate

about its powers and unfair about its consequences. The habit of parliamentary forms, practised for eighteen years before independence, is not nothing, and a study that dismissed it to keep the indictment clean would be doing the thing this collection exists to avoid.

The second is the refusal of the flattering conclusion. That the emirate did not imprison its opposition is a real difference from its neighbours and should be granted. But the reason it did not need to is the finding, not an exculpation: an order that has arranged its franchise, its chamber, and its career ladder so that dissent converts smoothly into office has no occasion to imprison anyone. The 1928 congress asked for a constitutional monarchy and got, instead, seats. Its members were not silenced; they were seated, and salaried, and eventually made governors — and the question they had raised, of whether the Emir's powers should be reduced and the legislature made genuinely representative, was never answered at all. It was simply outlived. The one time a Transjordanian parliament tried to insist, it reached for the budget annex, and was dissolved.

A note on sources. No text of the Organic Law of 16 April 1928 or of the electoral law of June 1928 is quoted verbatim in this module, because neither was verified against a clean public-domain reproduction of its text in the course of writing; both are described from the reference and scholarly literature, and a doubtful line is dropped rather than guessed. Verified particulars: the promulgation of the Organic Law on 16 April 1928; a unicameral Legislative Council of sixteen elected deputies sitting with the Prime Minister and six members of the Council of Ministers who held voting rights; three-year terms extendable to five, with the Council elected in October 1937 extended by two years to 1942 and five governments formed during its term; two-tier indirect election in which primary voters chose secondary electors; a franchise restricted to adult males who were literate, paid direct taxes, or held sufficient property, excluding women, the illiterate, and most nomadic Bedouin; district seats for Amman, Salt, Karak and Tafila alongside reserved seats for southern Bedouin, Circassians, and Christians; the Council's consultative character without binding authority over fiscal matters, foreign affairs, or executive appointments; elections in February 1929 with the first session convening 2 April 1929, and further elections in 1931, 1934, 1937, and 1942; the dissolution of the 1929 Council following its failure to pass the budget annex, with fresh elections on 10 June 1931 and that Council becoming the first to serve a full term; and the appointment of sitting members Abdallah al-Kulayb and Shawkat Hameed as governors in 1941, necessitating by-elections. Membership recurrences — Majed al-Adwan, Refefan al-Majali, and Hamad bin Jaz'i returned in 1931, 1934, 1937, and 1942, and Mithqal al-Fayez elected in 1934 — are drawn from the published membership lists of those councils. The opposition's activity is drawn from a Jordanian official account and the scholarly literature: the congress of 25 July 1928, its executive committee and National Charter, five national conferences between 1928 and 1933, an eleven-point national pact calling for constitutional monarchy, and the boycott of the February 1929 elections by several opposition figures and groups; the Charter's full Arabic text was not verified against a primary reproduction and is summarised rather than quoted. The 1923 Adwan rising and its casualties are as established in Module 1. Modern scholarship is paraphrased and credited, not quoted: Yoav Alon on tribal politics and co-optation; Philip Robins and Mary Wilson on the emirate's constitutional development; and the comparative literature on Jordanian electoral design. Where the record disagrees, the disagreement is given rather than resolved.

Part of the collection Patterns of Power. *Tested, never revealed.*

PATTERNS OF POWER · BRITISH TRANSJORDAN — MODULE 10

TERMINATED BY MUTUAL AGREEMENT

> *Module 10 · Change and Collapse — how the holding was repriced from ninety-two thousand pounds to twelve million while every reason for holding it expired; how the apex destroyed his own best protection; how the fuse laid in the officer corps burned down on schedule; and how an order that could not be seized was instead sold to a new buyer*

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

The rule, and what it forbids

The framework's account of change is severe and it forbids the story most people want to tell. Once a floor of force is established and a hierarchy has settled onto it, the common man does not make structural change. A peasant does not overthrow a functioning state apparatus; a labourer does not redraw a constitution; a crowd, however large and however justified, does not by itself replace one order with another. Change, when it comes, comes from within the hierarchy or from another hierarchy: elites split into factions, a rival elite intervenes or conquers, or the elite exhausts itself militarily or fiscally and can no longer pay for what it holds. Popular anger is a real force and it matters — but it matters as material that some faction of the elite uses, or as a cost that makes an elite reprice its holding. It is rarely the agent and almost never the author.

Transjordan tests that rule under an unusual condition, because here the order did not collapse at all. The Hashemite throne set up in 1921 is still occupied. What ended was not the arrangement but the *sponsorship* of it, and the module's work is to trace how a holding worth ninety-two thousand pounds a year in 1926 was repriced until its holder let it go, and how the thing being held survived the letting go by finding another buyer. Every hinge in that story is an elite decision. Not one of them was made by a Transjordanian peasant, a refugee, or a crowd.

The repricing

Module 5 established the buffer's original logic: about one per cent of what Iraq cost, in exchange for three specific functions. Transjordan walled the French in Syria from a Hashemite prince with a grievance; it walled the Wahhabi Ikhwan from the settled edge of Palestine; and it held the east bank as Arab land exempted from the Jewish national home, the reserve of Palestine. That was the whole case for the expenditure, and in the 1920s the expenditure was trivial.

By the middle of the 1950s the British subsidy to Jordan was running at something on the order of twelve million pounds a year. Set that beside the ninety-two thousand of the 1926 Vote and the scale of the change is plain — the holding had become more than a hundred times more expensive.

The causes were structural and they compounded. The Legion, which had cost about £186,000 at a strength of some 1,450 men in 1940, cost over £1,600,000 at nearly six thousand by 1945, stood at around twelve thousand by 1949 and around twenty-two thousand by 1956. An internal-security gendarmerie had become a standing army, because after 1948 Jordan had a long armistice line with Israel, a trebled population, and a strategic position that required real forces rather than desert patrols. Britain, meanwhile, had emerged from the war as the world's largest debtor, shedding India in 1947 and Palestine in 1948, and conducting a general retrenchment from imperial commitments it could no longer fund.

And here is the decisive point, which is easy to miss because it is a negative. *Every one of the three original reasons for holding Transjordan had expired.* French Syria ended in 1946, so there was no French flank to guard. The Saudi state consolidated and the Ikhwan ceased to be a raiding threat, so there was no Wahhabi tide to wall. And Palestine itself ceased to exist as a British mandate in May 1948, which voided at a stroke the third and most important function — a reserve of Palestine is meaningless when there is no Palestine to hold it in reserve for. By 1950 Britain was paying a hundred times more for a position whose entire original justification had lapsed, and the position's value had to be argued afresh in Cold War terms to a Treasury that had been trying to cut this line item since 1927.

That is a repricing in the framework's strict sense: not a change of heart, not a moral awakening, not a response to protest, but a cost-benefit ratio that inverted while nobody was looking at it. The framework predicts that colonial orders end when the metropole's will empties rather than when the ruled beat the floor, and Module 8 sharpened the prediction — that the will empties through the ordinary virtuous operation of officials doing their jobs.

That is exactly what happened. The most consequential actor in the ending of British Jordan was an accountant.

The apex trades away his own protection

Before the sponsor left, however, the client did something that transformed the order from within, and it is the clearest illustration in this study of change coming from the very top.

Module 8 identified two variables that made the Transjordanian throne durable where Iraq's was not: a substrate with no large welded fracture, and a state whose revenue could not be seized. In 1948 and 1950 Abdullah personally destroyed the first of them. The Legion crossed into Palestine in May 1948 and held the territory that became the West Bank; a conference of Palestinian notables at Jericho in December 1948 endorsed union with Jordan; elections including West Bank residents were held on 11 April 1950; and on 24 April 1950 the parliament formally annexed the territory, granting automatic Jordanian citizenship to its residents — approximately four hundred thousand people by one estimate, with Palestinian refugees coming to constitute more than a third of a kingdom whose population was now around a million and a half. The Jordanian parliament was reorganised with thirty seats for each bank, the two having roughly equal populations. Jordan's later Nationality Law of 1954 extended citizenship to those who had held Palestinian nationality before May 1948 and ordinarily resided in the kingdom.

Whatever else is said about the annexation — and it is among the most disputed acts in the region's modern history, recognised internationally only by Britain and Pakistan — its structural consequence for the order this study has been describing is unambiguous. Abdullah had ruled a small, poor, overwhelmingly Sunni Arab population with no rival apex and no large excluded community, and had built a state whose every co-optive mechanism, from the land register to the tribal courts to the Legion's recruitment, was designed for exactly that substrate. In two years he doubled the population and imported into it a large, politically mobilised, differently formed community with its own national grievance and its own claims — the precise variable whose absence Module 8 identified as the reason his throne was safer than his brother's. He did it from above, deliberately, in pursuit of a dynastic ambition that had brought him north in 1920 and never left him.

The bill arrived quickly, and it arrived in the form the framework expects: not a rising, but an elite plot. On 20 July 1951 Abdullah was shot dead at the entrance to the al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem by a Palestinian gunman, amid rumours that he was negotiating a

settlement with Israel. The subsequent trial found the assassination had been planned by Colonel Abdullah al-Tall, the former military governor of Jerusalem, and by Musa Abdullah al-Husseini. A colonel and a notable: the killing came out of the political and military elite, not from a crowd. His son Talal reigned briefly; his grandson Hussein took the throne in 1952 and came of age in 1953.

The fuse

Module 8 argued that the emirate's army was coup-proofed by a device with a fuse: the men best placed to seize the state — its professional commanders — were foreigners and therefore categorically ineligible to rule, but the same nationalism the order was otherwise managing would eventually make foreign command the regime's chief liability, and Arabisation would then manufacture eligible officers where none had existed. The fuse burned exactly as described, and the dates are close together.

On 1 March 1956 King Hussein dismissed Glubb Pasha, after twenty-six years in Transjordan and seventeen in command. The Jordanian government's own account to Washington, delivered by its ambassador five days later, was that the action *had been determined by King Hussein solely for internal administrative reasons and was taken only against General Glubb as a person*, that press reports had exaggerated the matter, and that Jordan intended to honour its treaty obligations to Britain in full. In London it was read very differently — Eden took it as a Nasserist stroke against British influence — and historians have generally read it as the first real assertion of Jordanian independence after decades of British control. The Legion was Arabised; Ali Abu Nuwar, a young nationalist officer, rose to command.

Thirteen months later the fuse reached its charge. On 13 April 1957 fighting broke out at the Zarqa barracks, the largest concentration of troops in the country, between units loyal to Abu Nuwar and units loyal to the King, with rumours circulating that the twenty-one-year-old Hussein had been killed; a Syrian force began moving south and turned back when the army's units declared for the throne. Abu Nuwar and other senior Arabist officers resigned and left for Syria, where they continued to agitate against the monarchy, and Hussein imposed martial law. What happened at Zarqa is genuinely disputed and this study does not resolve it: the royalist account holds that it was an abortive coup by Abu Nuwar, while dissident and much Arab-press opinion holds that it was a staged, American-backed counter-coup by Hussein against the pan-Arabist movement in Jordan. Both readings agree on the essential structural fact, which is that the crisis was a fight inside the officer corps.

One detail deserves to be underlined, because it is where this module rejoins Module 1. The Zarqa split ran between largely non-Bedouin units and Bedouin-dominated units, and the Bedouin units stood with the King. The bond Glubb had begun manufacturing in February 1931 with twenty men, four trucks, and a wage outlasted Glubb's own dismissal by a year and held the throne in the moment it was most exposed. The officers of Module 8 were replaceable; the formation of Module 4 was not.

The rival pole, and the sale of the position

The elite chaos had an external pole, and it was Cairo. Nasser's Egypt was, through these years, the rival elite centre bidding for the loyalty of the Arab street, the Arab officer corps, and the Arab governments, and Jordan was the most exposed of the monarchies. After Glubb's dismissal, American observers recorded that the political situation deteriorated steadily and the influence of pro-Egyptian, anti-British politicians grew; that elections on 21 October 1956 produced substantial gains for pro-Egyptian elements and a cabinet largely opposed to continued alliance with Britain, under Sulayman al-Nabulsi of the National Socialist Party; and that on 21 November 1956 the Jordanian parliament called for the abrogation of the Anglo-Jordanian treaty and for the acceptance of a subsidy from Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria.

That last clause is the hinge of the entire study and should be read slowly. The Jordanian parliament did not vote to end the subsidy. It voted to *change who paid it*. The dependence Module 6 identified — a state whose solvency was an external transfer — was so complete that even the nationalist assault on the British connection took the form of shopping for a different patron. And once the question had been reframed from *whether* to be subsidised to *by whom*, the outcome was a matter of who could pay most reliably.

Britain's exit was then transacted with remarkable lack of drama. A joint declaration was initialled at Amman on 13 February 1957 giving effect to the desire of both governments *to terminate the Anglo-Jordan Treaty in an agreed manner and, at the same time, to preserve peaceful and friendly relations between the two countries*, providing that the Treaty of Alliance of 15 March 1948 with its annex and supplementary papers would cease to have effect by an exchange of notes, and that Jordan would give Britain *all necessary facilities and assistance for the removal or disposal of all British stores, equipment and other property in Jordan.* The treaty was terminated by mutual agreement on 14 March 1957. Thirty-six years of sponsorship ended in a document about the removal of stores.

The Arab subsidy proved insufficient or unreliable, and the replacement came from elsewhere. Eisenhower had proclaimed his doctrine on 5 January 1957, offering American backing to Middle Eastern regimes threatened by international communism, and Hussein's public language had turned increasingly Cold War in register. When Nabulsi's government moved to recognise communist China and open full relations with Moscow, Hussein dismissed him on 3 April 1957 — ten days before Zarqa. The United States, which had been providing modest economic aid since 1951, extended emergency budgetary support of ten million dollars within twenty-four hours of the King's request that April, followed by phased commitments running to some tens of millions and by military assistance.

The order had not been overthrown. It had been re-sponsored.

Reading change against the framework

Four contributions, and the first is the one this whole case has been building toward.

A subsidised order collapses only if the subsidy cannot be re-sourced. Module 8 found that the throne was unseizable because its revenue was attached to a person rather than to territory — a cheque cannot be taken by whoever holds the palace, the way a wellhead can. Module 10 supplies the corollary: the same property makes the client *portable*. A ruler whose value to his sponsor is positional rather than productive is selling something that other buyers may also want, and when the first buyer's valuation falls he may look for a second. The Hashemite throne survived the emptying of Britain's will because the position it occupied was still worth paying for to somebody — first, briefly, to the Arab states, and then to the United States on Cold War terms. The corpus should carry this as a general finding about client regimes: their fragility and their durability come from the same fact, and the question that decides which one shows is simply whether the position remains valuable to *anyone* when it stops being valuable to the incumbent patron.

The dangerous interval is the gap between sponsors. If the unseizability of the throne rests on the subsidy being attached to its occupant, then the protection is suspended in exactly the months when nobody is paying. Britain's treaty terminated on 14 March 1957; the American emergency grant arrived in late April; and the Zarqa crisis fell on 13 April, in the middle of that gap. The corpus should note the pattern: in a re-sponsoring, the moment of maximum vulnerability is not the loss of the old patron nor the arrival of the new one but the interval between them, when the calculation that makes a coup unprofitable is temporarily unavailable. Whatever happened at Zarqa, it happened then.

An apex can trade away his own structural protections, and the framework should not treat the founding variables as fixed. Abdullah's annexation was a deliberate elite decision that destroyed the homogeneity Module 8 identified as one of two pillars of his dynasty's safety, substituting for it precisely the kind of large, mobilised, differently formed population that the Iraqi comparison had shown to be dangerous. He did it because his ambition had always been larger than his emirate, and Britain had leashed that ambition in the 1928 treaty for exactly this reason. Fourteen months after the annexation he was shot at the door of the al-Aqsa Mosque. The corpus should record that the variables protecting an order are themselves objects of elite choice, and that the apex's own ambition is among the commonest ways they are surrendered.

The fuse burns on schedule, and what survives it is the formation, not the command. Arabisation of the officer corps followed within a year of Glubb's dismissal, and the first crisis inside the newly eligible officer corps followed within thirteen months of that. But the throne held, and it held on the bond built in the desert in the 1930s: at Zarqa the Bedouin units stood with the King against units that did not. The framework should draw the distinction plainly — an imported command structure is a *device*, removable in an afternoon by a twenty-year-old king, whereas a formation running through families across three generations is a *structure*, and when the two are in tension the structure is what remains.

Two disciplines close the module. The first: nothing in this sequence was authored from below. The refugee in the camp, the peasant on his registered plot, the crowd in Amman — all of them were present, all of them had grievances that were real and in many cases just, and none of them made any of the decisions traced here. The annexation was a king's; the assassination a colonel's and a notable's; the dismissal a king's; the Zarqa crisis an officer corps'; the termination a treaty between two governments; the re-sponsorship a matter between a king and a president. Popular anger appears in this story as an *input* — the material Nasser's appeal worked on, the pressure that made Glubb's dismissal politically necessary, the cost that entered the Treasury's calculations — and never as an agent. The framework's rule holds without qualification in this case, and holds most strikingly in a decade when the streets of the Arab world had never been louder.

The second: the mildness of Britain's departure should not be read as grace. There was no Sétif here, no Amritsar, no war of independence, and the empire left by an exchange of notes with arrangements for the removal of its stores — which is a genuinely different ending from Algeria's or Kenya's, and the difference is worth stating. But the reason is the

one this study has been documenting since Module 5. Britain left quietly because Britain had never been heavily present, because the position had ceased to be worth what it now cost, and because a client had been built who could be handed on. An empire that departs without a fight has not necessarily behaved better. It may only have had less to lose, and a buyer already waiting.

A note on sources. Primary quotations are from public-domain government records. The terms of the Anglo-Jordanian termination are quoted from the text of the joint declaration initialled at Amman on 13 February 1957, as read into the House of Commons record on 18 February 1957 (Hansard), including the parties' stated desire to terminate the treaty "in an agreed manner" while preserving friendly relations, the provision for termination of the Treaty of Alliance of 15 March 1948 by exchange of notes, and the undertaking to provide facilities for the removal or disposal of British stores and property; the treaty was terminated by mutual agreement on 14 March 1957. The Jordanian government's explanation of Glubb's dismissal — that it was determined by King Hussein "solely for internal administrative reasons" and taken "only against General Glubb as a person" — is from the memorandum of a conversation between the Acting Secretary of State and the Jordanian Ambassador, Washington, 6 March 1956, printed in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957*, volume XIII. The American summary of the deterioration following Glubb's dismissal, the results of the elections of 21 October 1956, and the Jordanian parliament's call of 21 November 1956 for abrogation of the treaty and acceptance of a subsidy from Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria are from the same series, volume XII. Contested and varying figures are given as ranges or as reported: the British subsidy at around £12 million annually by the mid-1950s; Arab Legion strengths of about 1,450 in 1940, nearly 6,000 in 1945, roughly 12,000 by 1949, and roughly 22,000 by 1956; approximately 400,000 Palestinians granted citizenship at annexation, with refugees constituting more than a third of a population of roughly 1.5 million; and American emergency aid of $10 million in April 1957 with larger phased commitments thereafter. Dates given as established: the annexation of 24 April 1950 following elections of 11 April 1950 and the Jericho conference of December 1948; the assassination of Abdullah on 20 July 1951 at the al-Aqsa Mosque, with the trial attributing the plot to Colonel Abdullah al-Tall and Musa Abdullah al-Husseini; the dismissal of Glubb on 1 March 1956; the Eisenhower Doctrine of 5 January 1957; the dismissal of Nabulsi on 3 April 1957; and the Zarqa events of 13 April 1957. The two competing accounts of Zarqa — an abortive coup by Abu Nuwar, or a staged American-backed counter-coup by Hussein — are given as unresolved and are not adjudicated, as is the international status of the annexation, recognised formally only by the United Kingdom and Pakistan. Modern scholarship is paraphrased and credited, not quoted. Where the record disagrees, the disagreement is given rather than resolved.

Part of the collection Patterns of Power. *Tested, never revealed.*

PATTERNS OF POWER · BRITISH TRANSJORDAN — MODULE 11

THE RAID THAT DID NOT COME

> *Module 11 · The Grim Accounting — the ledger in lives and conditions: a founding whose dead can be counted in the low hundreds, a security that was real, a twelve-year drought met with seed loans and no capital, and a colony whose deepest harms were things that were never done*

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

What this module is for

Every study in this collection reaches a point where the structural analysis has to be set against what happened to people, and where the temptation runs in two directions at once. One temptation is to let the elegance of the mechanism soften the suffering — to have explained an order so well that it no longer seems to require judgement. The other is to reach for the register of atrocity because the subject is colonialism and atrocity is what the genre expects. Both are failures of accounting, and the discipline is the same in either direction: count what is there, in the numbers the record actually supports, and do not import from other cases what this one does not contain.

Transjordan makes that discipline unusually demanding, because the honest tally is small. There is no massacre here on the scale of Simele, no razzia, no detention camps, no famine, no forced labour, no settler dispossession, no penal colony. A reader arriving from the Algeria or the Kenya study will find the violence column nearly empty and may conclude that nothing much happened. Something much did happen, and the work of this module is to show where the weight of it actually sits — which is not in what was done to Transjordanians but overwhelmingly in what was never done for them, and in a bill that came due outside the frame.

The dead

The founding violence is small enough to be counted, and it should be, because a figure that can be stated exactly is worth more than an adjective. In 1921 the resistance of Shaykh Kulayb al-Shraydeh in the northern district of Kura was broken by Abdullah's forces with RAF support at a cost the record puts at fifteen or more dead, followed by a general pardon in May 1923. In 1923 the rising of Sultan al-Adwan, paramount shaykh of the ʻAdwan, was broken by Peake's Legion with two RAF armoured cars and allied tribesmen at a cost of around eighty-six dead, among them thirteen women, with al-Adwan fleeing to Syria. External fighting was bloodier but fell mostly on outsiders: the Ikhwan raiding forces broken near Amman in 1922 and 1924 lost heavily, the figures given inconsistently across the accounts and running into the hundreds or more, while the emirate's own defenders lost a fraction of that; the 1922 raid, on one account, massacred two small Bani Sakhr villages south of Amman before being cut up as it withdrew.

Assemble those and the dead attributable to the establishment of the Hashemite order east of the Jordan number in the low hundreds, of whom Transjordanians resisting the new state number around a hundred. Set beside the ten thousand or more Iraqis estimated killed in the suppression of the 1920 revolt next door, or beside what the same empire was doing in the same decades elsewhere, the difference is not marginal; it is a difference of two orders of magnitude, and it is the single most important fact in this column. It requires no apology and no qualification: the imposition of state authority east of the Jordan killed very few people by any comparative standard available.

Two things must be said immediately afterward, and neither cancels it. The first is that the men who died at Kura and in the Balqa were Transjordanians resisting the consolidation of a state over them, not foreign invaders — the eighty-six included thirteen women — and the smallness of the number is a fact about the country's thinness and the scale of the task, not evidence that consent was given. The second is that the founding was cheap in blood partly because the order that followed was so effective at making resistance pointless, and the modules on formation, plurality, and the default have described how. An order that kills few because it has arranged matters so that nobody can usefully fight it has not thereby become innocent. It has become efficient.

What was gained, and it was real

The credit column opens with something the framework's usual instruments are poorly equipped to measure, because it consists of events that stopped happening.

The raid was the organising fact of life in the steppe and its margins. The *ghazu* was an economy and a code as much as a form of violence, and it was also a system in which men were killed, herds taken, villages stripped, and cultivators on the desert edge lived under a permanent tax of fear. By Glubb's own dating the last raid into Transjordan came in 1932, and the desert was in substance quiet within a few years of the Desert Patrol's forming in February 1931. That is a genuine and large improvement in ordinary human security, and it was felt first by the weakest — the villager who could not defend his grain, the small herder without a powerful confederation behind him. The contemporary Arab historian Albert Hourani, writing in 1946, judged that the perennially acute problem of relations between Bedouin and settled folk had been solved by tact and by the creation of the Arab Legion. He was not a British apologist, and the judgement should be recorded.

The second real gain is the one Module 2 traced. The cadastral survey and land settlement, running from 1927 into every village, converted collective *musha'* tenure into registered individual title — and because the purpose east of the river was a stable buffer population rather than a settler frontier, the programme was directed toward securing the smallholder on his plot rather than clearing him off it. West of the Jordan, the same imperial technology of registration was running toward dispossession and producing the landless peasantry whose destitution fed the revolt of 1936. East of it, mass landlessness did not occur. That divergence is one of the sharpest natural experiments in this collection, and its result belongs unambiguously in the credit column.

Third, the state behaved decently in bad years. The 1930s brought drought, locusts, collapsing cereal prices, and the world depression; the administration remitted portions of the tithe, advanced short-term seed loans, and took measures against the moneylender. These were modest interventions by a poor government, but they were made, and a peasant who kept his land through the depression because his tax was remitted and his seed advanced is a real beneficiary of a real policy.

And fourth, people were not killed in large numbers by their government, at any point, throughout twenty-five years. In the company this study keeps, that deserves to be stated flatly rather than buried in qualifications.

The twelve-year drought and the capital that never came

The debit column's true weight begins here, and it begins with a phrase from the scholarship that summarises the mandate's material history better than any argument. Transjordan endured a protracted drought running from about 1924 to 1936 — the better part of the emirate's first fifteen years — and was, across the same period, *starved of funds for investment capital by the regime of financial austerity imposed by the Treasury*.

Put those two clauses together and the accounting of Module 5 acquires its human face. The cheapness that made the order gentle is the same cheapness that left the country undeveloped. Ninety-two thousand pounds a year buys an army, a prince, and a land department; it does not buy irrigation, wells, agricultural extension, storage, credit institutions, clinics, or roads at any scale that would change what happens to a family in the fourth year without rain. The emirate was not drained of a surplus — there was none. It was, instead, held at subsistence by a sponsor whose institutional virtue was spending as little as possible on it, through a decade of environmental catastrophe, and the drought was met with tithe remission and small seed loans because tithe remission and small seed loans were what the vote would run to.

The framework has a name for the general phenomenon and this case sharpens it. In the extractive colony, underdevelopment is a *by-product* of extraction: capital is pumped out and the place is left hollow. In the subsidised buffer, underdevelopment is a by-product of *parsimony*: nothing is pumped out, and nothing is put in, and the place stays exactly as poor as it was found. The second is less wicked and, over twenty-five years, not obviously less consequential for the people living through it. And it compounded with the other structural choices: Module 6 established that when a real independent revenue finally appeared — an American oil company willing to pay a transit tax for a pipeline — the protecting power was opposed and had so advised the Emir. A country kept at subsistence by austerity was also, at the moment of its independence, being steered away from the one income that might have ended the austerity.

The accounting by omission

The rest of the debit column consists almost entirely of things that were never built, granted, or permitted, and this is the module's structural finding: *in a cheap colony the harms are omissions rather than commissions, and an accounting method designed to count bodies will therefore report that almost nothing happened.*

A generation was left unformed. The country's only secondary school graduated four boys in 1925 and three in 1926; the mass of the population reached adulthood unable to read the treaty, the budget, or the newspaper. Module 4 showed the consequence and Module 7 showed it arriving on a delay as a public sphere too thin to sustain a press. Module 9 showed it arriving a second time as formal disenfranchisement, since literacy was a qualification for the vote — so that a policy taken in an education estimate in the 1920s excluded the same people from the franchise in the 1930s without anyone having to legislate an exclusion.

An entire mode of life was structurally disfavoured. The mandate's spatial reordering, as the scholarship puts it, favoured the sedentary communities over the nomadic tribes: the land settlement registered cultivated ground and could not easily register a grazing range; the tax system assessed harvests; the wage and the fort replaced the herd and the raid. The Bedouin who joined the Desert Patrol gained a wage, a rifle, a rank, and a pension, and the framework has credited that as formation and as a real improvement in his security and income. He also, in the same transaction, watched his people's independent capacity to make war — the oldest freedom they possessed and the axis on which their whole social order had turned — pass permanently into the monopoly of a state placed over them from outside. Both halves are true, and the second is not adequately described as nostalgia.

And the political omissions have been documented in their own modules: a chamber in which the executive held seven of twenty-three votes and which was dissolved the one time it refused supply; an opposition answered not by argument but by seats and governorships; a treaty whose Arabic text was subordinate to its English.

The bill that came due elsewhere

There is a final entry, and the honesty of the whole accounting depends on how it is handled. This study has argued that Transjordan's value to Britain was positional, and that one of the three positions it held was as the reserve of Palestine — the ground east of the river from which the Jewish national home provisions were withheld by Article 25 and the memorandum of September 1922. Module 3 recorded that Transjordanians therefore experienced the mandate's exclusions as partly protective, uniquely in this collection: the same instrument that denied them sovereignty shielded the east bank from the settler project convulsing the west.

The corollary is that the shield had another side. A buffer's function is to absorb or deflect a pressure, and pressure deflected is not pressure dissolved. The consequences of that arrangement fell, over the following decades, on people who were not Transjordanians and who appear nowhere in the emirate's ledgers — and then, after 1948 and the annexation of 1950, on people who had become Jordanian citizens by an act of the King's rather than by any choice of their own. Roughly four hundred thousand people received Jordanian citizenship at annexation; refugees came to constitute more than a third of a kingdom of some one and a half million. This study does not adjudicate the vast and bitter disputes attaching to those events, and Module 12's coda will set out what it can and cannot say. What belongs here, in the accounting, is only the structural point: *the ledger of a buffer state does not close within the buffer's own borders*, and any accounting that stops at the emirate's frontier will show a modest and defensible balance while omitting the largest entry.

Reading the accounting against the framework

Three contributions. The first is methodological and the corpus should carry it explicitly. **The grim accounting of a cheap colony must be conducted in omissions**, because its harms do not take the form of events. There is no massacre to date, no famine to name, no deportation to count; there is a school that was not built, a well that was not dug, a tax that was not collected because there was nothing to collect it on, a revenue that was declined on the client's behalf. The framework's instruments — casualty figures, extraction tonnages, displacement counts — are all designed to register commissions, and they will report a null result here. That null result is not an absence of harm. It is a limitation of the instrument, and a corpus that does not correct for it will systematically rate the parsimonious colonies as the benign ones.

The second is that **cheapness explains both columns simultaneously**. Module 5 found that the devices making Transjordan cheap — a native army, a co-opted shaykh, a licensed customary court, an unbuilt school — were the same devices that made it sit lightly on the governed. This module completes the thought: they are also the devices that left it undeveloped through a twelve-year drought. Gentleness and stagnation had one cause. The order did not kill its subjects and did not develop them, and both facts issue from the same line in the same estimate. This is the deep reason the case resists both the celebratory and the accusatory reading, and the framework should hold it as a general property of positional colonies rather than as a peculiarity of this one.

The third is that **a positional colony exports its costs**. The extractive colony concentrates harm on the governed and benefit at the metropole, and the ledger, however ugly, at least balances within the frame. A buffer is by definition an instrument for managing a pressure that originates elsewhere and would otherwise land elsewhere, and its accounting therefore has entries that fall outside its own population entirely — on the neighbours, on the deflected, on the people whose claims the buffer was constituted to exclude. The corpus should note that this makes the buffer the hardest colonial type to judge, because the parties who bore its costs and the parties who received its benefits are not the same population, and no single national accounting can contain both.

Two disciplines close the module. The first: the smallness of the violence column is not a technicality to be hurried past on the way to the indictment, and a study that treated it that way would be dishonest. Fewer than a hundred Transjordanians appear to have died resisting the establishment of this state. No Transjordanian starved in a famine caused by policy. No Transjordanian community was cleared to make room for settlers. Measured against Algeria, Kenya, Iraq, the Congo, or Palestine across the river, the human cost of British Transjordan was very low, and the security gains — the end of raiding, the smallholder secured on registered land — were substantial and were felt by the poorest first. That is the truth, it is unusual, and it should be stated without hedging.

The second: none of it was a gift, and the reasons it turned out this way have been traced through eleven modules and are not moral reasons. The order was gentle because it was cheap; it was cheap because there was nothing worth spending on; it developed nothing for the same reason; it withheld formation because forming people costs money and creates claims; and it was permitted to remain quiet because its metropole had no interest in looking at it. The men who ran it were, many of them, decent by their own lights and some of them by anyone's. But the outcome was not produced by their decency, and the counterfactual that matters is not *what if Britain had been crueller* — it is *what if the twelve million pounds a year that Britain eventually found for the Legion in the 1950s had been available for wells and schools in the 1920s*. It was not available, because nobody was going to spend that on a buffer. The raid that did not come is a real entry in the credit column. So is the school that did not open, on the other side.

A note on sources. Casualty and event figures are given as the record supports them and as ranges where it disagrees: fifteen or more dead in the breaking of the Kura resistance in 1921, with a general pardon in May 1923; approximately eighty-six dead including thirteen women in the suppression of the ʻAdwan rising of 1923; Ikhwan raiding forces of roughly 1,500 in 1922 and variously 3,000 to 4,500 in 1924, with their losses reported high and inconsistently across accounts and the emirate's own losses a small fraction; and the massacre of two Bani Sakhr villages reported in one account of the 1922 raid and not in others. The comparative figure of roughly 10,000 or more Iraqi dead in the suppression of the 1920 revolt is as given in the literature and varies between sources. Glubb's dating of the last raid to 1932 is his own and is presented as such. The judgement that relations between Bedouin and settled communities were resolved through tact and the creation of the Arab Legion is Albert Hourani's, published in 1946, and is paraphrased rather than quoted. The characterisation of a protracted drought between about 1924 and 1936 and of the emirate being starved of investment capital by Treasury austerity, and the finding that the mandate's spatial reordering favoured sedentary over nomadic communities, are paraphrased from Vartan Amadouny's study of the mandate-period economy. Tithe remission, seed loans, and measures against imprisonment for debt are drawn from the mandatory's reports to the League of Nations for the period and from the scholarly literature; the specific measures described in the 1930 report concern the western territory, and no claim is made that identical measures applied east of the river, where parallel relief is attested in general terms. Population figures are given as ranges: roughly 200,000–230,000 at the emirate's founding, with some accounts putting the figure as high as 400,000 by the mid-1940s, and roughly 400,000 Palestinians granted citizenship at the 1950 annexation with refugees constituting more than a third of a population of some 1.5 million. Land settlement particulars are as established in Module 2, drawing on Michael Fischbach. Educational particulars are as established in Module 4. No primary text is newly quoted in this module. Where the record disagrees, the disagreement is given rather than resolved.

Part of the collection Patterns of Power. *Tested, never revealed.*

PATTERNS OF POWER · BRITISH TRANSJORDAN — MODULE 12

A HUNDRED YEARS OF THE PROVISIONAL

> *Module 12 · Convergence and Divergence — what this case confirms, what it breaks, and the machine completing one full turn: an arrangement improvised as a temporary expedient in 1921 that has become, for the people living inside it, simply how the world is — and the strongest defence of a colonial order this collection has had to answer*

A case study in the Patterns of Power series · Thomas J. Bryan with Claude (Anthropic) · held as tested, not revealed

What the last module is for

A framework built from patterns rather than laws earns its keep by being told where it fails. The convergence module therefore does two things: it records what this case confirms — the places where an order assembled in a particular desert by particular men behaved as the collection's other orders behaved, which is evidence that the patterns are patterns — and it records where the case broke the expectations, which is where the framework changes. And then, because this is the last module, it has to face the thing the whole study has been walking toward: that British Transjordan is the strongest case for the defence that this collection has yet encountered, and that the defence has to be stated at its full power and answered without evasion.

What converged

The floor came first and it was real. Before any story was told about the arrangement, organised violence established who could not be resisted — at Kura in 1921, in the Balqa in 1923, against the Ikhwan at Marka in 1924 — and every subsequent institution rested on that settled fact. The order's founding was not a contract; it was a monopoly established by force and afterwards described in other language.

The robe was cut for the metropole. The language of Article 22 — a sacred trust of civilisation, peoples not yet able to stand by themselves, tutelage by advanced nations — was

addressed to Geneva and Westminster and meant nothing to a shaykh of the Bani Sakhr. The order's legitimating story was written for the people paying, exactly as the colonial bend predicts.

Formation was withheld from the majority, and the withholding was expensive in the way the framework says. Four secondary graduates in 1925, three in 1926; a public sphere too thin to sustain a newspaper; a franchise limited by literacy. The old order — Islam, the *sharīʿa* court, tribal *ʿurf* — simply held the field, as it does whenever a conqueror declines to form the people he has taken.

The default held through aligned self-interest rather than loyalty. Every link from Resident to shaykh to trooper was fastened by an interest that pointed the same way, and the arrangement persisted because defection cost more than compliance, not because anyone approved of it. Mithqal al-Fayez took Zionist money and backed the Palestinian revolt while remaining the Hashemite state's greatest landowner; the default never required agreement.

And change came from above, without a single exception. The annexation was a king's decision; the assassination a colonel's and a notable's plot; Glubb's dismissal a king's; the Zarqa crisis a fight inside the officer corps; the ending of the sponsorship a treaty between two governments. Popular anger was everywhere in the story and authored none of it.

What diverged, and what each divergence gave the framework

Seven breaks, each of which changed something.

The ledger ran backward. No surplus was extracted; a subsidy was paid in. The corpus gains the *positional colony* — held for where it sits rather than what it yields, its accounts permanently negative, its returns arriving not as income but as a contingent payout at a moment of crisis. The insurance frame is the right one, and it explains why such colonies are perpetually threatened by the economy drive and perpetually undervalued by the accounting that judges them. Britain in 1927 saw ninety-two thousand pounds and promised to cut it; Britain in 1941 collected, when Glubb's men rode in the column that relieved Habbaniya.

Cheapness and consent were the same policy. In an extractive colony coercion and expense trade against each other. In the buffer they aligned: recruiting the base instead of policing it, buying a shaykh with a title deed instead of a stipend, licensing the old law instead of imposing a new one, not building schools. Every device that made the order cheap also made it sit lightly. This is the single most important structural finding of the study and

it forces the uncomfortable corollary that the gentleness was not chosen for the governed's sake.

Importation and illegitimacy are separate variables. The framework had treated an imported apex as legitimacy-less. Abdullah carried a portable robe Britain neither wrote nor owned — Sharifian descent from the Prophet, service in the Arab Revolt — fully legible to a Sunni Arab population in its own categories. An imported chair can root where a forged chieftaincy cannot, and what decides it is whether the story the newcomer carries is cloth the governed already recognise.

A floor can recruit its own base. Peake's Legion was a leash; Glubb's Desert Patrol, from February 1931, was a bond, enlisting the raiders it had been built to suppress. That is neither the surveillance of an unbelieved order nor the withdrawn force of a believed one, but a third thing — belief manufactured out of engineered self-interest, a wage that hardens into loyalty across twenty years and two generations. It held at Zarqa in 1957 after its architect had been dismissed.

Formation can be licensed rather than withheld or replaced. The Law of Tribal Courts left shaykhs judging by their own customary rules in their own tents and inserted the state at two points: the King's approval of judges, and a state committee's oversight. Nothing visible changes and the location of sovereignty moves. The framework gains a third option beside forming and withholding, and it is cheaper than either.

The seam can be held open by indifference rather than concealment. Nothing about Transjordan was hidden from Britain; almost nobody in Britain was interested. A censored fact can be smuggled out; an uninteresting one is safe forever. And the imported apex ran a *second* asymmetry, against his sponsor as well as his subjects, which is a structural position the framework had not carried — the intermediary who holds two stories is more useful to both parties than one who holds only theirs, and is destroyed when the two audiences meet.

Rents are seizable; subsidies are not. This is the study's central mechanism and the answer to its founding question. Oil is attached to the ground and transfers to whoever takes the wellhead, so Iraq's throne was worth a coup and got one in 1958. A subsidy is attached to a person the payer chooses, so seizing Amman meant inheriting a bankruptcy. The resource that looks like a state's greatest asset is, for regime durability, a liability; the cheque that looks like humiliating dependence is armour. And the corollary from Module 10: the same property makes the client *portable*, so when Britain's will emptied the throne was not overthrown but re-sponsored — the parliament of November 1956 voting not to end the

subsidy but to change who paid it. The order's fragility and its durability came from one fact.

The coda: the bill outside the ledger

The buffer's third function — the reserve of Palestine, the ground from which the national home provisions were withheld by Article 25 — has a consequence that no accounting bounded by Transjordan's frontiers can contain, and the study owes the reader a plain statement of what it can and cannot say about it.

What it can say is structural. A buffer deflects pressure rather than dissolving it. After the mandate ended, Abdullah's Legion held the territory that became the West Bank; a conference of Palestinian notables at Jericho in December 1948 endorsed union; and on 24 April 1950 the parliament annexed it, granting citizenship to roughly four hundred thousand people, with refugees coming to constitute more than a third of a kingdom of about a million and a half. Fourteen months later Abdullah was shot at the door of the al-Aqsa Mosque, the plot attributed at trial to a colonel and a notable. Jordan lost the West Bank in 1967. In September 1970, after the Dawson's Field hijackings and two assassination attempts on the King, the Jordanian army moved against the Palestinian fedayeen organisations that had come to operate as a state within the state; Syrian armoured forces crossed the border on 18 September in support of the PLO and withdrew; a ceasefire was mediated on 25 September and the PLO was expelled to Lebanon by mid-1971. The casualty estimates for that conflict diverge very widely — from figures of roughly three and a half thousand in some compilations to five or ten thousand for the fighting in Amman alone and higher claims elsewhere — and the disagreement is itself part of the record and is not resolved here.

What the study cannot say is who was right in any of it. The questions attached to these events — the legitimacy of the annexation, recognised formally only by Britain and Pakistan; the character of Abdullah's contacts with the Jewish Agency and later with Israel; the rights and claims of Palestinians in Jordan; the justice of 1970 — are among the most bitterly contested in modern history, and this collection has no standing to settle them and would damage itself by pretending otherwise. The single structural point that belongs to a study of British Transjordan is this: *the ledger of a buffer state does not close within the buffer's borders*. An accounting that stops at the emirate's frontier will show a modest and defensible balance and will have omitted its largest entry.

The counter-position, at full strength

Now the defence, stated as its best advocates would state it, without softening.

Judge by outcomes. Britain found east of the Jordan a raided, illiterate, ungoverned periphery of a collapsed empire — no state, no capital worth the name, no institutions, a quarter of a million people at subsistence under the permanent tax of the *ghazu*. It spent twenty-five years there and remarkably little money. It killed fewer than a hundred people imposing order, which is not a rounding error in colonial history but a category difference. It ended the raiding. It secured cultivators on registered title and prevented the mass landlessness that tore Palestine apart across the river. It built an army that became the finest in the Arab world and bound the desert tribes to a throne by wage and rank rather than by terror. It left a functioning state with a constitution, a parliament with eighteen years of practice, a trained civil service, and a monarchy that has now stood for a century — through the loss of the West Bank, a civil war, assassinations, four Arab–Israeli wars, the Iraq wars, the Arab Spring, and the disintegration of Syria. Jordan today absorbs refugees at a rate few states on earth match, and it has not fallen.

And then the comparison. Iraq was the sister case: same room, same month, same men, same family, incomparably richer. Iraq's king was machine-gunned in a courtyard in 1958 and the country has known coup, dictatorship, war, invasion, and insurgency ever since. Syria is a ruin. Look at the map, the advocate says, and observe that the only thing those men built which still stands is the poorest thing they built. That is not luck. It is competence — an understanding of tribe, of subsidy, of army, of monarchy — and the people who benefit from it most are Jordanians, who by and large do not wish it undone.

The answer

The concessions first, and they are not tactical. The durability is real. The relative humanity is real and the figures support it. The security gain was real and fell first on the weakest. The land settlement genuinely protected the smallholder where the identical technology dispossessed him ninety miles west. Glubb's bond was real, and it held the throne in 1957 after Glubb himself had been dismissed. And the attachment of Jordanians to their monarchy is real — it is theirs, arrived at over three generations, and it is not a false consciousness for a foreign analyst to explain away. Nor were the builders cynics. Peake, Glubb, the residents, the men who drafted the trusteeship language: most of them believed what they said, and their belief is precisely what made it work.

Now the refusals, and there are four.

The syllogism does not hold. *It survived, therefore it was justified* is the exact inference this framework exists to block. Eleven modules have explained why it survived, and not one of the reasons is a moral reason. It survived because it was too poor to be worth seizing; because its revenue was a cheque attached to a man rather than a rent attached to the ground; because its officer corps was categorically ineligible to rule; because its substrate carried no large fracture until the King imported one; because its opposition was answered with seats and governorships rather than with argument. Durability is a fact about incentive structure. Reading it as vindication is the same error as reading Rome's endurance as proof of Rome's virtue — and this collection has spent its whole existence refusing that move.

The comparison is rigged. Setting Jordan against Iraq and Syria compares one conquest's outcome to other conquests' outcomes; it does not compare conquest to self-rule. The counterfactual that matters is what Transjordanians would have built, and it was foreclosed — in 1921, without a referendum or any local mandate; in 1928, when a national congress at Amman produced a written programme for a constitutional monarchy with reduced emiral powers; in 1931, when the one Council that reached for the one power that mattered was dissolved for it. There *was* a Transjordanian alternative, authored by Transjordanians, stated in a charter. It was never refuted. It was outlived.

Credit cannot be claimed for parsimony. Every entry in the credit column issues from the same source as every entry in the debit column: nobody would spend money on this place. The gentleness and the twelve-year drought met with seed loans and no capital are one policy seen from two sides. Britain did not decline to build a settler colony east of the Jordan out of respect for its inhabitants; it declined because the ground was worth nothing and was needed for something else. The absence of atrocity here is a fact about the endowment, not about the conqueror's character — and the proof is that the same empire, in the same decade, with the same civil servants, behaved very differently in places that were worth taking. An empire that is mild where there is nothing to gain has demonstrated the price of its mildness, not its possession of the virtue.

And the bill was partly paid by people outside the account. A buffer's function is deflection, and what was deflected landed elsewhere — and then, by an act of the King's rather than any choice of theirs, on people brought inside the state. The survival being celebrated has entries among its costs that appear in no Jordanian national ledger.

The turn

One thing remains, and it is the refusal of cynicism, which matters as much as the refusals above.

The study opened by insisting that the order Britain met east of the Jordan was itself a naturalised former conquest — that the Islamic world of 1921, with its Qur'anic school and *sharīʿa* court and calendar and pilgrimage road, was the residue of the seventh-century Arab-Muslim expansion that broke Byzantium at the Yarmuk in 636, worn smooth across thirteen centuries until it was not an ideology at all but simply the way the world was. That naming was not a debunking. A built thing that became real is more genuine and more durable than a lie, and the people formed by it were not dupes; they were people, living inside the only world there was.

Close the loop. A prince arrived at Maʿan in November 1920 with a few hundred men, wanting Damascus. He was given, as a consolation and an expedient, a strip of desert nobody else wanted, on terms everyone involved understood to be temporary. The arrangement was funded by a treasury that spent the next thirty years trying to reduce the line item, governed under a treaty whose Arabic text yielded to its English, defended by an army whose commander told an American diplomat that the King was not the only one with a say in it.

A Jordanian born today inherits a Hashemite monarchy that is simply how the world is: the flag, the anthem, the army, the descent from the Prophet, the century of it. That is not a fiction they have been tricked into. It is a thing that was built and then became real — by exactly the process that had made the order of 1921 real for the people the emirate was laid over, and by exactly the process this collection has traced in Rome, in Venice, in Tokugawa Japan, and everywhere else the machine has been watched running. The provisional became the permanent, and then it became the furniture.

That is the whole finding, and it cuts in both directions at once, which is why it is the last thing the study says. The origin was an improvisation by tired men in a Cairo hotel who were mostly trying to save money. The result is a country, and the people in it are not wrong to feel it is theirs. Both of those are true, and the arithmetic that connects them has been laid out across twelve modules so that the sum can be the reader's own.

A note on sources. This module quotes no new primary text; all quotations and figures on which it relies were established, quoted, and sourced in the modules to which it refers — Article 22 of the Covenant and Article 25 of the Palestine Mandate with the memorandum of 16 September 1922 (Module 3); the Agreement of 20 February 1928 (Modules 2, 3, 5, 8); the Commons answer of 23 March 1927 (Module 5); the FRUS despatches of 1946, 1947 and 1949 (Modules 6, 7, 8); the FRUS records and Hansard text concerning Glubb's dismissal and the treaty termination of 1957 (Module 10); and the casualty and land-settlement particulars of Modules 1, 2 and 11. Coda particulars are given as verified with disagreements flagged: the Jericho conference of December 1948, the annexation of 24 April 1950 with citizenship for approximately 400,000 people and refugees constituting more than a third of a population of roughly 1.5 million, recognised formally only by the United Kingdom and Pakistan; the assassination of Abdullah on 20 July 1951 with the plot attributed at trial to Colonel Abdullah al-Tall and Musa Abdullah al-Husseini; the loss of the West Bank in 1967; the Dawson's Field hijackings of September 1970, the Jordanian army's move of 17 September, the Syrian armoured intervention of 18 September and its withdrawal, the ceasefire of 25 September, and the PLO's departure to Lebanon by mid-1971. Casualty estimates for the events of September 1970 vary very widely across sources — from roughly 3,400–3,500 in some compilations to figures of 5,000–10,000 for the fighting in Amman alone and higher claims elsewhere — and are given here as a disputed range rather than resolved; readers should treat any single figure for that conflict with caution. The study takes no position on the legitimacy of the annexation, on the character of Hashemite contacts with the Jewish Agency and with Israel, or on the justice of the events of 1970, and records the historiographical disputes on each as unresolved. Modern scholarship throughout the study is paraphrased and credited, not quoted; the principal debts are to Mary Wilson, Yoav Alon, Michael Fischbach, Philip Robins, Eugene Rogan, Tariq Tell, Vartan Amadouny, and Matthew Hughes, whose readings frequently differ from one another and, in places, from the structural reading advanced here.

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